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ABSTRACT 
Israeli Policy towards Occupied Territories under 
Likud Rule 1977 - 1988 
The Likud's victory in the 1977 elections which made Begin the first non-
Labour prime minister of Israel, marked a turning point in Israeli history. The heirs of 
Revisionist Zionism and its proponents were given their first opportunity to turn their 
ideology into operative policy. This came about after more than fifty years in the 
opposition (since 1925) where their direct influence on Zionist policy was marginal or 
nil. This dramatic change in the political status of the Zionist "right" made a new era 
for a fundamental and major historical case within the context of the history of 
Zionism and the state of Israel. One could see this as the Likud's historical purpose 
which was no longer based so much on the Jabotinskyite creed as it was on the 
venting frustration and rage against its opposite party. 
The Likud had a clear, firm nationalist ideology. It was therefore quite 
reasonable to assume that this ideology would provide the direction for its policies or 
that Likud would at least make a concerted effort to provide historical justification for 
its basic outlook. Many of the acts of the Likud governments from the election of 
1977 up to 1992 the last year of Shamir's government, have been rightly judged in the 
light of their relevance to Likud's ideology and principles. 
The first Likud government seemed called upon to actuate the world view of 
the Revisionist movement and to carry out its ideology according to a declared 
political policy. That is, it appeared obligated to immediately apply Israeli sovereignty 
to the Occupied Territories. Indeed under different circumstances, it later did this in 
Golan Height and East Jerusalem. In fact in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria as 
they always called) a much more central position in Revisionist ideology than the 
Golan Heights, the logical natural move from the point of view of Herut and its 
associates was not made. 
It was said that "the right of the Jewish people to Eretz Israel is an eternal in 
inalienable right" but there was no positive statement about applying Israeli 
sovereignty. The phrasing was of a distinctly negative nature. 
1. Judea and Samaria (The West Bank) will not be handed over to any foreign 
rule. 
2. Between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River there will be only Israeli 
sovereignty. 
Thus, from an ideological point of view, there was a definite "softening" for 
tactical purposes, and the tactics turned into policy. 
The first Begin government (1977-79), implemented what was imiversally but (in 
hindsight) mistakenly perceived as Begin's peace policy. 
Dayan who was once a stalwart and bastion of the Labour Alignment but had been 
relegated to political wdldemess following the October war, agreed to join the Likud 
led coalition as Foreign Minister on condition that no sovereignty would be imposed 
over the Occupied Territories while peace negotiation were in progress. 
To be sure, Begin was not in a comfortable position when he accepted Dayan's 
condition. His world view and ideology were clear; his style was often close to that of 
the messianic trend. But he also brought wdth him a Jabotinskyan political heritage 
and unequivocally refiised to define his movement as a messianic one. 
After the arrival of Sadat to Jerusalem, Begin came to Egypt with two projects the 
first was on withdrawal from Sinai and the second was on autonomy for the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. 
In fact, from Begin's point of view any agreement over "administrative 
autonomy" (not only cultural autonomy) for Arabs of the West Bank was merely a 
document of tactical nature. Even it included elements from the liberal formulations 
of Jabotinsky (which had also been of tactical nature at the time) Begin's basic 
intention in his formula of autonomy was to extricate himself temporarily from the 
bonds of ideology so that he could implement his political approach. 
Although Sadat disagreed with Begin on several crucial issues related to the 
Occupied Territories, his readiness to risk everything for peace and Begin's 
willingness to trade the Sinai for the West Bank, along with growing US pressure on 
Israel for peace led to the signing of the Camp David Accord. There was two parts to 
the Camp David Accord. The first called for the implementation of an autonomy plan 
for the West Bank and Gaza Strip to be followed after five years by a permanent 
settlement status. The second was a framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty 
between Israel and Egypt, which was to be the base for the complete withdrawal of 
Israel from Sinai. 
The Accord however, did not mention the PLO all through its text. The 
Framework did not address itself to two other important segments of the Palestinians 
problem, the status of Jerusalem and the Refugee question, since the Palestinians did 
not include only the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In fact there was no 
structural linkage between the two agreements concluded at Camp David. Egypt and 
Israel could conclude their peace agreement whether or not there was any progress in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moreover, following Camp David Begin maintained 
that he had achieved his main goal: the continuation of Israel's control over the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip and the prevention of a Palestinian state in these territories. 
Begin pointed out that Israel's status in the area was for the first time, internationally 
recognized. He presented Palestinian autonomy (under Israeli's rule) as an alternative 
to Palestinian independence, and although he admitted that Israel gave up the right to 
unilateral annexation, he pointed out that in practical terms its position on the West 
Bank had not eroded. 
Begin's second phase started in 1980 and ended in 1983 when Begin resigned 
from the premiership. With the departure of Dayan and Weizmann there was no 
longer any serious opposition to Begin. With a new political elite emerging around 
him Sharon, Rafael, Arens and Shamir, constituted the most hawkish government in 
Israel's history. In addition the support of National Religious Party (NRP) radicals 
and sustained by the Eretz Yisrael true believers in the Renaissance Party the position 
of the government was to the far right. The Israeli policy towards Arabs and 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories became increasing dogmatic, aggressive and 
single mined. 
The second Likud government carried out the most hawkish policy towards its 
neighbor. Israel bombed the Tamuz 11 Iraqi reactor and in July 1981. A year later 
Israel invaded Lebanon. 
Begin himself controlled the entire decision making process. He was not only the 
ideologue of the invasion but also its executioner. 
During Begin era the process of building settlements in the West Bank including 
East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip reached unprecedented level. The government did 
everything possible to erase "the green line" and place Jewish settlements where they 
would obstruct any future attempts to divide the West Bank into separate Jewish and 
Arab enclaves. A ^^-'^' 
Likud's Sharon plan pursued the objective of building a third beh of settlement on 
the Western highland extending from Jenin to the north and Bethlehem to the south 
effectively bisecting the high land of the West Bank. In fact Sharon plan intended to 
divide the populated West Bank into two small areas. The containment of the 
Palestinians would be facilitated by enclosing them from all sides by belts of colonies 
which would eliminate physically any chances of a return to the 1967 borders. It also 
moved Israeli border to the doorstep of the Palestinian populated areas with the 
intention of preventing their physical development to the west. 
The World Zionist Organization and Likud government produced the Droble plan 
which added another bloc of settlement surround the northern town of Jenin and 
around the town of Jericho to prevent even a small corridor connecting Palestinians 
with East Jordan. 
During the last few year of Begin's rule, the Likud pursued economic rather than 
purely ideological policies in an effort to prevent a territorial compromise in the West 
Bank. Likud attempted to use the centrifugal pulls in both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem 
metropolitan area as a vehicle for channeling Israeli population into the West Bank. 
The Likud settlement strategist believed that by using the natural demand for land in 
central Israel, they would be quickly able to form a critical mass of population, a 
sufficiently large number of people to prevent any effective internal or international 
pressure for withdrawal. Previously, only the ideologically motivated volunteered for 
the settlements but gradually ordinary families moved to the West Bank because 
housing was cheaper and the settlements were near enough to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv 
to serve as commuter suburbs. 
Likud under Begin also used tactics for land grabbing like declaring it to be 
abandoned. They believed that the Palestinian did not have strong ties to their land. 
Many of them had abandoned or were willing to abandon their property if offered 
property elsewhere in the Arab world. Likud also changed the style of land 
purchasing. For many years the purchasing of land was carried out by the government 
under Labour party for national goals supported by a solid public consensus. Likud 
party lifted the ban on private land purchasing by Jews on the West Bank. By the free 
private purchasing a rush of land speculation began and land values went up, so some 
Arab could not resist the temptation to sell. Due to the new land policy during Begin 
era Israel came to control about 42 percent of the land on the West Bank and 31 
percent in the Gaza Strip. 
Following the sudden and dramatic resignation of Menachem Begin, Yitzhak 
Shamir became Prime Minister in October 1983. The new government was more 
hard-line than the former government. Shamir used to be a member of Betar, and 
joined Irgun Zvai Leumi in Palestine. But later on he broke with the Irgun and formed 
a new group which became know as the Stem Gang or Lehi. After the establishment 
of Israeli State Shamir joined the Mossad and held a senor position in the Agency. In 
1970, he joined the Herut party and was elected to its executive committee. He served 
in the eight Knesset and continued to serve until the thirteen Knesset. Shamir was 
chosen to replace Begin as a Prime Minister, because he was seen as having emerged 
from the same ideological milieu as Begin. However he did not espouse Jabotinsky's 
liberalism. He was known instead for his caution and his secrecy, a political shadow 
boxer whose skills were developed in Lehi and in the Mossad. Ironically, he was 
proclaimed party leader beneath the portrait of Jabotinsky whom he had disowned 
nearly half a centiuy before. 
Under Shamir the Israeli government pursued policies aimed at undermining the 
material and national existence of the Palestinians in their own land. Under the guise 
of maintaining its own security Israeli government confiscated Arab land and 
launched an aggressive settlement policy which left the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
fragmented both geographically and demographically. Shamir's "iron fist" policies 
resulted in loss of life, imprisonment, detention, house or town arrest, house 
demolition, deportation, fines interrogation, travel restriction, curfews, closured of 
educational institutions, unjust taxes, economic hardship and the like. 
The harsh Israeli occupation policies entered a collision course with the 
heightened state of national and political awareness among the Palestinians. Deep 
anger and frustration among the Palestinians finally led to an uprising popularly 
known as Intifada. 
The Intifada started in Gaza Strip and soon spread to the West Bank. The Intifada 
had probably begun more as a spontaneous expression of accumulated frustration of 
twenty years of occupation, degrading living conditions, overcrowding and declining 
opportunities in education and employment than as politically co-coordinated 
demonstration against Israeli occupation. However it was soon being exploited and 
orchestrated by an underground leadership, the United National Leadership of the 
Uprising (UNLU) comprising elements from the PLO, the Communist Party and 
Islamic Jihad. Finally Hamas was formed by Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and his company 
to support the Intifada. 
The emergence of Hamas added a new dimension to Palestinian politics. The new 
organization was not willing to subsume itself within the framework of the PLO. 
Obviously during the first period of Intifada, Hamas activity was characterized by 
reaction to the immediate situation rather than the initiation of anti-occupation 
policies and attempts at a national leadership role. Indeed, Hamas's primary aim was 
to establish an Islamic state in the Occupied Territories whose liberation was to be 
achieved by holy war. 
Likud government had relied on a combination of political, economic and military 
measures to quell the Intifada. It sought to identify the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
leaders who might be willing to ignore the PLO and negotiate with Israel. The spread 
of Intifada exposed the Israeli armed civilian population. The Likud policies also 
graduated downward to include economic sabotage of a direct or indirect nature such 
as crop burning and uprooting of trees, prolonged siege of villages, the explicit 
prohibition of harvesting and marketing. Many of Palestinians saw their business 
sealed and their property confiscated. Even street vendors and vegetable market 
operators suffered the loss of their products as soldiers often dumped market stalls 
and crushed their produce. 
Under the National Unity government the Likud party forced the Labour party to 
adapt itself to the realities which was created by Likud government in the past. 
However, Labour opposed any additional settlement outside of the security zones and 
regarded most of the settlement set up by Likud during 1977-84 as worthless from 
defense perspective. By March 1988 Israel had direct control of more than 50% of 
land in the West Bank. There were already about 140 Jewish settlements in the 
Occupied Territories, housing about 140,000 people and more were plaimed. 
Palestinian everywhere in the Occupied Territories was being surrounded by 
aggressive Jev/ish settlements which harassed and intimidated them. It seemed that 
there was an Israeli master plan to deprive them of their land and home. 
In the mid 1990s, the wave of immigration from Soviet Union turned out to be 
blessing for Israel's economy. The Shamir government requested the US to grant it 10 
million dollars worth of loan guarantees. The US government conditioned the 
guarantees on Israel's stopping all Jewish settlement activities in the Occupied 
Territories. The Shamir Government however, refused to do as the US government 
conditioned. On 20 March 1991 a US State Department report to congress, had stated 
that out of an estimated 185,000 Soviet Jews who had arrived in Israel in 1990, 
approximately 4 percent had settled in the Occupied Territories. Further more in early 
October 1991 the US export import Bank criticized the structure of Israeli economy 
and cast doubt on its ability to repay debts if it continued on its current cause. 
During Shamir's early period, the PLO seemed to have largely lost the ability to 
wage an armed struggle against Israel through its borders due to the loss of the base in 
Lebanon and expulsion of the PLO's head quarters from Beirut. By 1985 the center of 
Palestinians activism had clearly moved into the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There 
were increasing numbers of individual violent attack of Palestinians against Israeli 
Jews. The growing politicization and mobilization of the Palestinian public through 
grass-root movement and PLO based institution and the rise of new young local 
leadership which had matured in the Israeli jails, all gradually changed the nature of 
the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories from acquiescent to rebellions. 
In this situation, security concern played a major role in determining the type of 
final arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Shamir government 
employed many policies and practices in the Occupied Territories for security reasons 
such has the strong-arm policy, Shin Bet Agency, Iron fist policy, the policy of 
preventive detention the policy of demolition of house and policy of beating and 
policy of maltreatment. Shamir's government had to deal with rising Shiite terrorism 
in Lebanon and fundamentalist Islamic militarism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
The PLO also began to shift more of its attentions toward the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip as the backbone of its legitimacy. Since the outback of the Intifiada in December 
1987 and especially since the 1991 Gulf War the PLO leadership has increasingly 
turned its attention to the Occupied Territories at the expense of Diaspora Palestinians 
including those residing in neighboring refiigee camps. Contrary to Shamir's 
perception of the facts the IDF was unable to properly handle the Intifada and scored 
only limited success in Lebanon. 
Under the premiership of Shamir official Israeli policy regarding a West Asian 
peace remained divided, Shamir opposed the concept of international peace 
conference involving the five permanent members of the Security Council and instead 
proposed direct negotiation between Israel, Egypt the USA, and a joint Jordanian-
Palestinians delegation excluding PLO. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the subsequent entry of US 
forces into Saudi Arabia had a massive impact on the regions politics, causing 
alliances to shift and crumble. During August two distinct blocs had emerged. One 
included Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt at the core of a group fully committed to 
securing Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. A pro-Iraqi bloc included the 
PLO, Jordan, Yemen and Algeria. Saddam Hussain sought to legitimize his predatory 
move by portraying it as a noble attempt to promote the liberation of Palestine from 
Zionist occupation. While the falsehood or dishonesty of this linkage was eminently 
transparent, the widespread emotional outburst it aroused underscored the 
explosiveness of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The PLO frankly announced support 
for Saddam's stand and his theory of linkage. Either in response to strong pro-Saddam 
sentiments among Palestinians in Jordan and the Occupied Territories or due to 
frustration with Israel's indifference the PLO hedged its bet on siding with Iraq. This 
was manifested by assiduous attempts to defuse the crisis on Saddam's terms-such as 
the dethronement of the Kuwaiti royal family and the complete satellization of 
Kuwait-something that was anathema to all Gulf regimes. When these efforts failed to 
produce results and the spectre of war loomed large, Arafat threw in his lot with 
Saddam. Should war break out, he told a frenzy audience in Baghdad, a week before 
the actual outbreak of hostilities, the Palestinians would be in the same trench with the 
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Iraqi people to confront the US-Zionist-Atlantic build up of invading forces. Thus 
mistake of riding with Iraq cost the PLO dearly. 
Soon after the Gulf War and the defeat of Iraq, President Bush stressed in a 
major speech to a joint session of the congress that he regarded the drive for a 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as one of his administrations top priorities in 
the post war era. The regional realignment during the Gulf War, he contended had 
meant Arab states and Israel standing together against a common aggressor Iraq. This 
he said had brought the prospect of peace in the area closer than ever before. In early 
June 1991 President Bush work utters to a number of West Asian leader in an attempt 
to advance moves towards the convening of a peace conference. Those receiving 
letter included the Israeli Prime Ministers, Egyptian and Syrian Presidents and the 
Jordanian and monarchs. As for the Palestinians, US Secretary of State, James Baker, 
from the beginning told West Bank leader that the PLO must be excluded from any 
talks, but that Palestinians linked to the PLO and from East Jerusalem might be port 
of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The PLO weakened by its stance during 
the Gulf War, had no option but to support the American peace efforts Arafat agreed 
the remain aloof from talks so long as Palestinians from within and without the 
territories were permitted to represent Palestinian interests. 
The first phase of the West Asian peace conference was held in Madrid from 31 
October 1991 with the following in attendance: Israel, a joint Palestinian-Jordanian 
delegation Syria and Lebanon. The process embarked on would consist of a series of 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the aim of achieving peace treaties 
between Arab parties and Israel. From October 1991 to August 1993 Israel and the 
Palestinians (under Jordanian umbrella) engaged in eleven sessions of negotiations. 
Between Israel and other Arab states nine roimds of talks took place before being pre-
11 
empted by rounds of talks took place before being pre-empted by the Oslo Accord of 
September 1993. 
Shamir decide to go to Madrid at the end of 1991 because of his belief that 
conditions were mach more favorable to Israel following the Gulf War. He felt that he 
could stonewall and prevaricate as he had done before and like Begin, render those 
areas of the peace process that did not accord with the Likud's position totally 
meaningless. The Israeli far right responded to Madrid conference by aimouncing that 
more settlements would be built and a large budget drawn up for the purpose. They 
proved the point by immediately establishing the new settlement in Golan Height. 
It was therefore, no surprise that the talks produced little discernible progress. The 
Palestinian and Israelis remained for apart. The Palestinians with PLO approved led 
agreed to interim stages for deciding the gate of the Occupied Territories, as stated in 
Camp David, but insisted that self-determination, meaning a Palestinian state, should 
be the final outcome. The Shamir government adhered to its position of autonomous 
for the Palestinian people but continued Israeli control of the land and all major 
functions including security and foreign affairs. Shamir's intent as he admitted after 
leaving office on June 1992 was to drag out talks or Palestinian self rule for the years 
while attempting to settle hundreds of thousands of Jews in the Occupied Territories, 
thereby creating the appearance of accommodation while working to ensure Israeli 
retention of the territories. The rigidity of these stances caused increasing despair 
among the Palestinian in the territories and intensified violence after promoted by 
Hamas. Shamir's bellicosity ultimately led to the defeat of the Likud in the 
parliamentary elections of June 1992. In those elections labor won the mandate with 
Yitzhak Robin as Prime Minister and Shimon Peres as foreign minister. The coalition 
included representatives of parties on the Left that supported peace and territorial 
12 
compromise more openly than Labour, analogous to the rightist factions that 
collaborated with Shamir and Likud but were even more militant. With Labour 
victory came out the Oslo accord of 1993 when laid the foundations of 
accommodation and compromise between the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
During 14 years of Likud party's rule, starting with Begin's accumulation of anti-
Labour fragment which had allowed him to build the Likud and attain power in the 
election of 1977, a reverse process of unraveling and fragmentation started under his 
less charismatic and less imaginative successor Yitzhak Shamir who had the 
additional disadvantage of having to cope with a motivated powerful far right. The 
Likud era ended with the heavy defeat of Likud party in the 1992 elections. 
The Likud party under both Begin and Shamir was the radical .testimony of their 
generation. They had an emotional standard of confrontational political lives. A 
strange symbiosis of radicalism and pragmatism allowed them to govern and this also 
ultimately proved to be their undoing. 
The defeat of Likud in 1992 elections meant the majority of Israelis determined 
that this world of Revisionist zealotry had its day and that it should fade into history. 
The Irgun and Lehi belonged to the mythology of the past. For Likud it's was the 
right time to reconsider the reality of today and the party's policies toward the 
Occupied Territories and the neighboring countries. The signing of the Oslo Accord 
with the PLO by Yitzhak Rabin in 1993 was a reflection of the changing tapestry of 
Israeli and Palestinian politics. The ideological struggle to retain Erotic Israel and its 
entirety lost all its meaning when Israel took the first hesitant step to recognize the 
PLO in 1993. For the Palestinian this change an Israeli attitude was the first faltering 
step towards the achievement of their long cherished dream of an independent state in 
the region. 
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Preface 
The Likud party under Menahem Begin gained a majority in the May 1977 
election and formed a new government. The Likud victory was significant in several 
ways. It resulted in the first transfer of power firom one wing of the Israeli political 
system to other. The new government began implementing a different social and 
economic philosophy affecting both domestic and foreign policies. 
This Thesis attempts to investigate of the Likud party both before and after its 
victory and focuses particularly an the party's policy towards the Occupied 
Territories. 
The Thesis is divided into chapters. The first chapter deals with the historical 
background to the formation of Jewish state of Israel. It traces the evolution of the 
idea of the Jewish state from manuel Noah to Theodor Herlz, the attempts and 
sacrifices of Zionist movement to create the Jewish state of Israel in Palestine. 
Finally, the last section is about the formation of Israel. 
The second chapter deals with the Israeli Right Wing, its ideology and 
practices. The ideology of the Israeli Right from Jabotinsky to Menacham Began and 
its effect on the Likud party's domestic and foreign policy has been critically 
analyzed in this chapter. 
The third chapter discusses the role of Likud party under the leadership of 
Begin before and after the victory in 1977. The Begin era is divided into two phases. 
The first phase begn in 1977 and ended in 1979. The second phase stretches from 
1980 to 1983 when Begin resigned from the premiership. Likuds policies toward the 
Occupied Territories in the Begin era discussed in detail this chapter. 
The fourth chapter deals with the Likud's position toward the Occupied 
Territories in the post Begin phase. This chapter discusses the position of Likud party 
under the leadership of Yitzhak Shamir. This chapter also thoroughly examines the 
emergence of the Intifada in 1989 going into the root and immediate causes and the 
important forces which run the Intifada. The last section of this chapter investigates 
the Likud response to the Intifada. 
The concluding chapter brings together the distinctive aspects of Israeli policy 
under Likud party rule from the beginning of the defeat of Likud party in 1992 
elections. The section also attempts to investigate the weakness of the Likud party and 
its future. It also discusses ways in which the conflict could be resolved to the 
satisfaction of both the Israelis and Palestinians Compromises are called for from both 
sides and the Likud has to eschews its vision of Greater Israel in order to live security 
with its neighbors. Simultaneously the Palestinian will have to make territorial 
adjustments and look for a long term solution to the real question of Jerusalem which 
has come to acquire greater symbolic value for both the parties. 
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Chronology 
1825. Mardecei Manuel Noah Invited Jews around the World to create a 
Jewish state at Grand Island New York. 
1839. Moses MonteCore submitted a project to Muhammad Ali Pasha to 
grant a land in Palestine for fifty years for Jewish Settlement. 
1862 Moses Herss a German Jew wrote Rome and Jerusalem which laid 
the intellectual foundation the Jewish nationalism. 
1881 A Jewish student group in Russian formed a movement named Bilu. 
1882. Leo Pinsker published a famous pamphlet "Auto emancipation" 
called Jews to found a state 
Dreyfus Case in France 
Hibat Zion (Love of Zion) was formed 
First Aliya (Jewish immigration wave) started 
1884 The First National Conference of Hovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion) was 
held in Germany. 
1895 Theodore Herzl composed "Der Judenstaat" (The Jewish State) 
1897 The First Zionist Congress was held in Basel Switzerland with its 
conclusion by Herzl's statement that the Jewish state should found 
after 50 years. 
1903-1914 Second Aliya began 
1914 World War I Started 
1916 Sykes - Picot Secret treaty 
1917 Balfour Declaration 
1925 The Revisionist Zionist was founded by Vladimir Jabotinsky 
1920-1948 British Mandate of Palestine 
1936 Arab revolt in Palestine 
1937 Irgun Zvai Zeumi, a Jewish Militan faction was formed by the 
Revisionist Zionist under the leadership of Menacham Begin. 
1939 The White paper of 1939 
1939-1945 The World War II 
1940 Lehi a Zionist Militia was formed by Avraham Stern 
1942 Stem died, Shamir replaced him as leader 
1946 King David Hotel in Jerusalem was blew up by the Irgun and Lehi 
factors 
1947 U.N. Resolution 181, and partition plan 
1948 State of Israel declared, Abdullah declare the Kingdom of Jordan (to 
corporate East Jerusalem and the West Bank) 
- In April, Irgun and Lehi cooperated to attack on Arabs in 
Deir Yassin, Killed 254 men, women, children. 
- In July, Herut Party was formed by Menachem Begin. 
1955 Foundation of Al-fatah 
1956 Sinai Campaign 
1964 Foundation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
1965 Gahal was formed by the merger of Herut and Liberals under the 
leadership of Begin 
1967 Arab-Israeli War (Israelis gain territory) 
1968 Arafat became chairman of PLO 
1973 Arab-Israeli War (Yom Kippur War) 
- Likud Party, a Right wing bloc was formed 
1977 Likud Party won the 1977 elections Begin became a Israeli Prime 
Minister-President Sadat visited Israel 
1978 Begin and Sadat came to Camp David for peace conference 
1979 Camp David peace treaty (Egypt-Israel) 
1981 Likud won the 1981 elections Begin continued his premiership and 
Sharon became a Defense Minister 
1982 Israel's invasion of Lebanon under the command of Sharon 
- Israel's complete withdrawal from Sinai 
1983 Begin resigned from Israeli government Itzhak Shamir became to 
power 
1984 First Israeli National Unity Government 
1987 In December Intifada has Started and Continued for 5 year 
- Hamas faction was formed 
1988 Second Israeli National Unity government under the Premiership of 
Shamir 
- PNC Algiers meeting declaration of Palestinian Independent 
1990 Sharon resigned from Israeli government Likud-Labour Unity 
government Collapses, Likud came to power again with more 
extreme right 
1991 Gulf War 
- Million of Russian Jews immigrated to Israel 
- Madrid Conference 
1992 Likud was defeat in the 1992 elections Labour coalition took power 
1993 Oslo Accords (DOP) signed in Washington, Common Agenda 
(Israel-Jordan) 
CHAPTER - 1 
"We are one people, our enemies have made us one, 
whether we will or not, we suddenly discover our 
strength, yes, we are strong enough to form a state, and 
indeed, a model state. We possess all the requisite human 
and material resources." 
(Theodor Herzl) 
"The Jewish State" 
CHAPTER - 1 
Historical Background to the Formation of Israel 
The rise of Zionism 
Pre-Herzl era 
The idea of formation of Jewish state goes baclc to the early nineteenth 
century. During the 1830's a pro-Zionist movement was started by a man who can be 
called the first American Zionist. His name was Mardecei Manuel Noah (1785-1851)' 
an American Jewish journalist, dramatist, lawyer and one time the U.S. consul in 
Tunis, Tunisia.^  Later, he became a High Sheriff and surveyor of the port of New 
Yorkl 
In 1824 Noah said, "We will return to Zion as we went forth bringing back the 
faith we carried away with us"."* 
One year later, he acquired Grand Island in the Niagara River near Buffalo, 
New York called Ararat and invited the Jews of the whole world to create a Jewish 
state.^ He realized that Zionist goals in Palestine would not be achieved without the 
support of Christian in America. He then advocated the foundation of a state in 
Palestine, just as Theodor Herzl was to do a half-century later. 
But the most important person was Sir Moses Montefiore (1785-1885), an 
English Jew who was a personal friend of Muhammad AH, a Viceroy of Egypt.^  He 
submitted project to Muhammad All the Pasha of Egypt for a grant of land for fifty 
years, in Palestine.^ Eventually, Muhammad Ali Pasha refused that because he was 
not the owner of the land. His approval therefore, should have a confirmation from 
Constantinople. 
Montefiore laboured throughout his long life for the resettlement of Jewish 
people in Palestine. However his plans did not succeed because his project was not 
approved by the Turkish authority.^ 
In Germany Moses Hess (1812-1875), a great Jewish thinker who reflected the 
transition from integrationist to the Zionist revolution by his life and his work'° was 
born in 1812 as a son of an orthodox Jewish family of Bonn in the Rhineland. As a 
young man he gradually lost interest in religion and ceased to be a practicing 
Jew."Although, his strongly devout father wanted him educated in the religious 
tradition and groomed him to take over the family business.'^ He was disinterested in 
business and wandered across Germany, trying his hand at teaching and writing. At 
the University of Bonn he enrolled his name as a student for a while'", and joined a 
group of left Hegelians. He became associated with Karl Marx and his friends.'•* He 
was drawn into the intellectual ferment of pre 1848 German radicalism. Eventually 
after its failure he withdrew from politic and went to Paris to live there. 
At Paris in the year of 1862 Hess produced "Rome and Jerusalem", a book 
which laid the intellectual foundations of Jewish nationalism.'^  
In Russia Leo Pinsker (1821-1891) emerged as a prominent Jewish activist. 
He was born in 1821 at Odessa in an educated Russian Jewish family. After his 
graduation in medical, he joined the Russian army as a field doctor, where he received 
a decoration from the Czar. 
However, the situation of Jewish people in Russia completely changed after 
the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881. Violence against Jews occurred in 
several part of Russia. 
The incident was the turning point for Pinsker. He came to believe that the 
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Jewish peoples must help themselves and secure a land of their own. 
Dr. Pinsker published his famous pamphlet "Auto-emancipation" in 1822, in 
which he described anti-Semitism as an incurably social pathological disease, which 
sprang from the homelessness of Jew who for the living is dead, for the poor a 
millionaire and an exploiter, for citizens a man without a country, for all classes a 
hated competition. The Jew must, therefore, become once more a nation, a people 
with a territory of their own.'Vet, the crux the solution in the concept of Pinsker was 
independent nation existence and it was of little consequence which territory was 
settled for this purpose. He was the first thinker whose work evoked an immediate 
responsive producing an organized effort to promote immigration to Palestine as step 
towards solving the Jewish problem.^ " 
In the early 1880s a group of fanatical young Russian Jews started an 
organization known as "Hibbat Zion" which sought to establish a Jewish state in 
Palestine.'^ ' 
The Hovevei Zion (another name of Hibbat Zion) started to advocate 
imagination to Palestine and drew their inspiration from Pinsker's writing; they 
considered his Pamphlet "Auto-emancipation" as their secret book. Frequently, the 
secretly meeting were conducted, soon, organizations were formed and money was 
collected to purchase land in Palestine, after many branches were established in all 
parts of Russia, Poland, Romania, England^^ and even in Germany, Austria and 
America '^'. 
By the rapidly growing of the movement, mode the Ottoman authority aware 
and understood the danger of the movement, they reacted sharply against the initial 
political potentialities of the Hovevei Zion^^ so that in April, 1882, they started to 
refuse all Jews, the right to settle in Palestine^ .^ However the Lover of Zion ignored 
that law and started their colonial activity in Palestine (See Map No. 1 & 2). 
In 1884, the first national conference of various Hovevei Zion societies was 
held at Kattowitz a German Silesian city under the leadership of Dr. Leo Pinstker^' 
who was one year back already agreed to become head of the Lovers of Zion in 
Odessa and ultimately became leader of the Hibbat Zion movement until his death in 
1891^*. 
In 1890, the Hovevei Zion won a certain unofficial toleration from the St. 
Petersburg government. Pinsker afterward, attempted to propaganda throughout 
Europe on behalf of migration to the Holy Land, his efforts, and was remarkably 
successfuP^. In the same year, the Fourth Congress (national conference) was held at 
Odessa under his leadership and another advance which was at the time of the 
conference, was the establishment of an office for supervising of the purchasing 
operations, immigration and settlement in Jaffa^°. Indeed, before the death of Pinsker 
in 1891, the Hovevei Zion was provided with a coherent ideology and the framework 
of the organization to strengthen the foundations of Palestine colonization and to 
achieve quasilegalization for the movement in Russia^'. 
"Bilu" The Pioneer Jew 
In the year of 1881 one such student, group from university of Kharkov 
traveled through Russia, recruiting some 500 fellow enthusiasts who had been 
moved by the writing of thinkers as different as Smolenskin", A.D. Gordon '^' and 
Lilienblum''^ , who had little in common apart from the intellectual malaise brought on 
by the frustrations of assimilation and anti-Semitism. Significantly, they called 
themselves by the name "Bilu" an acrostic of the biblical verse^ .^ Beith Yaakov lehu 
veneelchu (Home of Jacob, come let us go forth). 
Some of their members arrived in Palestine, they established, in a romantic 
and unplanned agricultural crusade the villages of Zichron-Yaakov in Samaria, and 
established a working group on Socialist lines predating the efforts of the Kibbutzim 
and Kvutzot". For start, they went to work at Migve Israel, the agricultural school 
which had been established a decade earlier. Later they established Rosh Pinah Lower 
Galilee and Wadi Hamin, Gedera south of Jaffa, which still exists though it ceased to 
be run on Socialist lines a long time ago^ .^ 
Herzl Era 
Theodor (Benjamin Ze'ev) Herzl considered to be the father of political 
Zionism, the founder of the World Zionist Organization and the prophet of the Jewish 
state^ ,^ was born on May 2, 1860 at Pest a city situated on the left bank of the 
Danube"". 
Herzl's father, Jacob Herzl was a middle class Jew, banker at sometime 
merchant at another. 
His mother, Jeannette Diamant came of a family apparently long established in 
Hungary'*'. Young Herzl received his early education in a scientific secondary school, 
but to escape from its anti-Semitic atmosphere, he was transferred in 1875 to a Jewish 
elementary school. 
In 1878, he passed the final examinations of the Evangelisches Gymnasium 
but not too brilliantly. His sister died of typhoid fever and the grief-stricken family 
moved to Vienna.'*'' In the same year, he enrolled in the faculty of law.'*'* As a law 
student he belonged to one of that aggressive, Teutonic student organization whose 
members defended their "honour" with sword and saber.''^  
During his study days he went on journeys to the Austrian Alps, to 
Switzerland and after taking his doctorate in 1884, to Holland, Belgium and finally to 
Paris'* .^ Herzl was admitted to the Vienna bar and practiced his profession for a while 
in the courts of both Vienna and Salzbury. During those years, he read a great deal of 
books and wrote several short plays and many essays/^ Finally, he chose to devote 
himself to literature and was well known by his flair for writing and a charming style. 
For a number of years, he was a journalist and a moderately success full play wright."*^ 
In 1982, he was sent to Paris by the Vienna Freie Presse as its correspondent. 
It was during his stay in France that the trial of Alfred Dreyfus a French officer of 
Jewish origin falsely accused of treason by the French state.''^ 
Herzl had to witness the public degradation of Dreyfus, his trial and his 
condemnation. He had to witness above all, in the earliest days of 1895 the tumult of 
French populace, the cry "A mort les Juifs" - "Down with the Jews", Death to the 
Jews" - not "this traitor" but " the Jews."^° 
Herzl, already keenly aware of the oppression and discrimination still suffered 
by the Jews of Eastern Europe, was shattered by the realization that someone by 
reason of his Jewish ness could be the victim of such vicious injustice in France 
which was the land of the original Enlightenment. If this could happen there, no Jew 
could ever be really safe anywhere.^' He came to conclusion that the only answer to 
the Jewish question was the creation of a Jewish state.^^ 
In the summer of 1895, Herzl composed a pamphlet entitled, Der Judenstaat 
(The Jewish State). He had never read either Leo Pinsker's Auto-Emancipation or 
Rome and Jerusalem by Moses Hess Published in 1962.^ ^ But the episodes of anti-
Semitism that accompanied the trial and the disgrace of Dreyfus led him to write the 
pamphlet, which was published by Breitenstein in February 1896.^ '* 
The basic idea can be briefly summarized: the world needed the Jewish state, 
Herzl wrote in the introduction, therefore, it would arise and it was not a Utopia. 
This is no amiable Utopia such as have been projected in abundance before 
and since Sir Thomas More. And it seems to me that the situation of the Jews 
in various lands is grave enough to make quite superfluous any attention 
setting tricks.'" 
In addition for answer to what is tiie original Jewish question: 
"The Jewish question still exists, I consider the Jewish question neither a 
social nor a religious one, even though it some-times takes these and other 
forms. It is a national question."^^ 
And his confidence in his people was so strong that he wrote: 
"We are one people, our enemies have made us one whether we will or not, 
we suddenly discover our strength, yes, we are strong enough to form a state, 
and indeed, a model state. We possess all the requisite human and material 
resources."^'' 
The location of Jewish state was to be any where between Palestine and 
Argentina. He wrote: 
"Here two regions come to mind: Palestine and Argentina. The society will 
take whatever it is given and whatever Jewish public opinion favours.^^ 
Herzl did not have the emotional ties to Palestine that his followers had, 
because he himself was not closely involved with the formal religious practice or 
observance of the Jewish faith.^' 
Indeed, the publication of Der Judentaat provoked both favourable and 
antagonistic reactions in Gentile and Jewish circles alike. Most of the Hovevei Zion 
societies generally supported him but most of the establishment Jews of Western 
Europe opposed him. ° 
Herzl worked out a memorandum embodying his idea, he began to lobby for it 
among Jewish philanthropists such as the Rothschild family and Baron Maurice de 
Hirsch, famous personalities, rabbis and community leaders. 
The Zionist Congress 
The first great Zionist Congress opened on Sunday, August 29, 1897, in the 
casino at Basel, Switzerland. The Congress brought together 204 orthodox, reform 
and secular Jewish representatives from fifteen countries including the United States, 
Algeria, Palestine as well as Western and Eastern Europe. 
The Congress established as its instrument a permanent Zionist organization, 
know as World Zionist Organization. Herzl was un-anxiously elected president of the 
Zionist organization.^' 
Obviously, the aim of the Zionist organization, as formulated by the First 
Congress was: 
"Zionism" strives to create for the Jewish people a "home" in Palestine 
secured by public law.^ ^ The Congress contemplates the following means to the 
attainment of this end: 
1. The promotion on suitable lines of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish 
agricultural and industrial workers. 
2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of 
appropriate institution, local and international, in accordance with the laws of 
each country. 
3. The strengthening and festering of Jewish national sentiment and 
consciousness. 
4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining government con.sent where necessary to 
the attainment of the aim of Zionism. ' 
Herzl's diplomatic effort 
Indeed, the most important policy requirement of political Zionism was the 
acquisition of an internationally recognized proclamation to colonize Palestine. In 
Europe at that time there were three major powers, Germany, Turkey and the Britain. 
Germany was the first that Herzl tried to contact. Fortunately, there were two persons 
who supported Herzl proposals, William Hechler and count Philip Zu eulenbury who 
v.as the Kaiser's most intimate friend.^ "* Both of them introduced Herzl to Grand Duke 
of Baden who later, becomes one of Herzl great admires . The Grand Duke reacted 
well to Herzl's vision of a Jewish state. He promised to discuss the matter with the 
Kaiser^ .^ In October, 1898, Eulenberg suddenly informed Herzl that the Kaiser had 
agreed to an audience during the impending royal visit to Constantinople.^ ^ At the 
meeting, Herzl proposed the creation of a Chartered land Development Company 
which would be operated by Zionists under German protectorate.^* When Herzl met 
the Kaiser again in Jerusalem on 2 November 1898, the Kaiser expressed benevolent 
interest in the efforts directed towards the improvement of agriculture in Palestine as 
long as there accorded with the welfare of the sovereignty of the sultan. However, 
when the sultan objected the Kaiser at once abandoned his earlier enthusiasm for the 
Zionist project. It was perfectly clear that no real support was to be anticipated from 
him.^' 
The connection with the Sultan 
Herzl, then, decided to focus his attention on the Sultan. In the summer of 
1900, Herzl sent Arminius Vambery to mediate with the Sultan. But no news came 
from Constantinople until about a year. Suddenly, a telegram reached Herzl from 
Vembery to come at once. The Sultan would receive him on May 17, 1901.™ 
At the meeting, Herzl proposed the Sultan of Turkey, for Jewish settlement in 
Palestine, approaching the subject indirectly with suggestion that the Jews would help 
Turkey to repay its foreign debt, although, the great power wanted to keep Turkey 
weak to prevent its recovery. Herzl could enlist the help of world Jewry and promote 
the country's industrialization and also develop the natural resources of the Ottoman 
Empire. However, this enticing offer failed to sway the Sultan. '^ 
The negotiation between Herzl and the Sultan was again set up in February 
and July 1902. The Sultan offered to Herzl that the Ottoman Jewish company could 
colonize Mesopotamia, Syria, Anatolia and in a world anywhere except Palestine. 
Although, some of Herzl's advisers were prepared to accept the Sultan's offer Herzl, 
however feared that such a charter might prove a serious impediment to the 
attainment of his ultimate "oal. * 
The Diplomacy with Britain 
Having failed to obtain legalization of Jewish colonization of Palestine from 
the Kaiser and the Sultan, Herzl concentrated his attention on England. In early 1902 
the British Parliament appointed a Royal commission to study the "threat of cheap 
labour" posed by the influx of Russian Jews into London's East End."Leopold 
Greenberg a British Zionist suggested Herzl has been invited to testify as a Jewish 
expert.^ '* Herzl therefore, appeared before the parliament body in July to describe the 
wretched condition of Eastern European Jewry. In this fashion Herzl delicately 
adverted to his Zionist solution. Thus, the British Government became officially 
acquainted with Zionism. The Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain met Herzl and 
became interested in his course.'^ He agreed to facilitate Jewish colonization of El-
Arish, a strip of land between the South-Western border of Palestine and Suez Canal. 
But Herzl would have to take up with Lord Lansdowne the Foreign Secretary of 
Britain. However, Lord Lansdov/ne suggested Lord Cromer the British agent general 
of Egypt for directly negotiation the matter.^ ^ 
Herzl then met Lord Cromer who told him that the question of water supplies 
was of vital importance. Water for irrigating land could come only from the Nile, and 
Herzl would have to wait for an expert report. On 12 May 1903 Herzl received a cable 
that the plan had definitely been rejected." 
Chamberlain reported to Herzl about a land in Uganda for Zionist mission but 
Herzl firstly, brushed the idea. After the failure of El-Arish project and the new 
pogrom in Russia Herzl accepted the Uganda project as an asylum for night for 
Jewish people.^ * 
The acceptance of the Uganda project of Zionist leader chocked every 
delegate who presented at the Sixth Zionist Congress in Basle. The congress was soon 
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polarized and led to violent controversy/' Herzl was finally, called traitor to his face. 
He did not live to see the Seventh Zionist Congress officially bury the scheme. He 
died on 3 July 1904 at the age of forty-four.*° 
Post Herzl Era 
After Herzl's death, the confrontations within the Zionist movement between 
the political and the practical remained unresolved. A few months later, at the Seventh 
Zionist Congress, David Wolffsohn who presented a compromise between the 
factions was elected to be the president of the Zionist movement.*' And the mess of 
the Congress opposed the Uganda project on the grounds that there could be no 
Zionism without Zion. 
The Zionist under the leadership of Wolffsohn still followed the way which 
was established by Herzl. Wolffsohn, eventually face an even stronger and more 
determined opposition criticized for running the movement like a despot of behaviour 
and more autocratic than Herzl's, but without Herzl's inspiration political genius and 
iron will.*^ Moreover, in Wolffsohn's period, the situation of international politic 
changed after the Turkey revolution of 1908-1909. The British Government had some 
revival interest in Zionism but less friendly interest, that because the British circles in 
Constantinople became an idea that the powerful Jewish forces closely linked with 
Germany, were working undermine the British position in the East and among these 
must be counted the Zionists. '* 
The British Government, however, had lost its enthusiasm. The Zionist 
movement buried the Uganda Scheme with Herzl's death. Inspired by the ideal of 
redeeming the land of Israel through toil, a second wave of immigration (the Second 
Aliyah) began in 1904 and continued until the outbreak of the First World War. 
Mostly of them were from Russia, Romania and Eastern Europe, its members. 
numbering as many as 40, 000 over the ten-year period, worked mostly as hired 
laborers on the farms established by the First Aliyah, or in the towns.^^ 
In 1911, at the tenth Congress Wolffsohn was displaced from his leadership in 
favor of a presidium heavily weighted with East Europeans.*^ The new leadership was 
presided over by Professor Otto Warburg a member of a well known Humburg 
banking family who was one of the very few leaders who did not have a single enemy 
in the movement.^^ 
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914, added troubles to the Zionist 
which its member was divide to two parts, between the Central power which led by 
Germany and the Entente led by the Britain.^^ 
The great part of the World Zionist movement was pro-German. However, 
there were exceptions, such as Dr. Chaim Weizmann, Ahad Ha'am, Jabotinsky, 
Rutenberg and Nordau, they warned agamst a one-sided pro-German orientation. 
The circumstances of war, however, was a remarkable political leader 
emerged in Britain. This was Dr. Chaim Weizmann who now became the dominant 
force in British Zionism.^° He and his supporters in England became increasingly 
active in seeking official support for their cause since Herbert Samuel, the president 
of the Local Government, tried to make the likely diplomatic advantage of a British 
protectorate over a Palestine Jewish home-land, before the Cabinet in early months of 
1915.^' In audiences with individual members of the government they sought British 
endorsement of their claim to Palestine as the historical and spiritual homeland of the 
Jewish people. In return, the Zionists volunteered to assert their influence in rallying 
Jewish communities throughout the world for the Allied cause. 
Hussain-Macmahon correspondence: 
When the First World War broke out and Turkey joined Germany's side in the 
war, the British Government and its allies encouraged the Arabs revolt against the 
Turks. To this end, they gave them several pledges to recognize their independence 
from turkey at the end of the war. These pledges included a pledge for the 
independence of Palestine the first of those pledges was given in 1915-1916 by the 
British Goveniment in the correspondence exchanged between the Sharif Hussain of 
Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt.^^ 
The Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) 
A month before the start of the Arab revolt, the foreign ministers of France, 
Great Britain and Russia entered into a secret agreement for the division among 
themselves of the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Sir Mark Sykes of Britain 
and Charles George Picot of France reached an agreement which was ratified by 
Russia and Italy.'''The agreement without regard to the pledge to the Arabs, the 
agreement roughly provided for 
1. An independent Arab state or a confederation of Arab states in a past of 
present day Saudi Arabia and Yemen. 
2. France in Lebanon and Syria, and Britain in Iraq and Trans-Jordan, "to 
establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they may desire 
and as they may deem fit to establish after agreement with the Arab states or 
confederation of Arab state". (See Map No.3) 
3. Parts of Palestine to be placed under an international administration of which 
the forms will be decided upon after consultation with Russia and after 
subsequent agreement with the other Allies and the representatives of the 
Sharif of Mecca.'^ 
The Beginning of Jewish Army 
The requirement of the war brought a chap change in Palestine. Whoever was 
suspected of active sympathy with the allies was treated by the Turkish authority. A 
variety of repressive measures by the Turkish commanders including mass 
deportation and imprisonment or exile particularly of Jews, took place during the 
war.^ ^ In March 1915, some 10000 Jews from Palestine most of them Russian 
nationality, had found asylum in Egypt. Half of them were lodged in refugee camps at 
Gabbani and Mafruza where they were sustained by Jewish communal funds.^^ 
Among those who were deported by the Turks was Joseph Trumpeldor. He 
made his way to Alexandria to volunteer for the British army. At the Mafruza camp, 
he met Jabotinsky who reached the camp at the end of 1914.^ ^ Both of them had the 
idea that the \ictory of the war would be with the allies and the prospects of Palestine 
enterprise would be greatly enhanced if the Jews could play a role in liberation of 
Palestine from Turkish rule. 
Practically, Jabotinsky and Trumpeldor or sought to persuade the British 
commander in Egypt to form a Jewish army under a Jewish flag to take part in the 
expulsion of the Turks from Palestine. The British agreed only to establish a battalion 
of Mule drivers. Jabotinsky then left for London to press for full fledged Jewish 
military unit. W'hile Trumpeldor enlisted in the battalion as one of its officers. He was 
transferred to the Gallipoli front and with about six hundred and fifty men of the Zion 
Mule Corp.'^ "^ 
Since 1915, David Ben-Gurion and Ben-zvi forced to leave Palestine; they 
made their way to America.'°' Indeed,Ben- Gurion was opposed at first to the effort 
of Jabotinsky and Trumpeldor, which he feared might bring Turkish reprisals upon 
the Jews in Palestine. However, with the entry of America into the war Ben-Gurion 
came to appreciate the political importance of Jewish participation on the Palestine 
front and he joined a group of volunteers from United States and Canada posted to the 
Jewish legion. 
Meanwhile, in Britain, Jabotinsky continued lobby for a Jewish Legion. In 
early 1916, suddenly, the agitation of the Russian Jews was beginning to gain 
momentum. Jabotinsky had seized the opportunity to bring his Jewish Legion idea to 
the notice of the War office and Foreign office. Although, Weizmann and Scott 
supported to interest Lloyd George who was a Secretary of state for war during that 
time, but this plan which was described as Weizmann's plan for forming a special 
Brigade for Russian Jews, was not approved by the British Government. Thence forth, 
Jabotinksy, Weizmann and some other Zionists joined in on organized effort as 
indi\'iduals for service in the British Army to persuade Russian Jews of military age to 
volunteer. "^ ^ 
New hope for them came when Lloyd George became a Prime Minister in 
December 1916. Two months later, he agreed to set up a meeting between Sir Mark 
Sykes and the Zionist to discuss the subject.' '^ 
The situation had changed since July 1917; the Zionist had made a marked 
advance in their relationship with the British Government. Since this time, Palestine 
was full swing under the British invasion and the United States of America had 
ranged itself with the allies. ^ 
Jabotinsky's campaign to organize more impressive Jewish Legion was finally 
approved by the British Government in summer of 1917, and the government also was 
considering its intended pro-Zionist Declaration.'°^ "^ ^ ;ijL*k.>A&' 
Practically, indeed, the recruitment effort for Jewish Legion was not limited to ' 
England, but Jabotinsky and Patterson ensured that circulars were distributed among 
Jewish communities in North and South America. In the meantime, there was a 
revolution in Russia, the Czar had addicted and Bolshevik came to power on October 
24. in the same year. Thenceforth, the importance moment in the new history of 
Jewish people came, when the British Government announced the Balfour 
Declaration. 
The Balfour Declaration 
The declaration consisted of a single long sentence in the form of a letter dated 
November 2, 1917 addressed by Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild 
as representative of the Zionist. It read as follow; 
Dear Lord Rothschild 
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's 
Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist 
aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by the Cabinet. 
"His majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best 
endeavours to facilitate the achie\ement of this object, it being clearly 
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and 
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights 
and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country". 
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the 
knowledge of the Zionist Federation. 
This sudden success surprised everyone including Weizmann. He said inter 
alias in his remarkable speech in 1927. 
"We, Jews got the Balfour Declaration quite unexpected. We never 
dreamt of the Balfour Declaration."'^' 
The Jewish Legion after the Balfour Declaration 
After the publication of Balfour Declaration, the effort to create a Jewish 
legion was accelerated. Jabotinsky and Trumpeldor worked hand to maintain the 
Jewish battalion as a force-in-being that could support the promise of the Balfour 
Declaration and they hoped to use the Legion in more effective defense for the Jewish 
community than the pre-war organization of settlement guards."^ They were invited 
to the war office in London to discuss the matters. After long deliberation, the three 
units of the Royal Fusiliers were combined to form the first Judean Regiment.'" 
Colonel John Patterson, former commander of Zion Mule corps, was to 
organize the first unit, the Thirty-eight Battalion of Royal Fusiliers. Therefore, his 
first recruits were some 120 veterans of original Mule corps and this time Jabotinsky 
himself volunteered as a private but later, was promoted to lieutenant and Patterson's 
aid- de-camp."~ 
The unit's members were supplemented from the immigrant Jewry of 
London's East End. Among the first of 6500 to enlist were Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi. 
In the 1918 campaign, when Jewish unit set foot in the Holy land, Jabotinsky 
urgently set about recruiting younger Palestinian Jews who had escaped the exodus or 
the Turkish press gangs. Only a few hundred of these survivors were fit for action but 
they were among the Legion most enthusiastic members." Thenceforth, in spring of 
the same year, the Jewish unit which was under the leadership of Petterson and 
Jabotinsky were assigned to patrol the Jordan Valley against a threatened Turkish 
counter attack. 
Eventually, all the Jewish battalions from the United States, Canada and Great 
Britain, came to participated in Allenby's Palestine Campaign."'' 
The Mandate 
The First World War came to an end in October 1918. Three months later, the 
Supreme Council of the Peace Conference decided that the conquered Arab provinces, 
including Palestine, were not to be restored to Turkish rule. The Allied Power 
intended to circumvent the fulfilment of their promises of Arab independence and to 
implement the accrete Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916; the Allied Power devised 
what became to known as the mandate system. This turned out to be disguised 
colonialism."' 
The World Zionist Organization had presented a memorandum to the Paris 
Peace Conference in 1919 setting forth its territorial concept of the home, as follows: 
The whole of Palestine, Southern Lebanon including the towns of Tyre 
and Sidon, the headwaters of the Jordan river on Mount Hermon and the 
southern portion of the Litani river, the Golan Heights in Syria including the 
town of Quneitra, the Yarmuk river and Al-Himmeh hot springs: the whole of 
the Jordan Valley the Dead sea, and the eastern high land up to the out skirts 
of Aman, there in a southerly direction along the Hedjaz railway to the Gulf of 
Agaba: In Egypt, from El-Arish on the Mediterranean coast, in a straight line 
in a southerly direction of Sham el-Sheikh on the Gulf of Aqaba."^ (See Map 
No. 4 & 5). 
It was Zionist's aim to occupy all these areas, which was planed to establish 
the Jewish state. However, the League of Nations and the Peace settlement did not 
accept these boundaries. The Mandate given to Britain included Tran Jordan the 
territory east of the river and beyond Aman. In 1921, Britain allotted Tran Jordan as 
an Emirate to Emire Abdullah son of Sharif Husain of Mecca. "^ 
Civil Administration established 
In July 1920, the Civil Administration came into existence following a 
meeting of the supreme Allied Council at San Remo the civil administration was 
established in Palestine, and the first officials to arrive in the country included British 
Zionist Jew who was replaced in key positions. Some of these were Herbert Samuel, 
one of the framers of the Balfour Declaration and a scion of the Zionist movement -
High Comminisoner."^ One of the early actions of this consortium was to enact the 
first Immigration Ordinance on 26 August 1920, fixing a quota of 16,500 immigrant 
Jews for the first year (See Map No. 6). 
Other legislation followed next to the Immigration Law, were Laws affecting 
land disposition, registration and settlement to hasten Jewish acquisition Arab land. 
One of these Laws - disguised as Law to protect cultivators against eviction by their 
Landlords- had the opposite effect Osteen because almost all of the large tracts of land 
were owned by absentee land-owners living in Lebanon and Syria.' 
Other measures favouring Jews were the granting to Jewish companies of 
concessions over state land and the natural resources of the country, such as irrigation, 
electricity and the extraction of Potash and other minerals-from the Dead Sea. 
With Arab insistence that the establishment of a Jewish national home was 
itself an infringement of their rights, the British Government adopted two lines of 
policy: 
The first was to try to interpret the concept of a national home in such away as 
to reassure the Arabs that it did not imply a Jewish state. 
The second line of policy was that the Government lived from 1922 in the 
hope that sooner or later the Arabs would give up their opposition to Zionism and 
become reconciled with the Jewish national home policy. 
Both Jewish and Arab communities complained that the British mandatory 
authorities discriminated against them. Both protested any measure intended to lead 
toward self government; the Arabs because it was not enough, the Jews because it 
favored the Arabs. The first effort was the plan for a twenty three member Legislative 
Council in 1922. Of the twelve -member elected majority, eight were to be Muslim, 
two-Jewish and two Christian. Another ten would be appointed by the High 
Commissioner, who would act as council head. The Arabs rejected, the plan because 
they feared that the two Jews would vote with the High Commissioner and the ten 
Government-appointed Council members to form an anti-Arab majority. The Jews, 
although willing to accept the proposal, were unenthusiastic because they would have 
only two of the twenty-three representatives. The Arab attacked Sir Herbert as an 
"ardent Zionist" and the Zionists belaboured him for "bending over backwards" to 
appease the Arab. He finally cast aside all self-government plans and reconstituted the 
old Advisory Council. 
Since no locally acceptable, constitutional system could be worked out, 
Palestine was governed by an order-in-council issued by Great Britain in 1922. The 
order-in-council defined the legislative, administrative executive and judicial 
functions of the Palestine government and powers of its officials. Final authority 
remained with the High Commissioner, who could be overridden only by London. 
Arab opposition to Mandate 
The Palestinian Arabs resorted from time to time to violence. They opposed to 
the Mandate and the policy of the Balfour Declaration. The opposition remained 
obstinate and unrelenting throughout the period of the Mandate. 
The first violent expression of Arab feeling occurred on Easter Sunday in 
April 1920, the second in May 1921 the third in August 1929 and between 1936 and 
1939 an all-out rebellion broke out which was preceded by an unprecedented Six-
months strike.'"" 
The principle commissions of inquiry were appointed directly as result of the 
riots there are as follow. 
1. Arab disappointment at the non-fulfillment of the promises of 
independence which had been given to them during the First World War. 
2. Arab belief that the Balfour Declaration implied a denial of the right of 
self -determination and their fear that the establishment of "a national 
home for the Jews" in Palestine will lead to their ultimate dispossession of 
their homes and home land.'^^ 
The Growth of Political Zionism 
In February 1919, Weizmann and Sokolow called a Zionist Conference in 
London. At this meeting, Weizmann was appointed to the Executive, in summer of 
1920, a second post war Zionist Conference was convened at London. At this 
Conference, Weizmann was elected President of the Zionist Organization, and Nahum 
Sokolow, his lieutenant was made Chairman of the Executive. 
The conference also passed the following resolution. 
1. The Organization is determined to live at peace with the non-Jewish 
communities. 
2. All land in Palestine colonized by Jews in eventually to become the 
common property of the Jewish people. 
3. A Jewish National Fund will be established to employ voluntary 
contributions for the purpose of making the land of Palestine the common 
property of the Jewish people. 
4. A Central Immigration office will be created in Palestine and Palestine 
offices will be opened in all countries expected to furnish contingents of 
young immigrants.'^ ^ 
The 12* Zionist Congress came to a close with confirmation of Weizmann 
who stood at the head of an elaborate organization which provided all the necessary 
office for bringing the aim of political Zionism to fulfillment. 
With the establishment of a perfectly organized machine for the maintenance 
of the advantage gained with the British Government during the war years and the 
promotion of Jewish colonization of Palestine, Weizmann had succeeded in 
maintaining and reinforcing British support, and in laying the groundwork for the 
Jewish colonization of Palestine. He was next faced with the problem of fulfilling the 
third requirement of the Herzlian program winning the support of world Jewry to the 
cause of political Zionism. Zionist Federation; Separate Unions and Separate 
Societies were already in existence in countries all over the world. But a mechanism 
was needed to recruit large groups of non-Zionist Jew. The Jewish Agency was 
chosen to fulfill this task.'^ ^ 
At the Zionist Conference at Carlsbad in August and September of 1922, there 
fore, the Zionist Organization formally accepted the rights and duties of the Jewish 
Agency, expressing the wish that the Jewish Agency shall represent the whole Jewish 
people. 
For Weizmann however, the idea of extending the Jewish Agency presented 
itself as a perfect solution to the problem of fulfilling the third policy requirement of 
Herzlian program, wirming the support of World Jewry. 
In February 1923, the Actions Committee passed a resolution stating that the 
controlling organ of the Jewish Agency shall be responsible to a body representative 
of the Jewish people, and the Committee also decided to enter into negotiations with 
reading Jewish communities in order to gain their participation in the Jewish 
Agency.'^^ However, at the congress of 1925, a party known as the Revisionist which 
led by Vladimir Jabotinsky opposed extension on the basis that Zionist policy could 
not be entrusted to Jews lacking strong nationalist convictions. The conclusion 
however, the Congress passed a resolution favouring the establishment of a Council 
for the Jewish Agency compared equally of Zionist and non-Zionist Jews. The Jewish 
Agency bases its activities on the following principles: (1) the development of a 
continuously increasing volume of Jewish immigration into Palestine. (2) The 
redemption of the land in Palestine as Jewish public property. (3) Agricultural 
colonization based on Jewish labour and (4) the promotion of Hebrew language and 
culture in Palsetine.'^^ 
The Peel Commission 
The Arab Palestinians resentment against the denial of iheir inherent right of 
national self determination and the colonization of their land by non-Palestinians 
boiled over when the flow of Jewish immigrants escalated in 1933. The revolt was 
intensified during 1935 under the leadership of Al-Sheikh Izzuddin Al-Qasam and 
because even keener in 1937.'^' Disturbances became a daily occurrence in the whole 
of Palestine. The British High Commissioner then ordered the arrest of members of 
the Arab Higher Committee. 
The British Govermnent in 1937 instituted a Royal Commission headed by 
Lord Robert Peel to inquire into the disturbances. The Peel Commission report 
introduced, openly for the first time the idea of partitioning Palestine.'^° 
The Zionist leader would not accept the Peel Commission's tentative scheme 
for division of Palestine into about two-thirds Arab and one-third Jewish (a much 
bigger share for the letter than the population ratio warranted at that time) and a 
transfer of population to make the scheme feasible.'^' (See on Map No. 7). Dr. Chaim 
Weizmann, was cautiously in favour of the partition proposal. He was support in his 
approval of the principle of partition by David Ben-Gurion. Among those who 
opposed partitions were Menhem Ussishki, Chairman of the Jewish National Fund 
and Vladimir Jabotinsky head of the revisionist.'^^ 
However, the Peel commission's partition scheme was rejected by the 20"^  
Zionist Congress in Zurich in 1937, but not shut out possibilities of negotiation. 
Weizmann had on idle that the Zionists should be prepared to accept a state even if it 
were the size of a tablecloth. The suave diplomatic Jew had clear ideas of how a 
Jewish state, of any dimension to start with, would expand. Partition on favourable 
terms remained constantly under discussion between the Zionist and their imperialist 
patron. Churchill gave Weizmann hoped of a good partition after the Second World 
War.'" 
The White papers 
There were two important White Papers, which were declared by the British 
Government. 
The early White Paper was declared by Mr. Winston Churchill then Colonial 
Secretary. In fact, before the declaration of the V/hite Paper in 1921, the delegation of 
the Palestine Arab Congress, which largely dominated by the Husaini family, 
discussed their grievances with Mr. Winston Churchill. They cleared about the term 
of the Mandate and time was ripe for a formal British declaration of what the future of 
the country they contemplated. The result of that meeting was the Churchill White 
Paper which condemned, the enthusiastic remarks and objected to the Pro-Zionist 
favouritism and denied that it was the intention of the British Government to create to 
wholly Jewish Palestine.'"''* Weizmann regarded the Churchill White Paper as a 
whittling down of the Balfour Declaration, but he was willing to accept it in as much 
as it reaffirmed the right of the Jews to form a National Home in Palestine. Further 
more the White Paper succeeded in defeating opposition to the Mandate in the British 
parliament and on July 24,1922 the Mandate was approved by the body.'''^ 
Another White Paper was declared in 1939 by Malcolm Mac Donald, the new 
Colonial Secretary. 
In fact one year back, in the summer of 1938, the British began an intensive 
search for an alternative solution to the Palestine problem. In late June, Malcolm Mac 
Donald thought of the feasibility of negotiations between the Arabs and the Jews for 
finding a settlement. The White Paper, entitled the "Definite British Plan" for 
Palestine and published on 17 May 1939, dealt with three main points namely. 
1. Future government for Palestine, 
2. Jewish immigration 
3. Land reforms.'^^ 
On the questions of future government for Palestine, the White Paper declared 
that the pledge continued in the Balfour Declaration to provide for the development of 
a Jewish national home. 
While retaining the concept of a Jewish national state, the White Papers 
rejected the Arab contention that British were obliged to set up an independent Arab 
state in Palestine under the pledges made by Henry McMahon on behalf of the British 
Govenmient in 1915. It further declared that the ultimate British objective was 
establishment of "an independent Palestine state in which the two peoples - Arabs 
and Jews shared authority in the government in such a way that essential interests of 
each are secured. 
Regarding Jewish immigration, it declared Jewish immigration the next five 
years to be rate which the economic absorptive capacity permits, approximately one-
third after the total population of the country. After a five year period in which above 
75,000 Jews would be permitted, no fiirther Jewish immigration to be permitted 
without acquiescence of the Palestinian Arabs. 
On land reforms, the White Paper said that their main purpose was to 
authorize the British High Commissioners to prohibit any regular transfer of land 
from Arab to Jews during the transitional period under review.'•'' 
However, the Zionists condemned the White Paper as an outrageous breach of 
faith, claiming that it denied them the right to reconstitute their national home in 
Palestine. In other side, the Arab also did not expect this white paper to have a 
different ending. 
The 1939 White Paper, however, come as a major setback to Zionist 
diplomacy and the leaders of the movement immediately sought a reorientation of 
Zionism in the face of the new turn of events. Throughout the war years, just such a 
reorientation took place in term of policy, organization, and of a shift in political 
concentration from Great Britain to the United State. 
Jewish Immigration to Palestine 
After Churchill's policy was approved the pace of immigration increased still 
further. The Jewish population of Palestine on Armistice Day was about 55,000. It 
was 84,000 in the Census of October 1922, and was believed by the High 
Commission to have increased to about 108,000 in March 1925, at the end of 1925, it 
was esfimated by the Zionist Organization at 138,000. On 1 September 1926, the total 
populafion, exclusive of about 100,000 nomadic Bedu, was officially estimated at 
777,000 including 158,000 Jews, who thus constituted about 20 percent of the settled 
inhabitants. In the 1930s, the number rose to about 232,000 legal immigrants. The 
Jewish population in 1939 numbered over 445,000 out of total of about 1500, 000 
which was nearly 30 percent of the total. Similarly, by the end of 1939, Jewish 
holdings of land had risen to almost 1.5 million dunums held at the beginning of the 
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Table - 1 
Immigration into Palestine 1920 - ] 
Year (October-September) 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
Immigrat 
Year 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1929'"' 
Recorded Immigration 
Jews 
5,514 
9,149 
7,844 
7,421 
12,856 
33,801 
13,081 
2,713 
2,178 
5,249 
Non Jews 
202 
190 
284 
570 
697 
840 
829 
882 
908 
1,317 
Table-2 
ion into Palestine, 1930-1939 '^*^ 
No. of Immigrations 
4,944 
4,075 
9,553 
30,327 
42,359 
61,854 
29,727 
10,536 
12,868 
16,405 
During the decade 1920-29 about 100,000 Jewish immigrants had entered 
Palestine, far less than envisaged by the Zionist Organization, but substantial enough 
to make a marked impact in a country where the total population in 1922 was 
officially estimated at about 750,000. The Zionist Organizations controlled the 
immigration, keeping out politically inconvenient elements. 
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The World Zionist Organization's discriminatory policy towards the native 
Arab population led to the eruption of violence in 1929. Awakened by this reaction 
the Mandatory constituted two Commissions the Shaw Conunission and the Simpson 
Commission to investigate into the question of immigration and land transfers.'"*^ 
In 1946, the number of Jews who immigrated to Palestine rose to 608,000 a 
large number of the Jews came to Palestine after 1933 as a result of Nazi persecution, 
their ration changed frorh one twelfth to one third of the total population.''*'' In the eye 
of the Palestinian community the Jewish immigrants were exclusivists and arrogant in 
their political and economic ideas, too western, too modem, too aggressive and in 
general a corrupting influence. More important, Palestinians quickly recognized that 
Zionism would be detrimental to nascent Palestinians nationalist aspirations. The 
Jewish immigration was threatening the numerical superiority of the indigenous Arab 
community and Zionist colonization was shaking its economic foundation.'''^  
Between 1930 and 1936 the British administration tried to initiate measures, 
such as the establishment of elected municipal councils, and later, a legislative council 
with a large majority of the appointed members in an attempt to reduce political 
frictions. These measures proved to be ineffective. The efforts of the Zionists to 
establish a settler state in Palestine were met with violent resistance from the 
Palestinians, and this situation continued simmering until it finally boiled over in 
1936.'^ * 
Zionism during the Second World War 
The Second World War had begun on 1 September 1939 when Germany 
invaded Poland. But, no fighting took place in Palestine during the War of 1939-1945. 
In these circumstances political development continued in the same general sense as 
before. On the one hand, official Zionism openly declared that the aim of the 
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movement was a Jewish state or commonwealth. On the other hand, the Arab came to 
regard the White Paper of 1939 as a right acquired not only the Palestine but by the 
Arab world in general.''*^ 
For the war, although, despite bitterness created by the 1939 White Paper, the 
Yishuv (Jewish people who stayed in Palestine) and World Zionist leaders had no 
alternative but to support Allied war efforts against the Nazis who was persecuting 
European Jews. Before terminating 1939, Zionist Congress, Weizmann informed 
Prime Minister of Britain Neville Chamberlain that the Jews stand by Great Britain 
and will fight on the side of the democracies.'''^ 
The National Council of Palestine's Jewish community initiated full scale 
mobilization in 1939 enlisting some 135,000 volunteers for military and other 
services. In 1942, a Jewish Rural Special Police unit was also formed under the 
British Middle East commander Chief and the unit finally became a Jewish Brigade in 
1944. 
At the mid point of Second World War, there was an extraordinary Zionist 
Conference at the Biltmore Hotel in New York in 1942. The Conference was openly 
given for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth. A Jewish state in Palestine 
was at last unequivocally meant. 
In fact, the declaration represented a triumph for the outspoken policy of Mr. 
Ben-Gurion, Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive in Palestine, over the more 
cautions attitude of Dr. Weizmaim President of the World Zionist Organization.'''^ 
The Biltmore programme had changed two significant in Zionist policy. There 
was to be fighting with arms by the Jews, with some international assistance against 
the Arabs and the British Mandatory administration in Palestine. Secondly, the United 
States was to be regarded from then on as the patron of Zionism and the pander of its 
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designs in suppression of or preference to Britain. The Zionist headquarters were 
transfer from London to New York.'^° 
The Formation of Israel 
The British Government disgusted and tired out by a policy of violence, 
designed to impose the Biltmore Programme of the Haganah and the two extremist 
groups the Irgim Zvai Leumi and the Lehi. They successfully made the Mandate 
unworkable and Britain sent a letter to the United Nations expressing its wish to give 
up the Mandate and hand it over to the United Nations. 
The United Nations accepted the offer and in early of May 1947, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations Organization set up the United Nations - Special 
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to investigate and make recommendation on the 
Palestine issue in all its aspects.'^' On 31 August 1947 the UNSCOP came forward 
with two plans, a majority plan for the partition of Palestine into two states, one 
Jewish and one Arab with economic Union; and a minority plan for a federal state. 
The assembly adopted the majority plan on 29 November. The Zionists favored 
partition, while the Arabs rejected both plans. The partition plan divided Palestine into 
six principal parts, there of which comprising 56% of the total area were reserved for 
the Jewish state and three (with enclave of Jaffa) comprising 43% of the area, for the 
Arab state. It provided that Jerusalem would be an international zone administered by 
the United Nations as the Holy city for three religions.'" (See Map No. 8). 
The whole Arab world rose in protest against the United Nation partition 
resolution because it denied self-determination to Palestine's Arab majority. Palestine 
wide committees were formed to meet the crisis. The Yishuv and Zionists throughout 
the world on other hand were overjoyed at the United Nations recommendation.'^^ 
9Q 
In the first week of April, the Haganah concluded cooperation agreement with 
Irgun and Lehi and took delivery of two large arms shipment from Czechoslovakia. 
They come out with the first stage of offensives in operational Plan. D (for the 
Hebrew letter "Dalef). The Plan was designed to destroy Palestinian Arab resistance 
through the capture and clearing of their towns and villages. By this operation, about 
1700 people were killed. The Jewish forces which led by the Irgun and Lehi swung 
into full-scale attacked again in April 1948. Indeed after a short period the Mandate 
was terminated on 14 May in the same year, 400,000 Arab's had evacuated their 
homes to become reftigees in neighboring Arab countries.'^'' (See Map No. 9 and 
No. 10). 
Immediately after the Mandate was relinquished, the State of Israel officially 
declared by the Jewish authorities in Palestine, a few minutes later the United States 
of America accorded its recognition and was followed by the Soviet Union, while the 
United States representatives were still debating trusteeship in the United Nations. Dr. 
Chaim Weizmann was chosen as the first President of the new republic and David 
Ben-Gurion as its first Prime Minister.'^ ^ 
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CHAPTER - II 
"It is impossible to dream of a voluntary agreement 
between us and Arab, not now, and not in the future. 
Every nation civilized or primitive sees it as its 
national home where it wants to stay as the sole landlord 
forever. 
I love my people and Palestine this is my creed; this 
is the business of my life". 
(Vladimir Jabotinsky) 
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CHAPTER-11 
The Israeli Right Wing: Practice and Ideology 
The long history of Israeli Right can be broadly divided into two main phases: 
The first phase is before the establishment of Israeli state, which covers the history of 
the Revisionist movement headed by Zeev Jabotinsky and the development of the two 
underground organization, the Irgun Zvai Leumi (The Etzel or IZI) and Lohamei 
Heral Israel (Lehi). The second phase is after the establishment of the state. It covers 
the history of the Right in the state of Israel, mainly that of the Herut movement 
headed by Menahem Begin and its development from an isolated opposition (until 
1965) into a central and subsequently (1977) ruling party. 
The Israeli Right Wing Before the formation of Israel 
Jabotinsky and the Zionist Right Wing 
In April 1920, with the help of Pihas Rutenberg and Moshe Smitiansky, 
Jabotinsky put his idea of a self Defence Corps into practice. These corps later 
became Haganah unit (Jewish defense organization). The authorities as well as the 
public knew of the organized existence of the Haganah members and of their being 
armed.' 
The first operation, as an opening of the operation, Jabotinsky personally led 
the resistance to the Nabi Musa riots in the same month which they founded. It was 
the first Arab attacks in Jerusalem.^  After the riots, Jabotinsky was arrested with 
nineteen members of Haganah who had taken part in the terrorist operations and he 
was sentenced to fifteen years of penal servitude and transferred to the prison of 
Acre.^  However, Jabotinsky along with other who were sentenced in the case were 
granted amnesty a few months later by Herbert Samual, the first high commissioner. 
Jabotinsky became the very symbol of militant Zionism from that time.^  
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Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky was born in 1880 in a middle class Jewish family 
in Odessa, which ranked with Warsaw, Vilna and Salonika as one of the great Jewish 
cities of Europe.^  
He was quite distanced from Judaism in his youth. Like Theodor Herzl, he 
approached the Jewish experience from outside. He was educated in Russian (rather 
than Hebrew) school in a relatively cosmopolitan atmosphere. At the same time he 
started to learn Hebrew at an early age and was eventually to become an 
accomplished Hebraist. Jabotinsky left Russia for the first time in the spring of 1898 
for Switzerland. He enrolled in the Law school of university of Berne, for a while and 
in autumn of the same year he went to Rome. As a university student in Rome he took 
a number of courses in Roman law, Political economy and Statistics. He studied there 
for a number of years.^ 
Jabotinsky admired Mazzini and Garibaldi the creators of Italian unity. He 
learned how Italians had forged their democratic unity on the battlefield. He found the 
teachings of Mazzini of much relevance for the Zionist movement.^  Later, he was 
impressed and influenced by Mussolini. He was slow in seeing that Fascist leader was 
a hollow, theatrical imitation of the great revolutionary leaders of Italy.^  
After his returning to Odessa, he worked as a journalist in a daily newspaper; 
Jabotinsky was a skilful writer in several languages and a brilliant orator, an agitator a 
man of many parts.^ He published several articles up to the out-break of the first 
World War. These were sometimes signed with his name and sometimes appeared 
under his pen name of "Altalena". 
If the Dreyfus case was the turning point of Herzl, so the Kishinev pogrom 
(1903) did the same for Jabotinsky. He became involved in the first attempts at self 
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defence in Odessa in the work of the Kishinev pogrom and attended the Zionist 
Congresses and the Helsingfors Conference." 
After the Young Turk Revolution (1908) Jabotinsky worked for the World 
Zionist Organization (WZO) in Constantinople but he resigned as a result of 
disagreements with David Wolffsonh the president of World Zionist Organization. 
Betar 
In March 1921, Jabotinsky joined the Zionist executive. He spent almost two 
years in a leading part in its activities as a political adviser, fund raiser all-purpose 
Zionist propagandist. However, in protest against what he regarded as Weizmann's 
fatal policy of renunciation and compromise, he resigned from the executive in 
January 1923.'' 
Jabotinsky intended to withdraw from politics altogether for a time but when 
he was invited to join the editorial board of Rassvat (Dawn) he accepted the invitation 
and his articles were always hard hitting and well written. 
The idea of setting up a political party and a youth movement occurred to 
Jabotinsky during a trip to Latria and Lithuania in late 1923. In Riga, the capital of 
Latvia, he met members of the local Jewish student association, a generation of youth 
that was worth believing in and Jobotinsky described it as fundamentally identical to 
any other nationalist student group in its immediate environment. He envisioned a 
new kind of nationalist Hebrew Jew, a kind of Jewish gentile possessed of an overall 
national culture.''' Jabotinksy made up his mind to enlist them for cause of Zionist 
activism. The group of the students required him to organize a party, which was later 
founded at Riga. Its name was Betar (name after Trumpeldor) the revisionist 
movement. Jabotinksy did not merely offer them an operative political programme 
consisting of a few simple points, but tried to imbue them with an activist national 
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consciousness, a national awareness, and a national cultural ethos. Betar was intended 
to be a spiritual home for its members in the Diaspora, as well as an organized cadre 
for training those who were to take part in the future national and political struggle.'^ 
Poland prior to 1914 was the archetypical country of romantic nationalism. 
Between the two world wars Poland became caught up in an intensive process of 
nation-building and state building. There was a country bursting with intense national 
inspiration and the polish national and political culture was the closest and most 
familiar example of a nation and state for the publicity efforts of the Zionist Right. 
The Revisionist also had their own image of Poland.'^ It took the Betar a number of 
year to grow in Poland, but eventually, its main strength was concentrated. Betar with 
its emphasis on monism (UM adulterated Zionism), gained in strength. It always 
aspired to be mass organization, appealing not only to high school students but to 
young people in all walks of life. From Poland it spread to many other European 
countries and also established branches overseas and of course in Palestine." 
The Revisionist Movement 
Jabotinsky and two Zionist activist circles, namely a group, of veteran Zionist 
journal Rassvat and a group of Jewish students, members of the National student 
union in the Latvian Capital Riga, had a meeting in 1925; the outcome of the meeting 
was a movement, called Berit Ha-Zohar (The Union of Zionist Revisionist). 
Meanwhile a Central Committee of twelve members was formed and Jabotinsky 
himself was elected President. The name "Revisionist" indicated that they demanded 
a "revision" of the Mandate in the sense that Tran Jordan should be included in the 
area to which the provisions of the National Home apply and their policy called for 
return to the principles and policies of Herzl (Herlian Zionism).'** 
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The new program of the Revisionist movement was based on the following. 
The aim of Zionism is the gradual transformation of Palestine (Trans Jordan 
included) into a Jewish "common wealth" that is into a self-governing commonwealth 
under the auspices of an established Jewish majority. Any other interpretation of 
Zionism, was considered invalid. 
Indeed, at that time, they were thinking of an operative Zionist programme 
rather than creating a new type of national ideology. All the main point in their 
programmes was of a pragmatic operative nature. Some of them were taken from the 
existing repertoire of Zionist plans, which for some reason or other had never before 
been included in a comprehensive programme of any other political party.^^ 
There was a point of view, which was difference between Jakotinsky and the 
Central Committee of the Union of Zionist Revisionists. The issue was whether "The 
Union of Zionist Revisionists was to become an integral part of the World Zionist 
Organization or not". In spite of Jabotinsky's option for independence, the Committee 
convinced him that the integral part of the World Zionist Organization's attitude 
would serve their purposes while the movement reserves to itself the right of 
independent propaganda in Jewish and non-Jewish circles.'^' However the Central 
Committee further decided that the Revisionist Union should participate in the 
Fourteenth Zionist Organization and Jabotinsky was again in the Zionist official 
political arena which he had resigned (from the Zionist Executive) two years-earlier. 
At that time he accused his former colleagues, especially Weizmann, of lacking 
political realism and of submitting without cause to the mandatory efforts to curtail its 
pledges to the Jews. Between 1925 and 1929 the Revisionist stubbornly opposed the 
admittance of non-Zionists to any share whatsoever in the administration of the 
projected Jewish Agency.'^ Only a part of the Revisionists actually withdrew from the 
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Zionist Organization in 1929. Jabotinsky however including among who remained, 
and refused to abide by the decisions of the Zionist Congress.^'' 
The periodic conferences of the "World Union" of the Revisionist movement 
attracted increasing numbers of delegates from Europe and the United States. At the 
1925 Zionist Congress only four delegates of the Revisionist movement attended. But 
despite the modest show ing, Jabotinsky traveled widely, propagandized intensively, 
and won over tens of thousand of new followers. In 1929 Congress, thus twenty-one 
Re\ isionist delegates were represented and after two years the delegates increased to 
fift\-t\\o.-^ 
In fact, nearly two-thirds of the Revisionists lived in Poland in the mid 1930s. 
The Palestine branch fluctuated in size, winning members from and losing them to 
other parties."' 
Thus, at the 1931 congress Jabotinsky introduced a resolution, recommending 
that the Zionists openly demand a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan. Although 
the resolution was defeated, the Revisionist party thereafter adopted the proposal as 
one of its basic planks. In 1935 Jabotinsky formally resigned from the Zionist 
Organization and set up his own New Zionist Organization."^ 
The 1929 Arab riot and the effect 
The Arab riot which broke out in August 1929 appeared to be the opening of 
the stormy 1930s."' Before the Riot broke out, Ben-Gurion, Golomb and the other 
major leaders were busy with other tasks and they did not concern themselves with 
the details of Haganah activity. Therefore, the Haganah proved to be ill quipped to 
conduct defence on a scale commensurate with the Arab eruption. However when the 
riot took place, the Haganah did show that it was able to prevent an even greater 
disaster to the Jewish population. Even Jabotinsky, its long time enemy, now lavished 
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praise on the Haganah and conceded that it had saved the Jewish population during 
four days that elapsed until the British forces brought the outbreak under control.^ ** 
After the Riots, the public organ of Jewish community reconsidered the whole 
question of defence. Jabotinsky stuck to his view that the only a legal army quite apart 
from its political value could attain the required standard of training and discipline."^ 
Moreover, in early 1930, there was the Passfield White Paper (an unsuccessful 
attempt) countervailing Mac Donald Letter and other by now well known milestones 
in the political history of Eretz Israel (This term is use to denote the Hebrew kingdom 
under David) influenced the development of Revisionism in several ways.''" On the 
political constitutional level. Revisionist regarded the issue of the White Paper as 
proof of the utter failure of the current Zionist coalition under the leadership of Chaim 
Weizmann. In its view it was a direct and unavoidable result of the intrinsic weakness 
of Weizmann's policies, characterized by his surrender to the anti-Zionist 
administration in Eretz Israel, and an inadequate sense of the need to marsh at the 
active support of the British government behind the Zionist case.^' 
in July 1931 at 17' Zionist Congress in Base, the Revisionists introduced a 
resolution demanding the definition and formal publication of the final aim of 
Zionism along these lines. The establishment of the promised National Home in 
Palestine mean was turning all the mandatory territories on both sides of the Jordan 
into Jewish state i.e. a commonwealth with a Jewish majority"."' 
In fact, Jabotinsky was nearly chosen to be Chairman of the Zionist Congress 
and occupy the much coveted peat of his arch-rival Weizmann but the final result was 
changed by the warning of the leaders of the Haganah in Eretz Israel which claimed 
that the election of Jabotinskv as head of Zionist collation might set off renewed Arab 
riot in Eretz Israel. Eventually, Nahan Sokolow was elected President of the Zionist 
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movement, while Chaim Arlosoroff was chosen as the head of the Political 
Department." 
In spring of the same year, the Jerusalem commander of the Haganah with 
some followers broke away from Haganah and formed an independent defense unit. 
The majority of the dissidents was of the non-labours affiliation and resented labour 
dominance in the defense movement. The new independent defense unit knows as 
Haganah B which attracted many young members of the Maccabi athletic movement 
and also some university students, in addition to many revisionists.'''' 
Ar losorofrs Murder and the Revisionists 
Arlosoroff won a seat on the Jewish Agency Executive Committee at the 1931 
Congress. He became head of its political department dealing with international 
affairs. Following Adolf Hitler's ascent to power in Germany in January 1933, 
Arlosoroff helped German Jews to immigrate to Palestine by striking a deal with the 
German government which allowed Jews to depart with most of their property. The 
deal so called "Transfer" on arrangement for the transfer of German Jewish capital in 
form of German export goods, which had been approved by the worker party (Mapai) 
and the majority in the Zionist movement, was similarly regarded by the Revisionists 
as an act of high treason. In April 1933 Chaim Arlosoroff, the Chairman of the 
Political Department of the Jewish Agency, went to Nazi Germany to negotiate an 
agreement with Nazi authorities. The Revisionists objected to the Transfer Agreement 
because it counteracted their plan for a world-wide Jewish boycott of German goods, 
which they believed would weaken the Nazi regime.^^ The Revisionist pointed the 
Transfer Agreement as an act of high treason and a ultimate proof of the despicable 
indifference of the Labour movement toward the distress of European Jewry. This 
was denounced strongly by the Right Wing Zionist Revisionist and their extremist 
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faction in Palestine Brit Habriyonim.^^ In June 1933, Arlosoroff was killed during a 
stroll along the Tel-Aviv seashore with his wife. Soon after the murder of Arlosoroff, 
rumors were spread that it was the work of Revisionists. Three Revisionist leaders, 
Aba Achimeir, Zvi Rosenblatt and Avraham Stavsky were arrested as the murder 
suspects by a British mandate court. Two were released for lack of evidence but third 
Avraham Stavsky was given a death sentence by the identification of Arlosoroff s 
wife as one of the attackers."" 
The murder of Arlosoroff split Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) into 
two hostile camps. The Leftist Zionist blamed the Revisionists and the latter blamed 
the Arabs for the killing.^' 
The Split 
In fact, Jabotinsky wished to resign from the Zionist Organization 
immediately after the Zionist Organization rejected his demand for declaration of the 
establishment of Jewish state as an ultimate objective of Zionism. However, the 
moderate member of the Revisionist movement did not want a rift with the Labour 
movement. They preferred to use the 'Revision" of Zionist policy and the formation 
of an internal coalition against Chaim Weizmann as their policy."^ The meeting which 
was held in Calai and Boulonges was the last-ditch attempts to prevent the schism. 
After 1931 election, however, the Revisionists resigned from the National Council 
immediately to protest against the support of Zionist Executive and its conciliatory 
stance towards the Mandatory government.'*^ 
In addition, the Arlosoroff murder case led the Labour and General Zionist 
refused to sit on the Executive with the Revisionists at the Eighteenth Zionist 
Congress in 1933. They decried the Revisionist circles as "blood libel'.'" Moreover, 
the circumstances of economic boom after the arrival of the German Jewish 
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immigrates to Palestine under the Transfer policy, led to the break point between the 
Revisionist and the Labour movement. The immigration increased the demography 
and the capital, which turned the stable economic situation into a positive boom until 
1936. The boom periods weakened the power of Labour, which had, the previous 
tactic intended to avert the Revisionist threat became quite inadequate. Discrimination 
in entry permission had become an absolute measure of discrimination in work 
allocation''^ . The large extents of the affiliation of new comers became the key to the 
political composition of the Jewish population of Eretz Israel. The key according to 
which immigration certificate were allocated was the member of harhsharah 
(agricultural training courses) participants of various movements abroad, subject to a 
computation by the Jewish Agency's Aliyah Department of the manpower required in 
the Palestinian labour market. The Revisionist rejected the certificate policy which 
was the result of collusion between Great Britain and the Official Zionist Authorities 
and regarded the existing immigration policy as a clear attempt to prevent their 
immigration."*^ The Revisionist petition appeal which carried 600,000 signatures, 
failed to convince Britain which was under Arab pressure further limited the number 
of entry permission to Palestine. The Socialist Zionist leaders and the Jewish Agency 
refused to concede the Revisionist demand for illegal immigration. In October 1933 
after the clash, the Revisionist left the World Zionist Organization and set up their 
own trade union, and in 1935 they established their own News Zionist Organization 
which claimed some 700,000 members."*^  
Irgun Zvai Leu mi 
The National Military Organization or ETZEL being the Hebrew acronym for 
Irgun Zvai Leumi, was formed by the Revisionist Zionists in Palestine in 1937, during 
the period of Arab revolt (1936-1939).'*^ In fact the members of the Irgun mostly 
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came from Haganah B. which split from Haganah in 1933. Initially the leaders of 
Haganah B. did not want to align themselves with any political party but found it 
difficult to maintain a neutral position on the situation of political explosive between 
Labour Zionist movement and The Revisionist and within Haganah itself. Eventually, 
Avraham Stern, an independent Revisionist and leader of Betar, split from the 
Haganah. and recruited members of Haganah B. into a militant and terrorist 
organization called the National Military Organization or Irgun Zvai Leumi."*^ 
Indeed, the formation of Irgun was a result of disagreement of the Revisionist 
in Palestine with Haganah which limited itself to responding to Arab guerrilla 
act i \ i t ) . It was composed of those who opposed the Havlaga (self-Restraint) policy of 
the Haganah which implied a conscious effort on the part of the Jewish community to 
react moderately to Arab provocations and attacks. 
The Irgun favoured more aggressive tactics than the Haganah proper. It 
adopted and launched a programme of "massive retaliation" against Arab resistance to 
Zionist policy in Palestine."*^ It original aim was to organize massive illegal 
immigration which had been restricted by the British rule. By this aim it took a 
stringent anti British line. This polic\ was, by and large supported by the Revisionist 
youth movement Betar, which was headed by Menachem Begin who in 1938 met 
Yaacov Meridor one of the emissaries who was sent by the Irgun to Poland."** The 
Irgan and Betar combined to criticize Jabotinsky for what it saw as his pro-British 
stand. However Jabotinsky's retaliation to Begin's proposal for immediate conquest 
of Palestine that was absolutely impossible. The Irgun was not strong enough to face 
the British force. Moreover at that time they were fighting with the Haganah. 
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The Haganah and the Jewish Agency set their faces sternly against reprisals. 
In spite of appeals and condemnation by the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi (The 
National Council). The Irgun began to retaliate indiscriminately against Arabs.^ " 
In the meantime in May 1939 the British Government embodied the Mac 
Donald White Paper which was the signal for a recrudescence of violence by the 
Irgun.^ ' In fact it was not only Irgan which was against the White Paper. The White 
paper created the dramatic break in relations between Great Britain and the entire 
Zionist. The Jewish community regarded the new policy as a kind of betrayal. The 
criticisms of the White Paper indeed were transformed into a general attack on the 
Mandate. In Palestine, the policy of non-cooperation with the British authorities was 
announced by Ben-Gurion himself to encourage the Irgun Zvai Leumi.^' 
The Irgun established secret cells within the ranks of Betar in spite of the 
opposition of the heads of Betar as well as Jabotinsky himself. The conflicts within 
themselves however, came to an end only when Meacham Begin who was acceptable 
to both the Irgun and the members of the secret cell, was appointed Head of Betar in 
Poland in March 1939 six months before the break of World War 11.^ '' 
During this period, Britain was regarded by the leaders of the Irgun as a major 
impediment to Jewish national aspiration and Irgun members engaged in active 
resistance to the mandatory power. In June 1939 therefore, the Army and the 
Administration began to take action. Collective punishment was inflicted on Jewish 
communities, traffic in and out of Tel-Aviv was stopped for thirty-six hours, Jewish 
cafes and shop were closed to the forces, and two days of curfew was imposed in Tel-
Aviv. Violence did not diminish but look a second direction against the Government. 
In June the post office and the railway station in Tel-Aviv were bombed.^  
Nevertheless, after the outbreak of World War 11 the Irgun accepted Jabotinsky's 
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request to cease hostilities against the British and joined the war effort against the 
Axis power.^' 
Begin who volunteered for the Polish army was sent to Palestine in May 1942. 
Next year in December, he was discharged from the Polish army and was immediately 
appointed the commander of the Irgun with Meridor as his second in commanded to 
act as soon as possible in order to achieve their Zionist Right wing's aim.^ ^ 
During the early part of the war the Irgun had participated in the war effort, 
several of its leading members had been killed in special operations under taken on 
behalf of the British army command. The danger of German invasion had been faded, 
and the British authorities continued to carry out the White Paper policy.^' 
The Irgun under the new leadership which led by Begin demanded immediate 
transfer of power in Eretz Israel to a Provisional Hebrew government. By late 1943 
the new leadership thought the time was ripe for resuming ties attacks on the British. 
In early 1944 Begin and his Irgun staff had to determine the manner in which to call 
upon the Jews of Palestine to revolt and the anti British campaign would begin.^ ^ 
On the morning of February 1, 1944 citizens throughout Palestine found the 
Irgun proclamation plastered on the walls all over the country that there is no longer 
any armistice between the Jewish people and the British administration. 
Report of the extermination of Jews in Europe filtered through to Palestine but 
the British refused to permit the refugees of the Nazi Holocaust to enter Palestine.^ ^ 
The Irgun's terror attacks increased and they attacked the Palestine broadcasting 
station at Ramallah and various police stations in Tel-Aviv and Haifa area. In 1944 
more than two hundred of its members were arrested and exiled to Eritrea. The Irgun 
had the support not only of the Revisionist, but also to a certain extent of members of 
ihe religious parties and the Right wing General Zionists. Even sections of the Zionist 
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Left were so exasperated by the lack of any effective help for European Jewry on the 
partoftheBritish.^" 
After the Second World War, Menacham Begin, who often disguised himself 
as an orthodox rabbi to except British arrest, led the members of the Irgun to operate 
in small until. They blew up the British High Command and Administrative Center in 
the King David Hotel in the city of Jerusalem in summer of 1946.^' In the same year, 
they engineered a prison break at Acre where many members of the Haganah and 
Irgun were being held as political prisoners by the British. Many time up to the late 
forties; they attacked British airfields in Palestine. In fact their operations were not 
confined to Palestine only. In Europe they brew up the British Embassy in Rome. 
However, the British reacted immediately many members of Irgun were killed in 
battle and other were executed.^' During the months preceding the founding of Israel 
in mid-May 1948, the Irgun and other minor terror outfits cooperated in carrying out 
concerted attacks on Arabs. On 9-10 April 1948, in eight-hour attack on Deir Yassin 
village near Jerusalem, they killed 254 men women and children, two thirds of all 
inhabitants. They dynamited house, looted and raped. The bodies of the victims was 
mutilated and thrown in to a well. After the massacre some 500,000 Arab fled from 
the areas included in the United Nations plan for a Jewish State." 
Stern Gang (Lchi) 
A few days before Jabotinsky's death in 1940 Jabotinsky cabled from the 
United States to David Raziel one of the Irgun commanders to resume the leadership 
of the Irgun.^ However Avraham (Yair) Stern one of Irgun's top commanders refused 
to obey and seceded, he and a few hundred followers set up the National Military 
Organization in Israel. Its name was later changed to Israel Freedom Fighters 
(Lohami Herat Israel) known in Palestine as Lehi and known popularly abroad as the 
35 
Stem Gang. In fact, for several years previously Stern had pursued a policy designed 
to detach Irgum from revisionism. During 1938-1939 with the help of the Polish 
army, he had represented his organization in Poland, organizing the training of 
selected members and purchased arms for his group.^^ When the decision to cease 
hostilities against the British and join the war effort against the A.\is-power, was 
declared, it prompted Avraham Stern to split the ranks of the Irgun. Finally, he and his 
supporters split from Irgun after Raziel resumed the leadership of Irgun. The new 
group developed its own views regarding the nature of the struggle against Britain as 
well as its own international orientation. Stern however, maintained that anti-British 
activities should be intensified. As the British were engaged in struggle against 
Germany they would more easily yield to Jewish demands. Stern was of the opinion 
that the Jews should join the British army only after a political settlement had been 
reached.^^ Stern's single minded belief that the only solution to the Jewish catastrophe 
in Europe was the end of British domination of Palestine. Lehi criticized Revisionist 
ideology and challenged both Jabotinsky's leadership and principle of political 
Zionism. 
Irgun activities ceased until early 1944 when they resumed their attacks on the 
British after Menacham Begin had taken command from Ya'acov meridor. On the 
other hand, stern and his handful of followers continued the armed struggle 
throughout the war.^' Stern moved even further to the Right when the war started. As 
they could not defeat Britain with their own pony forces they looked to her enemies 
for salvation. They came into contact with an Italian agent in Jerusalem and in 
September 1940 they drew up an agreement whereby Mussolini would recognize a 
Zionist state in return for Lehist coordination with the Italian Army when the country 
was to be invaded. Stern also attempted to make contact with Otto Von Hentig, the 
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German emissary in Vichy Syria with the hope of striicing a deal against the British in 
Palestine. Mis overtures were contemptuously ignored/'** The Lehi had little or no 
source for funds its terror activities. Desperate for funds, Stern and Lehi were soon 
reduced to occasional bank robberies. In 1941 Lehists bomb attempt, which killed the 
Tel Aviv police chief and two Jewish police officers indeed, the event meant for a 
British intelligence officers. A few weeks later on February 12. 1942, Stern was shot 
dead by the British police officers as he tried to escape arrest.^^ 
The death of Stern put an end to any further attempts by Lehi to find allies 
outside Palestine and from that moment on it concentrated on terrorist warfare inside 
Palestine. Lehi under its new leaders Natham Friedmann Yellin and Dr. Israel Scheb 
concluded that violence was the one method capable of driving the British from 
Palestine.'" Two weeks after the death of Stern, Struma a ship which carried 670 
Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe to Palestine sank in the Black sea. Lehi 
attributed direct responsibility for the Struma tragedy and the decision to send the 
Jews back to Europe to Sir Harold Mac Michael the High commission for Palestine 
and to Lord Moyne. the British Minister Resident in Cairo. The assassination of these 
two was planed by the organization but the plan did not succeed at that time. 
Friedmann Yellin and some of Lehi's member were arrested in effect, the 
organization ceased to exist. 
In the early month of November 1943, Friedmann Yellin and other 19 
members of the Lehi escaped from a detention camp in Latrun. They had dug a 233 
feet long tunnel and walked out unnoticed. Immediately, the assassination of Sir Mac 
Michael and Lord Moyne was planned again. The attempt on the life of the High 
commissioner Sir Haroald Mac Michael was made on August 8, 1944. In an exchange 
of fire Sir Haroald Mac Michael was wounded but escaped with his life. On October 
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18, 1944, two hundred and fifty-one Irgun and Lehi men were gathered from various 
prisons and camps and sent to a detention camp in Eritrea/^ 
Three weeks later, on 6'^ November the Lehi perpetrated its most audacious 
crime. It took place in Cairo and was directed against Lord Moyne. He was 
assassinated in Cairo Street by two members of Lehi as he was leaving the British 
residence. The event happened few hours after Weizmann's friendly and reassuring 
luncheon with Churchill in London. The two killers were placed on trial in Cairo on 
January 10, 1945 and were swiftly convicted and hanged.^ " 
Indeed, the news of Lord Moyne's assassination shocked Jews all over the 
world. In Palestine, they thought that the terrorists had destroyed the hopes of the 
Jewish people and the Jewish people therefore, must forsake them. The leadership of 
the Jewish community made full use of the foreboding occasioned by the death of 
Lord Moyne to launch a large scale attack on the Irgun. Thousands of Haganah 
members were mobilized and concentrated in the big towns to carry out on anti-
terrorist campaign alongside the British police. 
The collaboration between Jewish Agency and British in Palestine continued 
for several months. Finally, certain political event in U.K. brought about a complete 
change in situation. Before the election of July 1945, the Labour Party demanded the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine at the Black pool conference. But a few 
weeks after the election Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary shattered all illusion and 
made it clear that he did not consider himself bound by the Black pool resolution.^ ^ 
Immediately, the meeting between the three organizations, Lehi, Irgun and 
Haganah was held and it was then agreed that the three organizations should continue 
their independent existence but should agree to forego for the sake of unity in armed 
58 
struggle all independent operations accept those for the confiscation of arms and 
money. 
The period of united struggle in the resistance moment greatly benefited the 
Lehi as it gained acceptance in the public eye. Those who were strongly opposed to 
violence no longer regarded it as their duty to assist the police in prevention of acts of 
terrorism and apprehension of perpetrator. Moreover, the political situation in general 
had deteriorated rather than improved." 
Between September 1946 and May 1948 when the state of Israel finally came 
into existence, well over a hundred acts of terror were carried out by the Lehi. Most of 
these were directed against military transport, army personnel and they robbed many 
banks to support their activities. Lehi and Irgun cooperated to attack Arabs in Deir 
Yassin. Another operation which operated by members of Lehi was the assassination 
of the Swedish diplomat Count Foike Bernadott, the UN mediator for Palestine and 
the French Colonel Andre Sarraut Chief UN observer in Jerusalem was killed in the 
same time by accident; the incident occurred after the declaration of Israel 4 months.^^ 
The Israeli Right Wing after the formation of Israel 
The Herut (The freedom movement) The British withdrawal from Palestine 
and the birth of the state of Israel brought an end to the Revisionist organization and 
the Irgun. However both were permitted to retain their separate units in the Israeli 
army. Unlike the leadership of Lehi, Begin and his associates emerged from the 
underground and made a determined effort to adapt to the reality of statehood. The 
debacle of the Altalena, the Irgun arms ship was a sharp lesson that he and the Ingun 
in general could no longer behave as they had in the recent past. They were 
constrained by the legal parameters of statehood. Eventually they established a 
political movement in august 1948 and decided to name it Herut (Freedom) or Tcnual 
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Ha'Herut (The Freedom movement) originally the name of the Irgun underground 
paper.'' Through this and other actions, Begin clearly indicated that his political party 
intended to be a continuation of his underground organization, not Jabotinsky's 
Revisionist party. However, Begin continued to emphasize his debt to Jobotinsky, his 
own underground organization (Irgun) and the political organization (Herut), which 
emerged from it intentionally, destroyed the Revisionist party. As he said, the Herut 
movement will arise out of the depths of the Hebrew underground and will be created 
by our great fighting family, composed of all classes of people from all over the 
world, of all classes and tendencies who rallied to the banner of the Irgun Zvai 
Leumi.^ ° 
The Herat's motifs and principles 
Immediately after the establishment of Herut party, Herut published a booklet 
which written the introduction by Begin and entitled "The Herut Movement, its 
Foundation and principles." The motifs and principle of the Herut party which were 
stated in the book are as following. 
"The state of Israel is not the land of Israel or the homeland of the Jews; the 
goal is the homeland and not one strip of its territory ... if we do not expand we will 
be thrown into the sea ... There is no Jewish irredenta, but a question of survival". 
The principles of Herut Party which were included in the book read as 
following. 
i. The Jewish homeland with its territory on both banks of the Jordan River, 
is a historical and geographical whole 
ii. The partition of the homeland is an illegal act. Agreeing to partition is also 
illegal. It does not bind the Jewish people. 
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iii. The mission of our generation is to recover tiiose parts of the homeland 
given to foreign rule. 
In dealing with foreign policy, the document states two seemingly contradictory 
principles. 
i. The main objective of the Hebrew foreign policy will be to ensure the 
unification of the torn homeland. Under a sovereign Hebrew rule. 
ii. The Hebrew foreign policy will be a policy of peace. 
Herut was more extreme views than any other parties. However, Herut was not 
merely an activist party (like Ahdul Avoda, the Left Nationalist), but an ideological 
one as well.*'' The Herut party remained fully as uncompromising in its demands after 
1948 as in the pre-state Jabotinsky era. Its platform stated that Israel must expand to 
its full "historical" borders on both sides of the Jordan River, adopt a straight forward 
western orientation in foreign affairs and a vigorous capitalist approach in its 
domestic policy. Mass immigration was to be encouraged, and a written constitution 
adopted to guarantee the nation's future political stability.^' 
Jabotinsky and Herut 
Although Jabotinsky died in 1940 but the impact of his though on the Herut 
party led since its inception by Menachem Begin has been greater the intellectual of 
any of the Zionist founding father on the various successor partiers to the parties of 
the pre-state World Zionist Organization. As the party spokesman repeatedly have 
referred to Jabotinsky as "our father, teacher and master" describe themselves as 
"disciples" "students" and children" and speak of their task as "carrying out the 
testament of Jabotinsky."**^  
The loyalty of Herut members to Jabotinsky was not because Herut treated as 
a pariah b\' Ben Gurion but the chief explanation for Herut loyalty is that Jabotinsky's 
61 
political mode of analysis no less than many of the specific programmes he advocated 
and goals he pursued remained untested and un-achieved. Although time passed from 
1948 to 1977 with tone and substance have been changed, an examination of llcrut 
platforms reveals striking continuity not merely from one election to next but with the 
policies originally enunciated by Jabotinsky.^ "* 
Herut on the Territorial Issue 
Despite its territorial longings. Herut in the >ears after the war of 
Independence did not advocate or seek war in order to regime the unredeemed 
portions of Eretz Israel. 
Herut's willingness to suspend its ideological demands, derived from the fact 
that though an essentially one. This suggested the possibility of an ultimate 
ideological retrenchment in changed circumstances after the passage of time. In fact 
Begin and Jabotinsky claimed that both banks of the Jordan River, according to lines 
sanctioned by the original League of Nations Mandate. .Although Herut remained 
bitterly critical of Ben-Gurion"s failure to "Liberate" at least West Bank during the 
war of Independence, the party acquiesced in the status quo post bellum. Herutniks 
were convinced that the Arabs would not give their profound animosity toward Israel 
- allow the Jewish state to live in peace. When the Arab started another war, as was 
virtually inevitable Herut would demand the "Liberation'" of the historical core of the 
Land of Israel.^' 
Although, Herut doubted that peace with the Arabs could ever be attained the 
movement was optimistic on two points of fundamental importance. 
First: The movement believed that Israel would eventually be able to liberate 
at least some of the unredeemed portions of the land of Israel. 
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Second: it was confident that Israel could survive and prosper despite 
inevitable Arab hostility. Herutniks were certain that Israel would be able to continue 
to off set the Arab's quantitative advantage by constantly enhancing its qualitative 
superiority.*'^ 
However Herut continued to make the claim to all of Palestine for failure to 
maintain that claim Begin warned meant that should the territories come into Israel's 
hands, Israel could be pushed back to the old border. 
Hcrut as an opposition party 
l-rom the first Knesset, Begin shaped distinctive opposition to the Mapai 
government of Ben-Gurion. When Weizmann swore for president, he missed 
Jabolinksky name from a roll call of Zionist heroes from Herzl and Ahad Ha'am 
onward, Begin vociferously reminded the new president to complete. 
In the Knesset, the ultra nationalist intellectual and poet Uri Zvi Greenberg 
now a Herut member of the Knesset similar attacked the government for their lack of 
wil l to reclaim the whole of the land, not only Trans Jordan but also the slopes of 
Lebanon and the approaches to the Nile.^^ 
Begin attacked the government again when an orchestrated lobby of pro-
Jordanian Palestinians in Jericho asked Abdullah to integrate the West Bank into his 
kingdom. Ben-Gurion government was acquiescent in the annexation of this part of 
the land of Israel. Begin said that who gave the government the right to hand over the 
cave of Machpeha. Rachel's tomb ... Gilead and Bashan to a foreigner an enemy an 
oppressor? Begin strongly opposed any idea of the internationalization of Jerusalem. 
He condemn the Armistice Agreement with Trans-Jordan of April 1949 as an 
enslaving agreement with the Britain's vassal and Ben-Garion's willingness to take 
back thousands of Arab refugees as the mean ofcreating a l l l lh column. 
Indeed from very beginning. Begin opposed the freezing of artificial border 
and the Mapai Go\erniTienfs tacit acceptance of the status quo. Our regime aims 
forgetting and making us forget, he told the first sitting of the first Knesset. Instead, 
he suggested that the government should educate people about the lost territories.*'''* 
No Concessions to the Gcrninns 
Through out 1951 the governments of Israel and Germany had discussed an 
agreement whereb> the German Federal Republic (West Germany) would pay 
reparation to Israel, for the persecution of the Jews by Germany during the Second 
World War.''''' Begin had originally been in favour of securing funds from Germany 
tor the survivors of the Holocaust via four wartime allies, and berated the government 
for not doing enough. There was qualified support from Herut. However by the advice 
of Vochanan Bader a long time Herut stalwart to change his(Begin) position on the 
issue and challenge the government.^^ Finally Begin changed his mind to oppose the 
agreement Begin called their move "The abomination of abominations in Israel"' He 
continued that there are thing in life more precious than life itself, there are thing 
more terrible than death itself ... and this is one of these thing there will be no 
negotiations with Germany. He likened Adenauer's federal Germany to a modern day 
Amaiek the Biblical enemy of the Jews. Begin asked "How can you take money from 
Amaiek?"" 
It was a traumatic moment with the passions of Being's supporters high and 
with the violence in the street again raising the grim spectre of Jew against Jew in the 
Jewish state. Begin was able to arouse the deepest anti-German emotions in Israel 
especially from Holocaust sur\ivors. to mobilize within and beyond Herut to out 
manoeuvre his opponents in the party and to attack the pragmatism of Mapai on this. 
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Begin made no concession, would entertain no change of heart or any display 
of reconciliation in his pre-election speech of the Fifth National Conference of Herut 
in November 1958 he told the delegates that a National Liberal government, headed 
by Herut would neither permit a German Ambassador to reside in the state of Israel 
non an Israeli ambassador to officiate in Germany.^' 
Herut and Suez Crisis 
In the last week of July 1956, the new leader of Bg\pt, Gamal Nasser 
nationalized the Suez Canal Company of which Britain and France were the principal 
shareholders, and the two European powers prepared to retake control of it. 
In October of the same year, Ben-Gurion entered into a secret pact with 
Britain and France which Israel would invade Sinai and thus justify Britain and 
France intervening to keep the combatants apart. On 29 October, Israel invaded with 
powerful armored columns and rapidly advanced towards the Suez Canal. Israel had 
taken almost all of Sinai including the Gaza Strip and Sham esh-Sheikh at the 
entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba. 
Flerut and the General Zionists achieved a measure of common ground when 
they immediately advocated a military offensive against Nasser. If the Suez crisis 
confirmed the General Zionist's belief that Israel had to take the initiative to preserve 
its existence it also became clear that Begin while in total agreement with this position 
which he urged a strong response leading to our liberation of Hebron and Bethlehem 
just before the Israeli advance in Sinai.''' 
However, Ben-Gurion eventually under American pressure announced an 
Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. On November 14 the Knesset agreed to an Israeli 
withdrawal from all the territory captured in the Sinai campaign. During a final debate 
on the withdrawal, held in the Knesset on 5 March 1957, Ben-Gurion was heckled and 
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taunted by members of I lerut from the moment he began to speak/^^ Begin viewed 
this as a total piisiilanimoiis act of betrayal. He told the Knesset that, if llerut had 
been in power they would have declared to the nations of the world that we will not 
retreat, we wil l not move, we will stand firm and we will succeed. '^^ 
The issue of the lost territories may gradually have become submerged with 
the passing of time, but it was never forgotten by llerut members and Begin himself. 
Herut and Political Journey 
From the beginning. Herut concentrated on winning the support of the neu 
immigrants most of whom came from the Arab countries of the Middle liast and 
North Africa, in early years of the statehood. The llerut party became the second 
biggest party after Mapai, but did not break through to a point which it was able to 
threaten the Labour hegemony. 1 lerut secured 14 seats in the first Knesset. 9 in second 
and 15 in the third, out of 120 Knesset seats. Bcgin"s political journey remained slow 
and faltering until in the decade between the Suez crisis and Six day war in 1967. 
However, in 1965 Herut and the middle-class heirs of the General Zionist agreed to 
form the Gahal alliance which its development from an isolated opposition into a 
central and subsequently ruling party. 
The Ideology of the Israeli Right 
The Right wing Ideological framework was originally proposed largely by 
Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky and later Menachem Begin proceeded systematically to 
implement Jabotinsky's vision and adopted a mode of behavior fitting his 
fundamental political philosophy. 
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Jabotinsky's ideology 
The Jewish Nationalism 
Jabotinsky's thought was strongly influenced by national romanticism, 
particularly that of Italy, such as Mazzini and Garibaldi. He came to see nationalism 
itself as a positive social and political force and a supreme value, maintaining in one 
instance, that there is no value in the world higher than the nation and the fatherland; 
there is no deity in the universe to Vv/hich one should sacrifice, these two most 
precious Jewels. He argued the Jews should be as friendly nationalistic as others. 
Nationalism, according to him, was the accumulation of pride and sovereign 
self respect in a rejecting and hostile cultural milieu, which would always and under 
all conditions remain an alien environment. Only a full and whole hearted national 
self awareness and feeling, equal to the nationalism of the surrounding nation would 
give the Jews the required opportunity for expression of their oun identity and sense 
of belonging.'^^ 
Jabotinsky transformed Jewish political culture from a religious, politically 
quiescent to a secular, democratic and nationalists. He thought that nation as his God, 
he said. 
"1 love my people and Palestine: this is my creed, this is the business of my 
life-
He went on to proclaim that the Hebrew nation was his absolute God.'^ '^  
For Jabotinsky, the need for a national territory now no longer resulted only 
from an activists impulse to return to the place of one's birth, but mainly from the 
need for a natural habitat that would enable the national group to develop freely and 
undisturbed, thus creating the conditions for an as authentic as possible expression of 
its particular genius and talents. With this view point Jabotinsky in fact repeated the 
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views of the central stream of new Jewish national thought, and he often reverted to it 
in ideological discussions with opponents of Jewish nationalism.'"" 
Moreover, for Jabotinsky the Jewish nationalism was to be an ideal 
combination of nationalism and universalise humanism. This idea although he talked 
about the creation of an original Jewish culture, he by no means thought that this new 
culture should be nurtured by Jewish source only, or in fact that should be typically 
••Jewish'" at all. National sovereignty was intended to create the necessary conditions 
for the free and unimpeded development of an authentic national culture, in which 
society itself would select and adopt without any compulsion or external 
intervention."" 
Jabotinsky saw national culture as encompassing a broad, variegated and 
pluralistic complex of activities, including everything from political institutions and 
judicial norms to every day behaviour and fashions in dress. 
The idea of Jewish state 
The idea of a Jewish state for Jabotinsky was of such basic importance that he 
could not accept its being trivialized through complex tactical maneuvers. He called 
for the establishment of a Jewish state covering the original Palestine-Mandate 
including 'Iran Jordan. His biographers attribute to him the reaction of Herzl's 
political Zionism, which aimed at a Jewish state as a prerequisite of Jewish mass 
settlement in Palestine as opposed to practical Zionism, which concentrated on short-
term practical works and relegated the political struggle to a subordinate tenth rate 
position.' 
Jabotinsky attributed the failure of the Zionist movement to mobilize the 
Jewish masses and large-scale resources to the fear of spelling out loudly the 
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historical aim o f Zionism: a Jewish state in whole ofi^alesline including 'Iran Jordan 
on both sides of the Jordan River.'"^ 
Jabotinsky became entangle led in a web of internal contradictions between 
his politics and his political philosophy. He demanded a Jewish state in the name of 
strength and power but ultimately he found himself begging for it. For Jabotinsky a 
state was an expression of a nation's might and prowess but he was speaking out of 
the abysmal \uinerability of Jewish people asking for a Jewish state no liiat Jews 
could be saved from the Nazis. It was the tragedy of the whole Jewish people.' " 
Jabotinsk\ admit that in such a Jewish state, the Arabs would become a 
minority, but denies that would involve an_\' infringement of their right and aspiration 
as he said. 
•'We maintain unanimously that the economic position of the Palestine Arabs, 
under Jewish colonization had become the object of envy in all the 
surrounding Arab countries, so that Arabs from those countries show a clear 
tendenc\ to immigrate into Palestine I have also shown to you alread\ that in 
our submission, there is no question of ousting the Arabs. On the contrary the 
idea is that Palestine on both sides of the Jordan should hold the Arabs, their 
progen> and many millions of Jews what I do not deny that is a hardship. It is 
not a hardship on any race any nation, possessing so many more National 
states now and so many more National states in futures. One fraction, one 
branch of that race and not a big one will have to live in someone else's state: 
well that is the case with all the mightiest nations of world. I could hardly 
mention one of the big nations, having their states, mighty and powerful, 
which had not one branch, living in someone else's state. Thai is onl\ normal 
and that is no hardship attached to that"."'"^ 
Jabotinsky and the idea of Arab Question 
Jabotinsky made clear in his articles and speeches that he was not in fact. 
denying that the Palestine Arabs had genuine national feeling and they used to form 
an organic part of the greatest Arabs nation. He asserted that the Arabs regarded 
Palestine as their homeland, meanwhile Jews also had proclaimed as their ancient 
homeland. Indeed, Jabotinsky did not e.xpect that the Arab would welcome his idea of 
immigration of Jewish people to become a majority of people in Palestine and idea of 
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Jewish state which were the goals of the Revisionist. Although the Zionist General 
Council and Weizmann believed that was impossible for a Jewish majority idea in 
Palestine and the idea of Jewish state, because they thought that they could not expel 
the Arabs."** But then Jabotinsky and Revisionist challenge in every sense of the 
mainstream Zionism. Jabotinsky thought that if a majority and a slate were the goals, 
they should be loudly proclaimed instead of kept hidden like some slightly 
discreditable secret. It could be justified to them on moral term that the ^rab had 
man\ states and much land while the Jews had none and nowhere to go.'"^ 
Jabotinsky did not think that the Arabs would fail to express vigorous 
opposition to Jewish settlement in Palestine. On the contrary be expected violent 
resistance on their part, as history had repeatedly shown in similar cases. For this 
Jabotinsky knew the remedy, Jewish battalions which would bear the burden of 
defense."*'' The gist of his argument was that no peace agreement with the Arabs 
could be as long as the settlement process had not been fully realized. Jabotinsky 
thought that there was no room for compromise. His territorial stand led him to a 
complete rejection of any and all Arab claims for national and political right in 
Palestine. His position was as uncompromising as that of Arab radicals who refused to 
allow any Jewish sovereignty in Palestine." Jabotinsky said. 
•'It is impossible to dream of a voluntary agreement between us and Arab — 
not now, and not in the future. Very nation civilized or primitive sees it as its 
national home where it wants to stay as the sole landlord forever."''' 
Jabotinsky now come to the conclusion that a Jewish majority must be attained 
with all possible speed. It was to be attained with even greater dispatch than his ten 
year plan (which calls for immigration of 1.5 million Jews to Palestine from Eastern 
and Central Europe in ten years time) called for "Then we will whole hcartedly assure 
the Arab minority absolute equality of rights both in matters of religion and in matters 
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of nationality and of civil rights", he explained "just as we demand these rights for our 
Jewish minorities in other countries" Jabotinsky indeed, were ready to grant the Arabs 
as individual rights but national rights will not be granted to them, this was 
Jabotinsky's major contribution to the politics of Zionism."" 
The Idea of Jewish Legion 
Jabotinsky's new contribution to the Zionist doctrine was the elaboration of 
militarist concept of a Jewish Legion to fight at the side of the Allies for the liberation 
of Palestine and for the establishment of a colonizing regime as a prerequisite of 
Jewish mess immigration and settlement."" History, indeed had decreed that the 
realization of Zionism will be accompanied by fierce Arab opposition, and Jabotinsky 
saw no prospect of any political compromise. This led him to the unequivocal 
conclusion that the Zionist effort could only be brought to function behind an iron 
wall to build by Zionists. By iron wall, Jabotinsky meant the imposition-either by a 
show of force or. if necessary by actual physical force of a sense of political 
conditions that would prevent the Arab from interfering with the Zionist enterprise.""' 
As in Jabotinsky's essay entitled "Man is a wolf of man" he advised his 
readers that do not believe anyone, be always on the guard carry your stick always 
with you. this is the only way of surviving in their wolfish battle of all against all"."^ 
He believed in the inevitability of an armed conflict with the Arabs as is 
apparent in his important political novel "Samson" this novel is a fertile source for 
examine his attitude toward military might. In essence, it is a vigorous call for Jews to 
aim themselves and recognize their ancient homeland by military force. Samson, the 
Jewish leader, says bluntly to the Philistines (Palestinian Arab) that "whoever rules 
Canaan will be decided neither in feasts nor by words. The implication is clear: it will 
be decided bv war and war alone. 
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In fact, Jabotinsky was not only a great believer in the usefulness of military 
power in international politics but also an admirer of the traits that he thought, were 
conductive for military success: discipline, training, order, unity, loyalty, leadership, 
and so forth. His speeches, writings and political actions are clear in dictations of his 
attitude; Jabotinsky often said that history is determined by force and not by reason"''. 
True enough, Jabotinsky deals at length with the topic of military education and 
instruction. For him it was not only a necessity for self-defense or a political asset but 
as a pedagogic principle. He demanded training as an instrument to inculcate 
discipline. He demanded an army, demanded a policy of retaliation instead of self-
restraint."' 
However, the idea of a Jewish Army after 200 years in exile though answering 
a deep-felt longing of the humiliated Jewish masses in the Ghettos had nothing to do 
with HerzTs conception of Zionism. Herzl never conceived a military contYontation 
with Arabs and the conquest of Palestine by force. On the contrary his vision of the 
future was that of a state without an army, free from all the paraphernalia of 
militarism "•\ 
Jabotinksy's Parity Idea 
There are three main factors, which should be mentioned as a background to 
Jabotinsky"s constitution plan. The first was the proposal, included amongst the 
provisions of Churchill White Paper, that a legislative council be established in 
Palestine, the main aim of which was to pacify the Arabs who were unwilling to 
accept the Mandate. The second and third factors are interrelated, fhe one concerns 
the fear that Britain might still decide to withdraw from the Mandate on the Balfour 
Declaration; the second concerns the setting up of an Arab federation. I f the British 
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left Palestine and Arab federation were set up, Palestine would most likely become 
part of this fcdeation."'^' 
In fact, Jabotinsky did not believe that peace was politically possible with the 
Arabs on the other hand he firmly believed that England would always remain in 
Palestine but he was at the same time of the opinion that the Executive must formulate 
its demands concerning the guarantees, it would demand in case the Government, or 
the circumstances, would force it to negotiated for a complete political understanding 
with Arab. Jabotinsky sent his parity proposal to the members of Executive and head 
of Zionist Political Department in Palestine (in December 1922).''*^' 
Jabotinsky envisaged the continuation of the Mandate under Britain, but at the 
same lime the internal administration of the country should be handed over to the 
local inhabitants and the Zionist movement, the armed forces shall consist of an equal 
number of Jewish and Arab, companies under separate Head quarter sections. He 
added that the administrative and legislative apparatus of Palestine must be so 
organized as to make it constitutionally impossible for the Arab to pass any measure 
against the will of ihe Jewish element. For this purpose, his scheme proposes a half by 
half proposition in government and in one, at least of the two chambers. The half by 
half scheme is so far from being extremist that it represents an exact replica of the 
plan proposed b\ the High Commissioner and accepted by the Colonial OfUce in 
1921 that plan foresaw a local army composed of an equal number of Jewish and 
Arab companies of equal strength.'^' 
Nothing came of Jabotinsky's proposals, nor were they ever mentioned. They 
remain a bit of a puzzle despite Jabotinsky's own explanation. 
The political result of Arab F^evolt was the Partition Plan of July 1937, 
eventually culminating in the White Paper of May 1939 and Britain's retreat from the 
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Mandate as a basis for her rule in Palestine.'^^Jabotinstcy preferred to regard both 
development, the [Partition Plan and White Paper, as unfortunate episodes in British 
policy, which would very soon pass and be forgotten once it had become clear that 
they were unworkable. He was convinced that London would shelve the partition 
plan.'-^ 
Eventually Jabotinsky himself became to oppose to the Partition plan. Really, 
his opposition was based on several arguments, which can be divided into political 
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strategic defensive and Zionist arguments. ' 
Begin's Ideology 
The Jewish State 
Begin joined Betar when he was fifteen. There, he was fascinated by the total 
Zionism of Betar and also the idea of Jewish state as he recalled in his time the idea of 
Eretz Israel.'^' One year before the outbreak of war he became the leader of the 
movement in Poland. Begin and his fiends laboured to educate a generation which 
should be prepared, not only total for the rebuilding of a Jewish state, but also to tight 
for it, suffer for it and if needs be die for it. " 
Eretz Israel or the Jewish state in the concept of Begin, has been regarded 
Biblical times as the mother of the children of Israel. It has always comprised what 
come subsequently to be called Palestine on both sides of the Jordan River that is to 
say not only Western Palestine but also the territory formerly occupied by three of the 
twelve Hebrew tribes, Manasseh, Gad, and Reuben. All those area. Begin believed 
that belonged to the Jews and he was prepared to act on this belief'^ ^ 
With the declaration of Israeli independence in May 1948, the old 
controversies about the territorial limits of the Jewish State returned to the fore. The 
Zionist establishment led by Weizmann and Ben-Gurion had accepted the partition of 
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Palestine west of the Jordan into a Jewish state and Arab state. But Begin didn't. He 
made a broad cast:''^ 
The state of Israel has arisen, but we must remember that our country is not 
yet liberated... Our God given country is a unity. The attempt to dissect it is 
not only a crime but also a blasphemy and an abortion. Whoever does not 
recognize our natural right to our entire homeland, does not recognize our 
right to any part of it. And we shall never forego this natural right.'"'' 
Begin declared that the bisection of homeland (Eretz Israel) is illegal. It will 
never be recognized. Nevertheless, while he continued vigorously to proclaim ihe 
vision of state on both side of the Jordan, he agreed to accept a Jewish state in part of 
Palestine on the British Mandate (Scheduled for May 15, 1948). Me was sure that ihe 
creation of the state would make territorial expansion possible, ai'ler ihc shedding of 
much blood. 
The Military Zionism 
Menachem Begin proclaimed a new stage in Jewish history, he said: 
"We are on the verge of the third era of Zionism after practical Zionism and 
political Zionism and it is military Zionism".'^' 
Begin argued that political Zionism and Military Zionism had to be brought 
together under the same roof It can be compare to Cavour and Garibaldi; he 
suggested to Cavour could not have achieved the emancipation of Italy without 
Garibaldi. Begin was constantly interrupted by Jabotinsky, who remained him that the 
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Jews lacked the military manpower in their homeland. He believed deeply in 
Jabotinsky's concept of an "iron wall" of military might which would protect the 
Jewish people from hostile adversaries. 
In his memoirs. Begin characterized himself as "The Fighting Jew" and 
transforms Descartes motto into "we fight, therefore we are". Mis military ideal has 
alwajs stood in contrast to that of the official Zionist "institution" which he regards 
with contempt. For Jewish leaders in Palestine in 1930s and 1940s, military 
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organization was an unfortunate necessity. For Begin, the willingness to take up arms 
iiad a position moral value. To fight was to be emancipated from Ghetto mentality; 
Cannons of self restraint were scored as expression of timidity from which Jews had 
to liberate themselves after nearly two thousand years of bondage.'"'' 
Begin merely mooted a future war of liberation and the establishment of an 
independent military force, presumably to be based on Polish - soil, lie claimed that 
despite its objective weakness, it was the moral force underlying this army that would 
give it its vigour and strength. 
Begin appearing as the representative of his generation, was clearly a product 
of the militant Hebrew nationalism that was rising out of the depth of Galut despair. 
Begin and Jabotinsky 
Jabotinsky was the great influence in Begin life, he learned the doctrine of 
Zionism from his and he was won over by his idea. As he avoids: 
"My entire life had been influenced by him, both in the underground and in 
politics, the willingness to fight for liberation of the homeland and logical 
analysis of facts in political matters".'^ ^ 
Although Begin was ground to sit at Jabotinsky's feet, he was no mere 
sycophant. The disciple clashed with the master on two celebrated occasions. Begin 
remonstrated with Jabotinsky for his effort to make peace with Ben-Gurion. In fact 
characteristically Begin was more Jabotinskyite than Jabotnisky himself.'^ ^ 
Between Jabotinsky and Begin were as well as between the two generations of 
nationalist Jews which they both represented while there were remarkable difference. 
Jabotinsky was a great believer in calm reasoning rational discourse and principles of 
law and justice. Begin and many of his younger generations, seemed to have lost their 
belief, in principles of law and justice the brutal attack on Jews in Nazi Germany, had 
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carded their confidence in instruction and value thai even Jabotinksy (a nationalist but 
still a cosmopolitan) was willing to accept. 
Later, one by one. Begin dismissed all the foundations of Jabotinsk\"s public 
diplomacy the petitions, the policy of alliances and the pro-British orientation. He set 
up an analogy with the liberation of Italy in the previous century. 
However, Jabotinsky was no less forceful in his reply. He said that no 
strategist anywhere in the world would sav that in our situation \sc can do what 
Garibaldi and De Valeria did. Our position is a far cry from that of the Italians or 
Irish. If you think there is no other way than that proposed by Mr. Begin and you have 
amis, go ahead and commit suicide. " 
Begin, however, still had a respect for Jabotinsky. Even after his death. Begin 
made a mention of Jabotinsky in the time of Hebrew revolt against British Mandatory 
rule in Palestine (1944-1948) as the symbolic father of the revolt and when he uas a 
Prime Minister (1977) he mentioned in his speech that Jabotinsky proposed a 
resolution which became to be the aim of Zionism, is the establishment of a Jewish 
state in their (Begin) time. Begin successfully posed as Jabotinsky's anointed heir and 
through his 1 lerut movement developed most of the Right-wing fragments.' '^  
The Revolt 
The demonstration against the British Mandate took place after the day which 
the White Paper was issue. The campaign of violence might ha\e gained serious 
momentum but for the outbreak of World War II, the Irgun and its members agreed 
for causation of its anti-British activity. After Begin had taken command of the Irgun 
in Palestine in early 1944, he announced the beginning of the Revolt and resumed 
attacks on the British that were for challenge to British authority that they were able 
in a short while to create conditions which compelled Britain to withdraw her regime 
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from Palestine. Begin maintained that exerting moral pressure relying on common 
interests with Britain or using the league of nation in order to put pressure on Britain 
would never achieve the objective of a large Jewish state.'^'' 
Begin thought that the revolt sprang from the earth. The ancient Greek story of 
Antaeus and the strength he drew from contact with mother Earth, is a legend. The 
renewed strength which came to us, and especially to our youth, from contact with the 
soil of our ancient land, is no legend but a fact... The blood of our people cried out to 
us from foreign soil on which it had been shed fired revolt in our heart and gave the 
rebels strength. We shall fight to the last drop of blood.'""^  
Begin announced that they shall win by virtue of their moral strength adding 
he was proffering an idea and its implementation be discussed by the experts. He 
made clear from the start that he would continue to fight until the British depart from 
Eretz Israel no matter how long the war lasts.''*' For this reason Begin rejected out of 
hand a proposal that the two dissident groups disband and join the Haganah. He said. 
We want a common front against the British. So long as the Haganah 
continues to fight, the common front will exist. But on the day that the 
Haganah abandons the military campaign against the British, we shall 
continue.''*^ 
Moreover, Begin had an idea that the British public opinion was greatly 
influenced by the Irgun's early activities. He thought that the press coverage was an 
indicator not only of the repercussion of the revolt in London but also of the morale of 
the British armed forces in Palestine itself And in other way the British newspapers 
may help to awake the moral of his own men.'"*^  
In fact. Begin knows very well that whenever the aims ofthe revolt against the 
British were succeed. Another step will come after the leaving of the British. The 
confrontation face to face between Jews and Arabs cannot avoid. Let them determine 
their own fate and let them decide among themselves who would rule the countrv. 
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Begin and the Arabs 
During the time of revolt, Begin and tiie Irgun sought to demonstrate threat the 
fight was between the Jews and the British. He appeared his idea that Zionism had 
made fata) mistake for twenty-five years in treating the Arabs as the enemy. Begin 
therefore, didn't appear to have paid much attention to the Arab problem. He did not 
rate the military potential of the Palestinian Arabs sufficiently high for them to 
constitute a threat to the Yishuv. 
Begin believed that they could demand the immediate withdrawal of the 
British, since the Yishuv would easily be strong enough to subdue the Palestinian 
Arabs and secure Jewish sovereignty over the whole country. 
Moreover. Begin promised the local Arabs full equality of rights in the 
sovereign Jewish state and equal share in its economic prosperity.'^"^ 
In a manifesto of the Irgun, which was published in the daily Herut in 1944, he 
stated: 
This war is not directed against you (The Arab) or drives you from the land on 
which you live, in Erezt Israel there is also place for you, and also for your son 
and your grandsons, as well as for the millions of Jews who have no place to 
live except this country. 
'I'he Jewish government wil l grant you full and equal right. The Arabic 
language and the Hebrew language wil l together be the official language of the 
country. There will be no discrimination between Arab and Jew in the 
allocation of government or public offices. The holy places of Islam will be 
under the supervision of your own representative.'"*^ 
But the fact was that the promise was never done and the Dir Yassin incident 
which the Arabs use to demonstrate that the Jews drove them from their homeland 
and killed more than two hundreds innocent people including women and children, 
happened just one month before the withdrawal of the British Mandate. 
Obviously, Begin and his companies broke relationship with the Arabs. They 
appeared their original idea which was committed to use forces to persuade all of 
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Arab peoples who were staying in Palestine to leave their homeland. As Samuel Katz 
one of Irgun's members said in his book "Day of Fire" as following. 
'The operation (of Begin and Irgun) became one of the strategic turning points 
in the war and for good or ill. Its political consequences are with us (The 
Irgun") to these days."'"*^ 
After Begin became the Prime Minister in 1977, he put his own gloss on of 
their concept, lie said. 
'The iron wall meant that one could not realize Zionism unless force separates 
us from the .Arabs. The Arabs would try to prevent their bloodshed. Although 
Jabotinsk) professed a policy of justice, but we discovered that justice had to 
be defended. It was however the justice of minority stales in a minimalist 
Jewish slate with no prospect of Arab sovereignty on cither bank ol' ihe 
Jordan".'"^ 
Indeed all of that was a matter of tactics rather than philosophy. There is no 
doubt that Benin has demonstrated hostilitv toward the Arabs throuuhout his career. 
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CHAPTER - III 
"I, Menachem the son of Zeev and Hasia Begin, do 
solemnly swear that as long as I serve the nation as Prime 
Minister, We will not leave any part of Judea Samaria 
(The West Bank), the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights" 
(Menachem Begin) 
Ian s. Lustick, "Israeli Politics and American Foreign Policy' 
Foreign Affairs Vol: 61, no. 2. 1988. 
CHAPTKR-III 
The Likud Party and the Occupied Territories during the 
Begin Era 
During the early 1960s, Begin tried earnestly to mollify the public perception 
of Herut and to project a more responsible image with less emphasis on the "fighting 
family" subculture of the Irgun. His attempt to uoo the Liberals was helped by their 
increasing frustration after more than a decade in the political vvildness. 
Consequentl). many in the Liberal party began to look more favorably on the prospect 
of an alliance with Herut. in fact, the liberals thereby gained a secure political base, 
whilst Herut gained respectability and access to the middle class. 
The Gahal (The Heruf-Liberal Bloc) 
In 1965. the Herut reached an agreement with the Liberals, the middle class 
heirs of the General Zionists, to form Gush Herut Liberalism - the Herut Liberal Bloc 
or Gahal. This was not a full merger. Each partner retained its identity, its separate 
policy and organization. But. this was an impoilant step of the llerut towards the 
creation of a broad center-right wing alternative to Labour, and it brought the party 
into the inainslream of Israeli politics.' 
Gahal policy was as Begin promised ta.\ reduction for large families, full 
employment, national unemployment insurance and a minimum - wages law. 
The joint parliamentary list with the name of Gahal won 26 seats in both the 
1965 and 1969 election. It was the first time when workers supported the I lerut (in the 
form of Gahal) in Israeli election. Around 100,000 people voted for joint llerut -
Liberal bloc. The vote of the workers in support of the Right wing indeed, increased 
dramaticali\ in sub-sequent elections." 
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Bclbic llic oiilbreak of ihc Six-day War in 1967 Gaiiai agreed lo join a 
Governinenl of National Unity in which six Gahai nominees held Ministerial portlblio 
and Begin was a Minister without portfolio. However, the government lasted only for 
three years when Gahai left in protest against the decision to begin negotiations with 
the Arabs under the United Nations auspices in 1970." 
The formation and coining to power of Likud Party 
A few months before the 1973 elections a new electoral bloc was created the 
Likud. Its constituents were Herut. the Liberal party, the free Centre. La"ain 
(successor to the State List) and Ach dut (a one man party which broke away from the 
independent liberals). Each of the parties would retain its own separate organization. 
Subsequenth. the Free Centre split from Likud and disappeared. 
The emergence of the Likud bloc (1948-81) 
Because of the Yom Kippur war, the 1973 election was postponed from October lo 
December of the same year. For this election, the population was too numbed to 
reassess traditional voting loyalties, and the election left the Knesset \irtuall} 
unchanged. The Labour remained the party of Government.' 
The cnierj^encc of the Likud bloc (1948-81) 
Heriit (1948) General Zionist (1948) Progressive Party 
(1948) 
Liberals (1961) 
Gahal(1965) 
HerLit -^  Liberals 
Independent Liberals (1965) 
Sharon List (1973) 
Free-Centre (1967) State J i^st (La'ain) 
(1968) 
Likud (1973) 
Continuitv 
Split 
Mergers 
Between 1948 and 1961 Herut and the General Zionists had reached 21-8 scats 
out of 120. Gahal. in 1965, gained 26 and in 1969, 28 seats in 1973 the Likud won 39 
seats and since then has increased its power to 45 (in 1977), and to 48 (1981). 
Unlike the 1973 elections, the right center Likud federation entered the 
1977 elections with a real hope of winning. Within the party, the preparation of its list 
of candidates became a much more serious matter than usual. However, many of 
pollsters had predicted an alignment victory and expected the Likud only a possible 
three seats advamaoe from 1973 elections. 
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The l.ikud took 45 seals out of 120 members Knesset and Mcnachem IJegin 
uas called upon to form a Government/' 
The Knesset election of 1977 constituted a landmark in Israeli politics. Not 
onl>' had the defeated Labour party which been a majority party holding power for 
forty four year>. it had also been the dominant party. Its place was taken b> a right 
wing, nationalist religious coalition under the Likud. 
The Occupied Territories 
The term of Occupied Territories refers to those areas of Palestine under 
British Mandate that occupied b> Israel in the June 1967 .Arab-Israeli War. Those are 
the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the Gaza strip.^(See Map no. 11) 
The West Bank 
fhe W est Bank {o\' the Jordan River) Palestinian 'ferritory. Area 2297 sq 
miles/5949 Sq km including enlarged East Jerusalem population figures according to 
a census in 1967 was 589000. By natural increase howexer. rose to about 673,000 in 
1978. (See .Map no. 12 and 13) 
fhe VVcit Bank \\as under the British Mandate of Palestine until 1948. After 
the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War, the West Bank was seized by Transjordan. After 
incorporating the region. Transjordan became the Kingdom of Jordan. In the June 
1<^ '67 War the West Bank uas occupied by Israel and put, in accordance with 
International law and practice, under military government, with the Laws of the 
previous government for occupying country remaining in force. 
In September the same year Levi Eshkol the Prime Minister announced plans 
for Israeli resettlement of l:zion bloc the four pre-slate Jewish farm communities in 
Bethlehem Hebron area in the West Bank. Alter a few da\s a group of Nachal youths 
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arrived as an Israeli vanguard many of them children of Kfar Ezion settlers who had 
been killed in 1948 fighting.** 
In 1968 the settlement plan in the Occupied Territories was started, 'fhere 
were four settlements in the West Bank form thirty-five new project settlements in all 
the Occupied Territories. Under Israeli auspices departments were established for 
West Bank, agriculture, education, posts and telegraphs, commerce and industry.' 
The Labour party's important plan for the West Bank was the Allon Plan. It 
was the main basis for the Labour pan\"s long lived concept of settlement and peace 
making with Arab neighboring countries. 
In August 1973 the ruling Labour party formally reversed its policy of merely 
holding on to the Arab Territories until the Arab state were ready to negotiate peace 
with it directly, and adopted the Galili Document, which allowed Jewish individuals 
and public bodies to purchase land in the Occupied Arab Territories and the 
government to supplement the hitherto privately funded settlement programme.'" 
East Jerusalem 
Area 2.5 sq. miles / 6.5 sq. km in 1948 and 28.5 sq. miles / 73.7 sq. km in 
1967.In the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War, East Jerusalem captured by the Arab forces 
and retained by Jordan measured 2.5 sq. miles/ 6.5 sq. km. It included the Old City, 
measuring about 0.4 sq. miles / 1 sq. km. and containing the Noble sanctuary, the 
Wailing Wall and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, the burial place of Jesus Christ." 
it was captured by Israel on 7 June 1967 during the Six day war. Israel occupied the 
Arab controlled sector of Jerusalem and immediately proceeded to unify the city. On 
28 June 1967 Israel expanded its law. jurisdiction and administration to an enlarged 
municipal area of Jerusalem, which included the Old City. Both the General 
Assembly and the Security Council of the UN condemned these measures. The 
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General Assembly declared these measures invalid. The Security Council also 
adopted four resolutions that condemned Israel's actions in Jerusalem. Israel, 
however, did not head these UN resolutions it neither rescinded any measures nor 
desisted from taking any new ones.''(See Map no. 14) 
Gaza Strip 
The Gaza Strip is a crucial past of illegally occupied Palestine territory, its 
area is 146 sq.miles / 378 sq.km. Its population in 1967 were about 380,000 and near 
to half million after 1980 were crowded into that narrow strip of the Mediterranean 
coast. 
In 1948-1949 Palestine War. the Arab armies managed to retain only a semi-
desert strip along the Mediterranean coast later called the Gaza Strip. 
From January 1949, the Gaza Strip was administered by Bgypt, but it passed 
in to the hand of the invading Israelis during the Suez War (October 1956) Israel 
vacated it in March 1957.'^ 
In June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Gaza Strip was once again captured by 
Israel. One shade of Zionist opinion had always included the Ga/.a Strip in liretz 
Israel and wishes it free of non Jewish people.' (See Map no. 15) 
Israeli Settlement Policy before Likud Rule 
Israel began its settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the 
.Allon plan of 1967. Vigal Allon. as the Deput)' Prime Minister proposed in his new 
fact plan on the basic concept to permit the Arab population to govern itself, with as 
little interference as possible from Israel, but to leave all strategic points in the West 
Bank under Israeli military, for securit\ propose. '^  He designed to keep 30 percent of 
the West Bank permanently under Israeli control, leaving two Arab enclaves north 
and south of Jerusalem, one totally surrounded by Jewish territory and other linked to 
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Jordan by a narrow corridor of land.'^(Sce Map no. 16 and 17) And in (laza Slrip the 
Labour parl\"s policy had been lo surround the Strip with settlements just inside the 
Green Line and in Northern Sinai. Five Nahals (militar) outpost) were strategically 
placed down the backbone of the Strip controlling the main road to Sinai and 
providing access lo Gaza's precious water table. There were 20 settlements in 
Northern Sinai with about 4.500 settlers whose aim was to se\er Ga/a liom l^gypt. 
consolidating Gaza's isolation and facilitating control.'''(See Map no.18) 
There were three main types of Israeli colonial settlements with in the 
Occupied Territories, especially in the West Bank. There are as the follow ing. 
1. The ovitpost or Nahul villages: 
This type of settlement are a sub-variety of the communal Kibbutz and occur 
when settlement is seen as the best way to improve the security situation but when 
farming can become profitable onU after years of through reclamation work. 
In the outpost village Nahal units, the Pioneer Settlement Corps of the Israeli 
army, undertake site preparations, construct the villages, sink wells and provide 
mobile power supplies and power cables, sanitation and sewerage facilities. Certain 
soldiers, whose demobilization is imminent, are posted in as permanent settlers, often 
to remain after their demobilization. The Nahal settlement forms has been the prime 
settlement type introduced to colonize the West Bank.'** 
2. The Religious Settlements: 
The second major type of Israeli rural settlement is the religious village, 
particularly for Gush Emunim, Group of the Faithful. An initial settlement established 
by the group and in various ways lands are assembled to facilitate the transition from 
the initial colonial settlement form to an integrated village community with related 
rural-farming structures. Within the initial stages such settlements arc often " i l leuaf 
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in the sense that they are no recognized by the Israeli government for allocations of 
\arioLis i'unding lor health, education, welfare, social services etc., although external 
funding is obtained from such organizations as the Jewish National fund. Youth 
Aliyah and Keren Hayesod.' 
3. The Residential Suburbs: 
'fhis was the general type of Israeli settlement, which is usually established 
directl}' b\ the Israeli government. Such settlements have been located particularly 
along the northern and eastern edges of Jerusalem as well as adjacent to smaller urban 
centres such as Bethlehem and Mebron Qiryat Arba, began as an "'illegar" settlement 
in April 1968 and recognized by the Israeli government in February 1970, is a large 
urban settlement for religious Jews adjacent to Hebron in the West Bank.' ' 
The initial Israeli settlement in the West Bank during the 1967-1977 period of 
Labour part) rule were concentrated in high-rise residential colonies around the 
1 10.000 Palestinians in Arab Jerusalem and in civilian agricultural settlement in the 
Jordan Rift area." 
fhc Labour Government discouraged Jewish settlement in the northern pai1 of 
the West Bank but in the last years of the Labour rule, it failed to prevent Gush 
Emunim settling at Gaddum, near Nablus. Even before the May 1977 election, 
Guddum was a thriving Jewish outpost complete with teachers posted by the Ministry 
of Education."" 
The Gush Kmunim and Settlement 
Gush Emunim was founded in February 1974 by a group of students who 
studies at the \'eshiva. Although Rabbi Moshe levinger was the most prominent 
figures in Gush Emunim early day. however Rabbi Zvi Yehuda kook Junior, who was 
son of Avraham kook chief of Rabbi of Palestine, was a religious mentor and spiritual 
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leader. Gush Emiimim, Israeli national religious extra parliamentary movement which 
advocated the application of Israeli sovereignly to the West Bank and Gaza Strip and 
considered this a vital goal in the realization of Zionism. Gush F.munim argued that it 
is possible to realize this goal only through a massive Jewish civilian presence in 
these areas. At the same time it verbally advocated coexistence with the indigenous 
Arab population."^ In tact Rabbi Kook Junior had been the only one to anticipate the 
feeling of proprietorship over Eretz Israel, the entire Holy Land including the West 
Bank, which later became so widespread. He had regarded the return to Palestine as 
hearting the coming of the Messiah."'* 
fhe settlement program of Gush Emunim was dramatically different from the 
Allon Plan; it reflected the Political gap between the Alignment and Likud. The Gush 
demanded the establishments of no fewer than sixty settlements in the central massif 
ol'the West Bank and the western foothills, assuming correctl) that there was already 
a national consensus on setting other areas especially the environs of Jerusalem and 
the Jordan Valley. 
The Occupied Territories under Likud Rule 
Menachem Begin became Prime Minister in June 1977. lie headed the Likud 
alliance with his concept that the West Bank (Judea and Samaria as Begin always 
called it) and Gaza Strip were past of the ancient homeland of the Jewish people and 
that the\ never pass froin Israeli sovereignty. 
The first act of Begin after the elections was to go to Elon Moreh. the Gush 
Emunim settlement on the West Bank and make a public promise that man\ more 
such settlements would nov\ be put up. In September 1977. Begin and General Ariel 
Sharon holding a forah Scroll at Gaddum. a Gush l-munim selllement announced 
their support for settlement activity in the Occupied I'errilcries. In the same month. 
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the Bcgin"s government sanctified three Gusli liinunim settlements and an 
announcement was made that three more would follow.""^ 
This happened after the Carter administration had specillcally demanded the 
discontinuation of settlements on the West Bank for three months and belbre the 
coming to Jerusalem of Anwar Sadat for peace mission. Further more, the visit could 
be expected to create a favorable climate of opinion for withdrawal among people 
who had pre\ iously been undecided on this issue. Begin himsell and part of the l.ikud 
leadership, became rather less supportive of their own policy line. 'I'he autonomy. 
they proposed for the West Bank certainly constituted a retreat from their former 
stand, which had advocated annexation of the area."^ 
Under Begin"s two governments which he headed between 1977 and 1983, the 
policy was to maintain Israel's rule over the West Bank and Gaza Strip and this 
period can be divided into two phases. 
The Urst phase, between 1977 and 1979. 
The second phase, from 1980 to 1983 when Begin resigned from the 
government. 
The First phase of Begin rule 
The first phase, that of moderation (1977 - 1979) Foreign Minister Moshc 
Dayan and Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann implemented what was universally but 
(in hindsight) mistakenly perceived as Begin's peace policy."^ 
Moshe Dayan, once a stalwart and bastion of the Labour Alignment but 
relegated to the political wilderness following the October War, agreed to join the 
Likud led coalition as Foreign Minister. Though Dayan was opposed to Israeli 
sovereignty on the West Bank, an idea to which Begin had a life-long commitment, 
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Botiin warned him in his Cabinet because of the inlernalional eminence llial skill 
clung to him. despite the setbacks and disasters of the October War. " 
Dayan's Vision rcjiiirding Peace with Arabs 
Da\an iiad premonition that something was albot in Middle 1-ast diplomac). 
lie could not put his Tmger on it but he sensed that Egypt was eager to seek the return 
of all of its lost territory in the Sinai. Israeli might soon become to be involved in such 
peace lalks. 
When Beiiin asked him to join his Cabinet, Dayan proposed that there would 
be no so\ereignt> imposed over the occupied lands while peace negotiations were in 
progress. liventualK' Begin agreed with Dayan's proposal and Dayan accepted the 
.lob. 
Da>an \ision for peace plan was not a peace plan in the ordinar) sense but 
more a blue print for building a peace making structure. It was an outline for 
i. Procedure and 
ii. The settlement of separate substantive issue."' 
The plan called for the creation of joint Arab-Israel commission presided over by 
U.S. otTicials. Here, the plan addressed itself to the administration's substantive 
proposals for peace in the Middle Bast. 
in fact, Dayan further proposed strict functional differentiation of issues such as 
borders troops separation agreement and withdrawal demilitarized zones greater 
autonomy for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, to be negotiated 
individually with the separate Arab confrontation states. IZgypt would negotiate the 
future of Sinai, Syria the future of the Golan Heights and Jordan the future of the 
West Bank and Palestinian population. For the Palestinian question, Israel would meet 
with one all Arab delegation to resohe the issue. The key was to separate the 
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explosive Palestinian problem Iroin other territorial issue: Dayan fell that a combined 
Arab delegation or lack of clear division would create rigidity, rhetoric and 
inflexibility of the parties/ 
On August 22. Dayan met secretly with King Husein of Jordan in London. It was 
the first time that any member of the Begin government had held direct talks with any 
.Arab leader. But the King was not prepared to speak on behalf of the West Bank 
Palcsiinians. 1 le slated that the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) was their sole 
representative, nor was he prepared for an> division of the West Bank between Israel 
and Jordan as basis for an agreement with Israel. It was essential for Israel to 
vsithdraw fully from all Occupied Arab lerritories including East Jersualcm.^' 
Concerning the PLO. Dayan's position complements Begin's. lie totalh 
rejects negotiating with the PLO even if it is willing to amend its Charter or accept 
U.N. Resolution 242.''" For Dayan. as for Begin, the PLO means the political and 
physical annihilation oi' Israel. His reason for refusing to negotiate with an 
independent PLO delegation is that the purpose of such negotiations would be to 
establish, eventually, a PLO state in the West Bank and Gaza, which both Dayan and 
Begin will not accept on any condition. Both reject absolutely the political autonomy 
or sovereignty of the Palestinians in the West Bank or elsewhere in western Palestine. 
For Dayan. strategically, the security of the West Bank will be strictly Israeli. The 
Jordan River will be Israel's security border. 
Politically. Dayan somewhat modifies total domination over western Palestine. 
Briefly say that the Foreign Minister conceives of territory as a strategic security 
asset, not as the essence of political ideological Revisionist Zionist dogma. 
Indeed, Begin had no intention of ceding the West Bank or the Gaza Strip to 
the Palestinians. The way to avoid continued American pressure with regard to the 
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W'csl liank. he tell was to lake an aclive pari in the search for peace irealy wilh ligypl. 
If peace could be made with Egypt, the United State would be pleased, and no harm 
would be done to the integrity of the West Bank.'^ ^ 
Sadat's Mission for Peace 
In November 1977 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, speaking before the 
Egyptian people's Assembly declared that he was willing to travel to Jerusalem if 
necessary to fmd a solution to the Arab-Israeli conllict. Begin's government 
immediate!) picked up on this cue and sent Sadat an invitation to come to Jerusalem 
and address the Knesset. 
On November 19, 1977, Sadat arrived in Israel and on Sunday afternoon. 
November 20. addressed the Knesset and people of Israel. This special session of the 
Knesset was televised live throughout the world. Sadat demanded Israeli withdrawal 
from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai and including East Jerusalem in exchange for 
peace and security of Israel.^ 
The immediate fall out on the Arab-front from Sadat's historic journc\ to 
Israel was a rapid deterioration in inters Arab relations. A campaign of vilification of 
and recrimination against Sadat reached unprecedented levels in Arab history. The 
Arab world suddenly was divided into three groups, Egypt and its discreel supporters 
like Sudan, Morocco, Somalia and Oman. The second group, comprising the Arab 
moderates led by Saudi Arabia was in a fix as to what to do. King Hussein made a 
vain bid to mediate between Sadat and Assad and said that his main preoccupation 
was to prevent a disastrous split in Arab ranks. Finally the rabidly anti Sadat and most 
immediately affected parties were Syria and PLO. Both Assad and Arafat announced 
a united front and later at a Summit in Tripoli, three other anti-sadals States Libya, 
Algeria and South Yemen joined them and formed the front of Steadfastness and 
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Conrroniation Stales. They decided to take severe steps like bree/ing of diplomatic 
and political ties with Egypt and boycott any meetings of the Arab league in Cairo for 
Sadat's treason against Arab and Palestinian people/^ 
One month later Begin came to Egypt with two projects. The first was on 
w ithdrawal from Sinai and the second was on autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza 
strip. But Sadat disagreed as he announced that with respect to the question of 
withdrawal we have achieved some progress, and Egypt's stand is that, a Palestinian 
state should be established. The Israeli position is that the Palestinian Arab in the 
West Bank and Gaza strip would enjoy self-rule we disagreed on that."^ 
Camp David and the Occupied Territories 
Begin's diplomacy in the first two years of his tenure (1977-1979) was based 
on the simple idea that Israel's control over the West Bank could be guaranteed if 
Egypt was removed from involvement in Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Moreover, Carter's growing diplomatic pressure on Israel and Begin's 
willingness to trade the Sinai for the West Bank, in addition with and Sadat's 
readiness to risk everything for peace led organismicaily to set up the Camp David 
Accord." 
After a long process, therefore, those negotiations paved the way for 
concluding the Camp David Accords in September 1978 and also resulted in the 
signing of a peace treaty between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin under the 
mediation of President Carter in March 1979, as a consequence of which the Israeli 
forces withdrew from the Sinai in April 1982. 
The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and 
its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 in all its 
pails. There were two accords were signed: 
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I he lirsl accord called for the implementation of an autoiioni) plan lor the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip to be Ibllowcd alter five years bv a permanent settlement 
status the details are as following.''^ 
1. West Bank and Gaza 
(a). Hgxpt. Israel, Jordan and the representative of the Palestinian people should 
participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its 
aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and 
Gaza should proceed in three stages. 
1. Eg>pl and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transi'cr 
of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, 
there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a 
period not exceeding five years. In order to pro\ ide full autonomy to the 
inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military go\ernmcnt and its 
civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority 
has been freely elected b\ the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing 
military government. The Jordan government will be invited to join the 
negotiations on the basis of their framwork."'^  
2. Egypt. Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the 
elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza or other 
Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement. 
which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing 
authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Ga/.a. A withdrawal of Israeli 
armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining 
Israeli forces into specified security locations."**^  
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3. When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank 
and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years 
wil l begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the 
beginning of the transitional period, negotiations wi l l take place to determine 
the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its 
neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end 
of the transitional period.'" 
(b) A l l necessary measures wil l be taken and provisions made to assure the 
security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To 
assist in providing such security, a strong local police force wil l be constituted by 
the self-governing authority. It wi l l be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank 
and Gaza, the police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters 
with the designated Israeli Jordanian and Egyptian officers. ' 
(c.) During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the 
self-governing authority wi l l constitute a continuing committee to decide by 
agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West 
Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption 
and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this 
committee. " 
{(.].) Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to 
establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of 
the resolution of the refugee problem. 
The second Accord was a framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between 
Israel and Egypt. This was to be the base for the complete withdrawal of Israel from 
Sinai. 
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1. F.gypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to 
settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by pcacellil means in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations/' 
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in goal 
faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this 
framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parlies to the 
conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace 
treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The 
Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between l£gypt and Israel 
will govern the peace negotiation between them, 'fhe parties will agree on the 
modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under 
the treat). ^  
Interim Wiliidrawal 
Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, 
all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of al-Arish to 
Ras Muhammad, the e.xact location of this line to be determined by mutual 
agrcemenl. 
The Position of Palestinian 
In case of Palestinian, Begin accepted the position that their problem ought to 
be dealt with in all its aspects with their participation in its resolution and the approval 
of the West Bank and Gaza."*^  
The Status of Jerusalem 
For the question of Jerusalem, Begins had insisted that he would sign nothing 
that meant signing away .Jerusalem. It was Carter who came up with the idea of 
dealing with Jerusalem, not in the body of the text but in a separate exchange of 
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letters between Begin and Sadat. Both leaders agreed to this, Begin's letter declared 
that Jerusalem was both indivisible and the capital of Israel. Sadat letter declared 
(with equal solemnity) that Arab East Jerusalem was an indivisible part of the West 
Bank, and that it should be returned to Arab sovereignty."'*' 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Camp David Accord 
It became clear that the Camp David accord did not mention the PLO all 
through its te.\t. The Framework did not address itself to two other important 
segmenis of the Palestinians problem: the status of "Jerusalem" and the "the Refugee" 
question since the Palestinians did not include only the inhabitants of West Bank and 
Gaza. Further, there was no structural linkage between the two agreements concluded 
at Camp David. This meant that Egypt and Israel could conclude their peace 
agreement whether, there was any progress in the West Bank and Gaza or not. .After 
the .Accord was signed, almost the entire Arab world opposed Camp David accord. 
even Jordan and Saudi Arabia also joined the opposition to the Accord. The Pl.O was 
soon joined the group which rejected the Camp David accord on the ground that these 
agreements had taken place outside the framework of collective Arab responsibilii}' 
and harmed the Palestinian cause violating the resolution of the Algiers, and Rabat 
Summit conference, it called for a just peace based on total Israeli withdrawal from 
Arab territories occupied in 1967 including Arab Jerusalem and for the establishment 
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of an independent Palestine state. 
At the fourteenth anniversary of the founding Fatah, Arafat, the leader of 
Fatah and PLO vehemently attacked the Camp David agreements. He said: 
fhere can be no peace, no settlement, no stability and no solution b) jumping 
over the national rights of our self- determination and independents statehood 
under the leadership of the PLO.^" 
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Earl\ in October a joint communique signed by eight-two West Bank and 
Gaza leader including the ma\ors of Ramallah Nablus, al-Bira. Hebron. Tulkan 
Bethlehem. Beitjaia and Bir Zait was issued rejecting the Camp David agreements 
and reaffirming their commitment to the occupation of their land. The leaders rejected 
the Camp David provisions with regard to the Occupied 'I'crritories in form and 
substance."'' 
The PLO response to the US-sponsored Camp David was not confined to 
condemnation alone. The Palestinians knew the importance of US in the realization of 
tlK-ir national goal becau.se of the American proximity to the Israelis. An cnliiel\ rigid 
and hostile approach towards the Camp David process would lead the Palestinian 
mo\ement nowhere. 
Following the signing of the Egypt-Israel treaty, the PLO and the US started 
accusing each other for being responsible for the continuance of the Palestinian 
problem. The PLO questioned American sincerity in entering into dialogue with it and 
accused the Carter administration succumbing to Jewish lobby and its propaganda at 
the cost of American interests in the area. Arafat stated that the Americans and 
Israelis were forcing the Palestinians to recognize that the occupation was legal in 
return for administrative autonomy. Palestinian legality, Arafat warned was the 
strongest card, which could not be exchanged just for the so-called self-government. 
The Palestinian had no doubt as to what the plan for self rule really meant: a 
perpetuation of Israeli sovereignly in the territories where PLO was demanded a state 
of it own.^' 
Camp David and its effect 
The .Accord, in fact creates serious divisions inside Likud. I'hose who had 
been uneasy with Begin's commitments at Camp David began to speak up and most 
ol' ihcin wlio rejected llie Accord were on the far Right ol" the Israeli political 
spectruiii. Ill an attempt to form an cITeclive political opposition, three Right-wing 
groups (the Lo\alist circle in Herat, the Land ot" Israel Movement, and Gush limunim) 
decided to establish a nationalist party in opposition to the Begin government, in 
October 1979, joining with Banai it took the name Tehiya (F^evival). 
Begin"s plan for the \\ est Bank caused a deep rift within the Israeli political 
elite, which major dilTercnces were both in terms of goals (l)ayan and Weizmann 
were willing to gi\e much more to the Palestinian) and in terms of procedure (Dayan 
and Weizmann were considerabl>' more llexible than Begin). The inner conllict 
begins even before Sadat threw his bombshell, announcing that he was will ing and 
ready to go to Jerusalem. The struggle ended with the departure of Dayan and 
Weizmann from the Begin government folio wing the signing of the Egyptian Israeli 
peace treat) at Camp David. 
In addition, with the separate peace treat)' that Sadat concluded with Begin. 
Egypt was officially out of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Taking advantage of a 
neutralized Hg)pt. Israel began a five-month attack on Lebanon, killing thousands of 
Palestinians and Lebanese, fhis happened just one month after the signing of i£g)pt -
Israeli treaty. This was the beginning, Arafat remarked, of Israel's final solution of the 
Palestinian problem by military means that culminated in the summer of 1982.^^ 
The Sccoiul Pliasc of Begin Rule 
A new policy line was implemented by Begin himself (who served until 1981 
as acting defense minister). With the departure of Dayan and Weizmann, there was no 
longer any serious opposition to Begin, Israeli policy towards Arabs and Palestinian 
in the Occupied 1 erritories became increasing dogmatic, aggressive and single mind. 
•Although Begin"s logic was not always apparent to friend and foe during his tenure in 
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office (thus many on Israel's Right accused him of betraying the idea of completeness 
of the homeland-shlemul ha moledet - at Camp David) it is clear now that, in effect. 
Begin carefully and quite effectively implemented a pre-designed, ideologically based 
policy 
Ariel Sharon who with Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan, openly advocated 
annexation and a tough occupational policy towards the Occupied Territories. Shortly 
after his appointment Eitan contrary to the precedent banning generals from making 
political pronouncements, issued a public declaration affirming Israeli right to the 
West Bank. With the appointment of a Gush Emunim leader as adviser to army's 
Chief Education officer, the IDE's new ideological and political orientation was 
apparent.'" 
Begin's second term (1981-1983) with a new political elite emerging around 
him Sharon Raful. .Aren and Shamir, constituted the most hawkish government in 
Israel's hislor). In addition, the support of National Religious Party (NRP) radicals 
and sustained by the Eretz Yisrael true believers in the Renaissance Party, the position 
of the government was to the far Right.^^ 
Begin accelerated the settlement process in West Bank including East 
Jerusalem and Gaza Strip. In October 1980 after the resignation of Weizmann Israel 
bombed the Tamuz II Iraqi reactor and in July 1981 carried out the Shocking raid on 
Beirut. Begin then planed and executed the war in Lebanon as final, decisive blow to 
the Palestinian national movement.^^ 
Indeed, after October 1980 the nuclear reactor bombing, there were many 
important crises which were most crucial military and political decision, fhe crises 
were such as the Syrian missile crisis, relations with America on the basis of the 
strategic consensus directed against the USSR, the Beirut raid and reactions to PLO 
opcralions emanating from Lebanon. Al l of Ihem pointing the way to the eventual 
invasion of Labanon.^' 
Between Be<j,in and Sharon 
In August 1981, Sharon was appointed as Defense Minister. Really, this 
appointment was the most significant event in giving the second Begin government its 
final, harsh look. The relationship between Begin and Sharon goes back a long way. 
to the aftermath of the 1973 war, and it has not always been amiable, s>mbiolic and 
friendly, it was often marked by mistrust and betrayal. In fact, Sharon was aware of 
Begin's authoritarianism, his unwillingness to tolerate opposition or competition, 
traits Sharon shares but does not admire in the others. 
Sharon refused to join Herut in 1973. To overcome Begin. Sharon in .lul> 
1973 created the Likud Right and Right-of-Center coalition hoping that Begin"s llerut 
would be small owed up by the Likud electoral bloc. The exact opposite happened. 
Begin"s out maneuvered Sharon, who left the coalition in 1974 in frustration, showing 
once again that Sharon is impatient with the Israeli Left and formed his own parly. 
Shlomzion (The Peace of Zion) although, Shlomzion was failure in elections, going 
only two seats but those seats were crucial to Begin, who needed both of them to form 
his coalition government.^' Finally Sharon dissolved Shlomzion, joined Herut and 
was appointed .Agricultural Ministry. He became Begin"s sword who turned Begin's 
words into action in his own inimitable style, carrying out Begin's accelerated 
settlements policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Obviously, he was the blunt 
instrument of Begin's policies who did the dirty work and i f necessary, the villain for 
any action that back fired. He ousted by force the Israeli settlers in the Sinai because 
pragmatically, a quiescent Egypt was needed for any future cause of action in 
Lebanon. He further dampened the spirit of Palestinian nationalism by ousting pro-
PLO mayors in the West Bank.^ ^ 
Sharon and Begin share the same dream Sharon is the dream's hatchet man. 
That dream is to annihilate the PLO, douse any vestiges of Palestinian nationalism, 
crush PLO allies and collaborators in the West Bank, tighter Israel's grip on the West 
Bank and eventually force the Palestinians there into Jordan and cripple, if not end, 
the Palestinians national movement. 
In fact, Sharon was now regarded as the key security and defense expert in the 
Likud. Begin appreciated his support for the Camp David Accords and believed that 
only Sharon would be able to evict the settlers from Sinai without a bloodbath. 
Sharon, he felt, was the only man who could stand against the far Right. He could also 
rely on Sharon to slow down the other parts of the Camp David Accord, especially 
those sections dealing with the autonomy plan for the Palestinian. Begin probably 
believed that he could extract the best from Sharon and in the process exert control 
over his action.^  
Israeli intervention in Lebanon 
On 3 June 1982, in London, a Palestinian gunman Hassan Said opened fire on 
the Israeli Ambassador, Shlomo Argov, at the Dorchester Hotel in Park Lane. He did 
not die, though he was left totally paralyzed. The attack on Argov coincided with 
renewed PLO shelling from bases in southern Lebanon of Israeli settlement along the 
border in northern Galilee. No Israeli was killed, but the shelling renewed calls in 
Israel for some tough action to be taken against the PLO bases. In fact Israeli 
intelligence told Begin that the gunman was not a PLO member but belonged to the 
small Iraqi-supported Palestine National Movement, headed by Abu Nidal, a fierce 
opponent of Arafat's leadership. Begin with held their information from his Cabinet. '^ 
In the Cabinet session convened at Prime Minister Menachem Begin's home 
on Saturday night, June 5, 1982, operation peace for Galilee was approved on the 
basis of a plan presented by the Defense Minister and Chiel-of Staff, fhis plan 
differed from a previous one worked out by the two generals and dubbed the grand 
plan. According to the grand plan Israel was supposed to reach Beirut, but the little 
non-presented to the Ministers stipulated as the operation's goal advancing 40 
kilometers north of the Israel Lebanon border. 
Almost unanimously, the Cabinet approved the Sharon proposal. The 
following day at noon, when fighting broke out, the four part cabinet decision was 
made public. 
1. The government of Israel has decided to charge the IDf with the task of 
removing all the Galilee settlements from the fire range of the terrorists, 
who are located mainly in Lebanon, along with their headquarter and 
bases. 
2. The name of the operation: Peace for Galilee 
3. While carrying out this decision, the Syrian army must not be attacked 
unless it attacks our forces. 
4. The state of Israel continues to aspire to a peace treaty with an independent 
Lebanon while safeguarding its territorial integrity.^" 
Israeli jet struck at Palestinian position in southern Lebanon and in West 
Beirut on the following day, Israeli jets and gunboats bombed the strafed PLO 
positions along the highway between Beirut and South Lebanon. I'or the first time 
since July 1981, artillery battles began between PLO and Israeli forces at the border. 
On 6 June, a few minutes before the invasion, the Israeli Chief of staff Rafael Eitan 
informed the Commander of the United Nations Interim force in Lebanon that Israel 
iniendcd to launch a military operation in order that Israel would no longer be within 
PLO artillery range. 
On 5 June 1982, the Security Council of the United Nations discussed the 
renewal oi' bombing by Israel and passed Resolution 508, demanding a cessation of 
hostile activities by Israel in Lebanon. During the debate, the Israeli Ambassador to 
the United Nations, Mr. Yehuda Blum, related the measures taken by Israel to the 
PLO's constant terrorist provocations since July 1981 which included 150 acts of 
terrorism instigated by the PLO. originating in Lebanon, against Israelis and Jews in 
Israel and elsewhere, in Athens, Vienna, Paris and London. In this list of alleged PLO 
activities, there was no reference to the PLO launching hostile acts from Lebanese 
territor\ on to the territory of Israel or no such activity had lact taken place during the 
period. Lebanon, in the view of the Ambassador was to be held responsible for all of 
these acts referred above. "' 
By the fourth day of the war the whole coastal region of Lebanon had come 
under Israeli control. The army in the western section had reached the outskirts of 
Beirut's southern suburb and established links with the Phalangists controlling Last 
Beirut. In the central sector, the Israeli army had reached very near the Beirut-
Damascus highway thought it had yet to take control of this strategic road, 'fhe Israeli 
forces in the eastern sector now began to e.xert pressure on the Syrian troops stationed 
in the Biqa valley taking full advantage of the fact that the little had already been 
enriched from the west by the advancing Israeli column in the central sector.' 
In fact, Sharon and IZitan played a game of cat and mouse with the Cabinet. 
They retreated from the grand plan and officially took up little plan, which was more 
acceptable. While lobbying in the Cabinet for little plan, Sharon and Eitan prepared 
the IDi^  {'or grand plan. 
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Sharon has never quite understood the meaning of the word "limited" upon 
taking the Lebanon operation in his grip; he widened its scope and planning. On 9 
June at 2 pm the lAF went into action attacking the system air defense missile system 
in the Biqa. The Syrians responded by sending out scores of interceptor into the sky in 
a bid to protest their missiles from the Israeli attack which was accompanied by a 
ground attack against the Syrian army stationed in the Biqa. Shorn of its air support 
and heavily outnumbered the Syrian army soon found itself in a very precarious 
situation. In three days of intensive battle, the Syrian army was pushed back several 
kilometer lost a large number of T-72 tanks and the IDF was on the verge of taking 
control of the Beirut - Damascus highway. 
For immediate help and protection. Assad secretly flew to Moscow and 
appealed to his Soviet allies. This prompted Leonid Brezhnev to contact President 
Reagan on the hotline urging the American president to restrain Israel. However, 
under the pressure of American president, Israel ultimately agreed to a ceasefire in 
eastern sector on 11 June. But the acceptance of the ceasefire was a tactical move on 
the port of the Israelis. Israel had already inflicted or crushing defeat on the Syrian 
army in Lebanon.^ ^ 
Following the ceasefire on 11 June, the IDF began to focus its attention on 
Beirut. As pointed out earlier, the IDF had already reached the outskirts of Beirufs 
southern suburbs by the fourth day of war. Now made a concerted etTort to capture 
strategic points on the southern finger of the city and strengthen the link that had 
already been established with the Lebanese Front in East Beirut. After a fire battle the 
IDF captured Khaldeh a strategic point all roads leading south from Beirut and its 
suburbs converged at Khaldeh) and set up new positions at the southern and of the 
runways of Beirut international Air port. On the after-noon of June 13, Israeli troops 
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reached Ihe eastern entrance to the city and took up positions along llie green hne 
dividing l-^ ast and West Ik'irut thereb) completely encircling the Syrian and 
Palestinian forces in West Beirut. Sharon then instituted what became known as the 
crawling stage of the war. The crawling stage of war continued on June 15 when 
Israeli forces extended their control along the Beirut-Damascus higlnva>. culling off 
an\ chance of Syrian reinforcements using the road to enter or reinforce the Pl.O in 
Beirut.'* 
The Results of the Invasion 
The PLO was forced to leave Bcirm. but Arafat was ncilher lakcn in his 
bunker nor forced to go to Damascus. The PLO both retained its political 
independence and it's following in the West Bank and Gaza, 'fhe I DP forced ihc 
Syrian Arm> lo withdraw from West Beirut, but not from ihc rest o\' Lebanon, noi 
esen from the hills o\erlooking ihe city. 
On the night of 30 August to 15 September Bashir al-.lumayil Hew to Nahari>a 
in northern Israel for his Hrst meeting with Begin. Sharon. I j ian and Kimche. Begin 
began by demanding that l?ashir"s tlrsl act as President should be to pa} visit lo 
Jerusalem, or Tel Aviv, that a date should be set for ihc signing of a peace treaty, ihal 
the renegade Lebanese officer Major Saad lladdad should be appointed commander 
of the south. Bashir was furious at his treatment b)' the Israeli Prime .Minister and 
refused to commit himself to anything. On 14 September one week before his 
inauguration, Bashir was-blown up by a massive bomb placed in the Phalange party 
headquarters. Israel blamed S)Tia but many Lebanese, including Phalangists believed 
the Israelis had killed Bashir because he had shown himself loo independenl. lie was 
succeeded by his older, more moderate brother Amin Jumayil.'"'' 
Israeli Objective and the cfTect on the Occnpied Territories 
The June 1982 invasion was not a limited one like the earlier invasion. It had 
deeper and more liindamental objectives, 'ihe.se were as Ibllows. 
1. Crushing and destroying the PLO both as a political and militar\ force in 
Lebanon.^** Sharon's goal of driving the PLO from Beirut would indirect 
inlluence political reality on the West Bank and in the (ia/a .Strip, flic 
assumption was that by making the PLO leadership, more moderate 
Palestinian elements in the Occupied Territories could conduct more open 
negotiations with Israel aimed at gaining a limited aulonom\ similar lo 
that offered by Begin in the negotiation with Hg_\pt.""' 
2. Installation of Bashir Jumayil as the President of Lebanon and the 
imposition of Lebanese Front control throughout the Lebanese body 
politic. The second objective was directly related lo the first, and had to do 
with changing the political situations in Lebanon. In order to prc\cnl the 
return of the PLO after the emanation of its commanders. Israel had to help 
the Christians form a new pro-Israeli. anti-Palestinian government in 
Lebanon, in other words make Bashir al-.lumayil President of Lebanon.'" 
3. Intlicting a humiliating defeat on the Syrian army so as to affect its total or 
partial withdrawal. The assumption was that these two objectives could not 
be achieved while Syrian forces were stationed in Lebanon. Therefore, a 
third objective became to remove Syrian army from Lebanon. 
4. Signing of peace treaty with Lebanon in fact Israel made Bashir Jumayil 
President of Lebanon that because in return, the new i'resident would sign 
a peace agreement between the new Lebanon and Israel.'" 
in addition, the effect of Israeli invasion to Lebanon was that after PLO's 
expulsion from Beirut the leadership would be forced to take refuge in Damascus 
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wlioro il would bo under close Syrian control and lose its inlluence in the West Bank 
enabling a more pliable nioderale Palestinian leadership to emerge there. Sharon also 
soughi to pusli out the Palestinian civilians living the Tyre and Sidon areas and in the 
camps, south of Beirut. The massive size and destructive force of IDI" assaults were 
mean to dislodge the bulk of these people and drive them across the frontier into 
S_\ria from where they were expected to fmd their way to Jordan, which Sharon and 
like-!r.inded Israelis considered to be the Palestinian stale Jordan would then become 
the >c '.e outlet for i'alcslinian political expression.'' 
I'lie L ikud's Policy towards the Occupied Terr i tor ies 
Likud's settlement Policy in the first phase (1977 - 1979) 
l,ikud"s new policy for West Bank settlement was based on the Likud's 
idcoiog) that all the West Bank is part of "Greaier Israel". It was designed to establish 
Israel's presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip firmly and extensively. This eflbrt 
entailed doing every thing possible to erase the "green line" (the 1949 armistice line 
between Israel and the Occupied 'ferritories in 1967) and to place Jewish settlements 
where iliey \sould obstruct an_\ future attempts to divide the West Bank into separate 
Jewisii and Arab enclaves. 
Formal erasure of the green line was at least partially achieved by orders from 
Begin's government to slate radio and televisions reporters forbidding ihem to refer to 
Judea and Samaria as the West Bank or as ""Occupied" or ""administered" areas unless 
quoting on identified source. 
Official maps no long included the armistice line between Israel and the West 
Bank and (Jaza. and Israel proper was officially referred to as the area within Israeli 
municipal boundaries or as other areas of Israel 
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The Likud party began wedging settlement in between and among Palestinian 
the so called "Sharon Plan" name after General Ariel Sharon Minister of Agriculture 
and sculemenls and pursued the objective o!" building a third bell ol" settlement on the 
western highlands extending from Jenin to the north and Bethlehem to the South 
etTecti\ely bisecting the high land of the West Bank. (See Map no. 19) 
fhis policy needed to divide the populated West Bank into two smaller areas, 
the co;Ttainmenl of the Palestinians would be i'acilitatcd by enclosing them all sides by 
belts of colonies which would eliminate physically any chances of a return to the 1967 
borders. It moved the Israeli border to the doorstep of the Palestinian populated areas 
u ilh the intention of preventing their physical development to the West.'" 
Sharon planned to the link the new belt to another two bells b\ ihc 
construction of three lateral roadwa>s: the Urst road, in the south linking Israel with 
ihe Gush Elzion bloc and then on the Dead sea. a second lateral road (the Trans-
Samaria Mighway) culling through the hearl of the West Bank, and a third nonliern 
lateral road."(See Map no.20) 
Ai the lime, when the Likud alliance wrested power from Labour parly, a 
strong selllemenl movement such as Gush ITzion project in southern pari of llic West 
Bank and Kiryat Arba settlement next to Hebron and ihe Semi-official .lewish 
settlements of Tekoah, Opra and Quddum all of which were sponsored by Gush 
Emunim. was already imderway. More ihan 90 selllements had been or were in the 
process of being established of these, 36 on the West Bank and a dozen residential 
quarters in and around the Arab Jerusalem region (East Jerusalem) 22 in Gaza Strip 
and Sinai and 25 other Jewish settlements were on Golan Meight. *' 
When the Rabin government fell (May 1977), two out of every three 
settlements in the West Bank were along the river, the rest were also located in areas 
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on which national consensus existed: the Jerusalem area Latrun. and the Etzion Bloc. 
Kiryat Arba and two other settlements were the exceptions to the rule and the rule was 
"settlement for security". 
In Sharon plan for settlement, which developed under the Likud, there was a 
change from the plan developed by Labour party for the Jericho area. While Labour 
had left the Jericho region as an open corridor to link the West Bank population with 
Jordan as part of its "Jordanian Option" the World Zionist Organizations plans, which 
the Likud approved, insisted on placing six settlements around tlie town of Jericho to 
prevent even a small corridor connecting Palestinians with Fast Jordan. ' The 
placement o\' new settlement underscored the direction of Likud's policy. Twenty-
nine of the thirty-five settlements established on legalized between two and half years 
of Begin first government were located in areas "considered out of bounds" in Allen 
Plan in the hill country of the nonhern bulge of the West Bank in the Jericho and 
I I I s o 
Mebron areas. 
Likud Settlement Policy in Benin's Second Phase (1980-1983) 
The World Zionist Organization, with the assistance of Jewish Agency, came 
out with the Urst so-called five-year comprehensive settlement plan for Judca and 
Samaria. The objective of the plan was to build Jewish settlements bloc in between 
and among the population areas. 
The objectives of these blocs are two folds. 
1. 'I'o surround the major Palestinians towns and prevent their expansion (ibr 
example, Nablus is surrounded by two blocs, 'firza and Lion Moreh, 
Ramallah is surrounded by Beit El, Givon and Maaleh Adumim blocs) 
2. To cut off the Arab towns from each other by building these blocs in 
between West Bank towns, 'fhe Kadumim bloc, for example divided 
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Nabliis Irom Qalgilya: the Slicvci Shomron bloc lies between Nablus and 
Jenin; the Kfar Etzion bloc created a barriers between Bethlehem and 
llebron.(See Map no. 19, 20 and 21 ) 
In September 1980 the World Zionist Organization produced on amended live 
year plan. 1980-1985 (the Droble plan)^'. A conspicuous addition was another bloc of 
settlements calculated to surround the northern town of Jenin, the only area left open 
in the previous plan. " 
The World Zioni.st Organization's plan which was approved by the Likud 
government, insisted on placing six settlements around the town of.lcricho to prevent 
e\en small corridor connecting Palestinians w ith East .lordan. 
In January 1981. the Droble Plan included the names of 54 sclllcmcnts 
existing or under construction in the West Bank. This does not include the Jordan Rift 
and Jerusalem settlement.'"' 
The largest increase oC settlement took place in 1980. The Thirt_\-eight 
settlements of 1980 were almost all across the Green Line in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, some of them in heavily Arab populated areas. This was the largest number of 
new settlements in any one-year in Menachem Bcgin's government. There had been 
forty-nine over the previous three years.'" 
In March 1980, construction of anotherlOOOO dwelling which was announced 
for the French Hill Neve Yakov northern axis had been started. To the Cast Jerusalem 
a much more serious venture had been taking shape in the form of the Ma'ale Adu 
min Bloc which is "targeted to become a major residential and industrial complex 
which will complete the encirclement of Jerusalem" and which, when completed will 
extend the municipality eastward more than eight miles towards the Hood of the 
Jordanian Valley thus clearly delimiting the north-south axis of the intended ""thick 
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ending of the Jerusalem dislricl" many kilo-mctcr beyond existing iinnexation 
boundaries. At Givon, west of Ramailah, an urban centre intended to accommodate 
20.000 to 30,000 inhabitants liad already been authorized.''" 
hi April 1982. the Likud government was evacuated the Sinai. The Likud used 
the alleged security risk that this situation would pose as an excuse to launch a major 
settlement drive within the strip such polic\' also meshed within its program on the 
\\ est Bank ofplacing settlements in the midst ofl'alestinian villages and towns. 
The principal outcome of the Likud program has been the expropriation of 
7500 acres along the South West side of the Gaza Strip, extending from West of 
Rafah (on the Sinai border) North past Khan Vunus. This Qatif Bloc contains ten 
settlements, 'fhe .settlers expected to rely on hothouse agriculture, light industries, and 
summer resort along the Mediterranean shore.' 
A second smaller settlement bloc was established at the northern end of the 
strip, in order to obliterate the pre-1967 armistice line. The Lrelz industrial /one 
forms the nucleus of this bloc, with two residential out posts. One of them is based on 
hothouse agriculture and light industry, and the other relies on Jewish religious 
tourists." 
During the last few year of Begin's rule, the Likiid Party used economic rather 
than ideological forces in an effort to prevent a territorial compromise in the West 
Bank. More specifically this was an attempt to use the centrifugal pulls in both the fel 
Aviv and the Jerusalem metropolitan area as a vehicle for channeling the Israeli 
population into the West Bank. 
The Likud settlement strategists, indeed believed that by using the natural 
demand for land in central Israel, they would be (.|uickly able to form a critical mass 
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ofpopulalion a surficiently large number ol'people to prevent any elTective internal or 
international pressure for withdrawal.^'^ 
In September 1983. one month before Begin"s resignation, there were 112 
settlements on the West Bank and 5 in Gaza Strip.(See Map no.22) The population 
living beyond the old "Green Line" had grown from 3000 to 40.000 (inckiding the 
new towns of Ma'aleh Adumin and Emanuel) the Pattern of settlements had changed 
too. Labour wanted to pressure the option of territorial compromise. Begin"s Likud set 
the engine in reverse, drawing resources away from the eastern fringe and scattering 
settlements among the Arab towns and villages. At first onl.\' the ideologically 
motivates volunteered for these outpost but gradually ordinary families swallowed the 
Government bait and moved to the West Iknk because housing was cheaper there, 
fhe settlements were near enough to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv to serve as commuter 
suburbs. 
Likud's Autonomy Policy 
At Camp David, Lg\pl and Israel committed accords to develop transitional 
arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza Strip for period not exceeding five years. 
The accords spoke of "full autonomy to the inhabitants" of the territories and the 
constitution of self governing authority.' Prime Minister Begin gave Israel's 
integration of autonomy in his 26 points "peace plan" before the Knesset in December 
1977. In contrast to the Egyptian and American interpretations of "autonomy" which 
envisaged eventual self-government for the Palestinians the Begin plan foresaw 
integration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Israel, not as a transition towards some 
kind of a compromise solution over this territories.'''" 
Begin"s blueprint was modeled on the concept of "personal autonomy" 
proposed for .levvish communities in pre-World War I Eastern Europe.'' Me 
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cmphiisi/cd lluil ••Hill aiilononi)" inenlionccl in iho Camp David agreements in no way 
implied lerrilorial or political separation Irom Israel. The Green Line, he stated no 
longer exists, it has vanished forever. These are no line anv more. We uant to coexist 
with the .Arabs in Erctz Israel — under the aulonom\ scheme the> will ensure 
securit). Jews and Arabs will co-exist in .ludea and Samaria as they do in .lerusalem. 
Ramie. Jaffa and Haifa. 
The Camp David agreement states also that the Israeli military government 
and its civilian administration \\\\\ be withdrawn as soon as seir-govcrnmcn\ au\horily 
lias been freely elected to replace the militar\ government, from this. Israel infers that 
while the military government will withdraw, it wil l not be abolished. Israel claimed 
that the agreement stipulates that the Israeli Defence Force will be allowed to remain 
in West Bank and Gaza Strip for purpose of defence.'" 
fhe Israeli offer of that autonomy indeed, would apply to the Arab inhabitants 
but not to territory, generated controversy among Begin's extremist followers who 
regard it as conciliatory. 
Israeli Security Policy before and under L ikud. 
Providing security and defense to the Jew ish community and the state of Israel 
was one of the original major settlement goals. Israel's defense policy is inseparable 
iVom its foreign policy. Moreover foreign policy is perceived as mainly a function of 
defense policy as in Dayan's sa\ing •"Small countries have no foreign policy, only 
security policy". Consequently those responsible for defense enjoy the right to 
inlluence foreign polic>' directly."" 
Security has ollen been used as the easiest pretext for territorial expansion. 
Israel is a borderless country whose borders is defined by occupation rather than by 
internationally accepted geographical lines. Begin announced in 1977 that settlements 
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improve IsracTs security and enhance it demand for peace with delensible border. 1 le 
added tiiere"s a challenge here tor all in the settlement mo\enient who want lo renew 
expand and establish defensible borders for the slate of Israel/ 
After the occupation in 1967, security and defense became especially 
important. The Golan Heights is of supreme strategic importance since il controls the 
northern part oi' Israel's central mountain massif. It is argued thai this region could 
provide basic security and defense needs.'' 
The West Bank became a ke> issue for the existence and security of the stale 
of Israel. After the 1967 War. ihe .Allon Plan permiued the presence of miliiar\ lorces 
as well as selllement in the Jordan \'alley with the primar_\ purpose of defending the 
West Bank. 
The securit)- bell would allow for the establishment of a forward line of 
defense consisting of either a deployment on the Hal hill in the .lordan Valle_\ and 
exploitation of the natural barriers provided b\ Jordan River. The Allon Plan also 
integrated the Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley in to the defensive s\slcm 
along Israel's eastern border.'^' 
One major aim of Israeli security polic\ was to isolate the Padayeen and lo 
prevent the co-operation of the local population with them. IsraePs s}stem of 
punishment was not aimed at convincing the local population and the members of the 
terrorist organizations to become supporters of the adminisiration. Dayan. one the 
architects of Israeli security policy saw that it was even more important lo direct 
punishment against the local population assisting the guerillas than against the 
saboteurs themselves in order to aehie\'e these aims.'"" 
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Likud's Approach to Security 
The Likud's attitude towards tiie Occupied Territories was difTerenl. With the 
exception ol the Sinai Desert and Rafah approach region, the Likud government did 
not regard the areas as "occupied territories" but as liberated areas of the "Historical 
Land of Israel" to which the Jews had as inherent right. The aim of security policy 
was no longer to achieve co-operation with the local population so that the occupation 
might be maintained as quietly as possible but rather to bring about autonomy in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip according to the agreement at Camp David. Under that 
agreement the Israeli Military Government and its civil authority would be withdrawn 
from the West Bank and Gaza Strip once a self-governing authority (administrative 
council) was freely elected by the inhabitant. 'I'he IDF would then be redeplo_\cd in 
specified security locations in those areas. But finally, Likud government claimed that 
the agreement stipulated that the Israeli Defense Force will be allowed lo remain in 
West Bank and Gaza Strip for purpose of defense and security ol" Israeli peoples. ' 
Under the Likud party rule, the security policy was known as the "Sharon 
Plan" which shows "important security areas" situated in the region of the West Bank, 
'fhese areas are an expression of the concept of national security held by Ariel Sharon 
and represent the essence of his plan. This policy defined the important areas, which 
would remain under Israeli control and make up three quarters of the total areas of 
West Bank and Gaza. Thus all of the Jewish settlements on the West Bank a part from 
three Mitzpe Shalem Mcvo Moron, and Nahal Zohar are included among the 
important security areas. Indeed, Jewish settlements are held to be a precondition for 
maintaining Israeli security area overtime. The security area also included the eastern 
slopes of the high land plateau and Jordan Valley up to the river, as well as the 
highland plateau's western slopes. ^(See Map no. 19 and 20) 
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Sharon plan integrated the Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley and high 
land plateau within Israeli security system. The aim was to concentrate rural 
settlements in selected areas and to coordinate the uelense actixiiics on a regional 
base in order to prevent or overcome Arab attacks on isolated communities or 
transportation link. In the absence of a large regular army, each rural settlement had 
military, potential to defend itself independently. " 
Israeli Land Policy iindcr Likud Rule 
Israeli land policy have had to be started when the occupation began in June 
1967. only one-third of all West Bank land had been registered under the operation of 
the ••seltlenient of Disputes - over land and water law" (\M\V Number 40. 1952, 
oflicial CiA/HTTl: 113. 16 June 1952) Registration was bcgLiii b> the British 
Mandate government. The Jordanian government continued it but it was a slow 
protracted process. Few lands beyond their one-third have been registered since 1967 
because the Israeli authorities suspended all operations of the settlement of Disputes 
law. Ownership of the remaining two-thirds is attested by possession of a Turkish or 
British certificate of registration or through registration in the ta.\ registers title under 
Jordanian law is also proven through purchase and use. (See Map no.23) 
According lo the land code, all lands in West Bank and Gaza Strip are 
classified into one of the following catagories.' " 
1. Wakf are lands that are dedicated to a pious purpose. 
2. Mulk are land that were initially given out by the Ottoman conquers (who 
considered themselves the owner by conquest of all the land they occupied 
to the Muslim residents and the Khuraj lands handed over to non-Muslims. 
3. Miri are lands which the Ottoman Emir did not allow being dedicated as 
Wakf nor gave out as Mulk. Cultivable tlelds. Meadows pastures and 
woodland which together account lor two-thirds of the West Bank. 
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4. Malriiki Land. This sort of land is a land which is withdrawn from private 
use for public purpose such as roads or village threshing floors. 
5. Mawat land. It is uncultivable land away from towns and villages. It falls 
entirely in the public domain.'"^ 
When Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, it considered all 
Mir i , Matruki and Mawat to be state land. (See Map no.24) 
After occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Israeli Military issued 
order Nuinber 59, which defined state property, as 
1. All property which was on the specified date (i.e., June 6, 1967) pertaining to one 
of the following 
a. The enemy state 
b. The juridical body which enemy state possessed any right in whether directly 
and indirectly and whether this right referred to control or not. 
2. The property, which was, registered on the specified which was registered of one 
of the two mentions above. 
3. The property, which on of the above two was a partner in on the specified data. 
4. The property which was on the specifically date pertaining to a juridical body 
which one of the two mentioned above in ( I ) was a partner of registered as owner 
of on having possession over.'^' 
Order 59 provided that the person appointed to implement the order may assume 
possession over state property and carry out whatever action he deems necessary for 
this. 
It is by virtue of order 59 that hundreds of thousands of dunums have been 
declared "state land" and transferred to Jewish settlers. 
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Vlililary orders were passed which liirlher facilitated tlie acc|iiisilion of land in 
the Gaza Strip and West Bank by amending those laws legislated prior to 1967. These 
orders empowered the government to 
1. administer that land registered as state land before 1967 (order 58, 59) 
2. seize privately owned land for military purposes. 
3. close areas for training purpose 
4. repossess land belonging to Jewish before 1948. 
5. expropriate land for public purposes (order 131, 321. 949) 
6. seize land by declaring it state land. Declaration of stale land represents a different 
strategy from that described by previous orders concerning land requisition state 
land declarations view all land as "national patrimony" and consequentU require 
Arab claimants to pro\e ownership, further more, under this strategy, land which 
are uncultivated and unregistered are more vulnerable to seizure. 
To assess the availability of legal methods which the military authorities 
could emplo> it acquire land, a comprehensive survey of the ownership and 
registration status of all West Bank and Gaza Land was begun in December 1979 b} 
the office of the custodian of Absentee property (which is under the control of the 
Israel land Authority) under the supervision of Plia Albeck a legal expert working 
with the Israeli ministry of justice."° 
There were differences between Labour and Likud's policy on land control, 
under Labour Alignment, Israel acquired land for military purposes and therefore 
acted in accordance with article 52 of the flaque regulations regarding Occupied 
Territories. Under the Likud, the rational for acquiring land became "national rights" 
(that is, the non Jewish people to settle in West Bank)'" a rational that is not based on 
anv recounized international lesjal riyhl. 
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The Begin govcrninciU in some situations sueli as llie tamed settlement in 
liion Morch. used the justillcation or"national security needs" latlier than immediate 
urgent military requirement for establishing a settlement. ' ' the Likud party found it 
neecssar) to invent a nev\ legal vehicle as a tool for land grabbing, that of seizing land 
by declaring it "'state land". 
Under Emergency Order 59 Palestinian land can arbitraril> be declared ""State 
land" by the government and its use wil l revert to the military. The land polic) of the 
Begin go\ernment left the population on the West Bank and (Ja/a Strip bewildered 
radicalize and an.\ious. liven the moderates lost faith in the Israeli government. 
Likud used other tactic for land grabbing like declaring ii to be abandoned. 
Zionist acti\ ists were inclined to believe that the Palestinian did not have strong tie to 
their land, many of them had abandoned or uere will ing to abandon their property if 
olTered properly elsewhere in the Arab world. The feudal lords who lived outside of 
Palestine were the first targets. 
After the establishment ol'the state of Israel, the exiled Palestinian lel't behind 
immovable property with on estimated value of 100,383.784 Palestinian pounds. 
Many of those Palestinians who still stayed in Palestine were termed ""internal 
absentees" whenever the Israeli official want to grab their lands. And 40 percent of 
the lands of those remaining Palestinian were also confiscated as abandoned 
property.""" 
Islamic Wakf land amounting to hundreds of thousands of dunums in Israel 
was also considered to be absentee land. The Israeli absentee property law dellned an 
absentee as inter alias, someone who moved to a country, which is in a state of war 
with Israel. 
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I'lic sl\le of land purchasing was changed under IJkud government, lor many 
>ears the purchasing ol^  land was carried out by the government under Labour parly 
tor national goals supported by a solid public consensus. But under Likud party, the 
government lifted the ban on private land purchasing by Jews on the West Bank. By 
the free private purchasing a rush of land speculation began and land values went up. 
so some of .-\rabs could not resist the temptation to sell, although, sale of land b\ 
Palestinian to Jews in the West Bank has always been considered on act of treason of 
the communilN. (n Jordan it has been made a crime (carrying the death penalty) for a 
Jordanian citizen who all West Bankers are to sell land to Jews by virtue of Jordanian 
Law Prohibiting the Sale of Immovable Property to the Enemy (No. 30 of 1973). fhe 
reason for this is the belief of that since the interest of Israel is to annex the West 
Bank and prevent Palestinian from having their own state, fhe sale of land is 
tantamount to assisting a policy of denying the society the opportunity to exercise its 
basic right of self-determination. 
In the first week of February 1981, Begin's government seized the biggest 
land since 1967, over 8,000 dunums of Palestinian, land mostly in the Hebron district. 
Another 8000 dunums near Tubas were declared state land, 5000 dunums belonging 
to al-Bireh were declared "closed" to construction, 15000 dunums near Jennie were 
designated for settlement expansion and 15,000 dunums West and South of Nablus 
were declared "state land" on 19 February 1981, 11,000 dunums were seized from the 
villages Abu-Dis and Azzariyeh escorted to the land by an Israeli military offices and 
were told that the area stretching as far as the eye can see to the east had been 
declared "state properly". One village Sheike said that the seizure could encompass 
70-80.000 dunums. In 1980 occurred on the outskirts of Jerusalem, encompassing 
44,000 dunums of mostly privately owned Palestinian land."^ 
On l-cbruar> 19, 1981, Sharon baldly slated thai Israel has proposed ihal land 
(in West Bank and (ia/a) be in three categories privalel)-owned, which would be 
under U K local Palestinian authority publicly-owned, without a usage designation, to 
be administered jointly b>' Israel and Palestinians: and state -owned for military or 
settlement purposes whose disposition would be exclusively in Israeli hands. 
It is clear that the Palestinians would be alK)wed [o exeicise liighly 
circumscribed power onl> in the limited plots which Israeli administrators had 
determined really belonged to them. Land belonging to the "state" was to be Israeli 
ruled and. since the Israeli government had aLithorized .lews to purchases property in 
the Occupied Territories from September 1979 on. land purchased by Jews was also 
to be Israeli rules. 
Much worse was to come after Begin"s re-election. On 9 August 1981. an area 
of 500.000 dunums extending south from Ramallah was declared as "planning Zone" 
in which no Palestinians could build. This zone makes up 10 percent of the entire land 
area in the West Bank, concentrated in Palestinian towns. 
Due to the land policy, between 1977-1983 Israel came to control a large area 
of about 42 percent of the land on the West Bank and 3 I percent in the Gaza Strip 
area's that under international law were occupied territories. 
Likud's Water Resources Policy 
Israel, the West Bank and East Bank share the same source of water, fhe use 
water from the same aquifers and consider the Jordan River and its tributaries as the 
source of recharge and an additional source for direct use.( See Map no.25 ) The 
shortage of water is an overriding problem in Israel, which in recent years has 
experiences as result of population increase, agricultural expansion and industrial 
development. In addition that about half of Israel an area of about 10000 sq. 
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kilometers known as Nagew is true desert land. Israeli colonization process in the 
West Bank has not been restricted to land seizure. It has also involved the exploitation 
of the scarce underground water resources by the Israeli Occupation authorities. 
This implies that Israel must search for new alternatives to secure its iulurc 
water needs. One of the alternatives has been the water resource in the West IBank and 
Gaza Strip. 
Ever) new acquisition of water lias been made at the expenses of the Arabs 
and particularly the Palestinians. This has led to further escalation oi" tension in the 
region, .'\fler taking over river waters and exhausting all the surface water resources. 
Israel turned to exploiting the subterranean water in the West Bank, claiming that she 
has right to these waters, as they arc important sources feeding the subterranean 
waters in the West Bank in order to meet the need of the settlements there. Israeli 
acquisition of water resources have created more difficulties for the .Arab inhabitants 
and this has helped Israel to seize more land and water and depopulate the West 
Bank."^ 
Since the occupation of 1967 up to Begin's government. Israeli policy aimed 
at restricting the use of water by the Palestinians taken by Israeli authorities, include. 
1. Banning the drilling of artesian wells by Palestinian Arabs. 
2. Putting ceiling on the amount of water to be pumped out of existing wells. 
This measure was carried out by fixing meters on Arab well and imposing 
penalties. For example, the Israelis do not allow Palestinian Arabs to pump 
more than 35 m.cm. annually. 
3. Preventing other drilling of any well for agricultural purposes."'' 
Indeed the first of the major water sources secured by the Israelis in 1967 was 
the water Irom the catchments basin of the West Bank. Most of the rainfall in the 
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Wesl Bank penetrates the soil and reaches aquifers b(Micatli the stretch up to Israel 
proper. An estimated annual volume of some 200 million cubic metres of West ikink 
wincv Hows into the coastal reservoir that had already begun to be exploited b\ the 
Israelis in the early 1950.''" The Israeli National water authorities or Mekoral has 
been responsible for the public water supply in the West Bank and Ciaza Strip since 
1967. Control of water was a key factor to the political and economic control of the 
ferritories during the first >ears of the occupation. The water rights of the Palestinian 
tanners were already encroached upon by the Israeli authorities. " Before 1967 Israel 
had been pumping away from the West Bank's water suppi)'. some 500 million metres 
annually b> means of artesian wells drilled in Israel. This constituted appro\iinaiel_\ 
one-third of l^ ^rae^s annual water consumption before 1967 and it constituted five 
si.xth of the West Bank waters.'"^ 
From the early of occupation, the Israeli authorities have been completely 
prohibiting Palestinian farmer from drilling of any new wells for irrigation purposes 
since such drilling would be carried out in the area whose aquifer Israel is exploiting 
the artesian wells in Israel. Water meters have been placed by the Israeli authorities 
on existing Arab wells to keep a daily check in order to maintain the limitations 
imposed on the amount of water the Palestinian are permitted to use. "^  
Before Begin government, numbers of artesian well were dug. As Dr. Hisham 
.Awartani. chairman of the department of liconomics of Al-Najah National University 
in Nablus (1978) presented on insightful study of Israeli's water policies in the West 
Bank. I lis conclusions are follows. 
I. The total number of artesian wells in the West Bank in 331 of which 17 have 
been drilled by the Israel water company (Mekorat) in the .lordan Valle\ to 
ser\e Israeli settlements in that area. 
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2. Twelve Arab wells have dried up following ihc 1967 occupation, many others 
in the Jordan Valley (mostly in the northern part) are suffering a declining 
water level and increasing salinity. 
Under Begin government, Israeli occupation authorities have been drilling deep-bore 
holes and installing powerful pumps in all areas of West Bank, fhe pumping of this 
underground water has taken place mosti) in the Jordan Valley where the Israeli 
agricultural colonies are completely dependent on this-water for their domestic and 
irrigation piirpose. 
On the other hand, the Likud government has a policy to encourage Jewish 
settlers in th.c West Bank to drill more artesian well. The result of this policy was that 
many wells have been drilled to provide established settlements with water and there 
are twenty wells in the Jordan Valley and ten in the mountainous region of the West 
Bank. In addition to those another seven ha\e been drilled by the military authority. 
fhe water resources of the West Bank under the Likud government provide Israel 
with about thirty percent of its annual consumption and the Israeli - exploited wells in 
Jordan vallev were able to pump more than 14 million cubic metres, 'fhe 88 existing 
Arab well in the same area were unable to produce more than 10 million cubic meters 
in the same period.'^"^ As Dr. Ilisham Awartani concludes in his stud)' that the total 
volume of water discharged from 314 Arab wells amounted in 1977 - 1978 under 
Likud government to 33 million cubic metres where as the 17 Israeli wells in the 
Jordan Valle\ discharged 14.1 million cubic metres. "^ 
The adopted policy allowed Jewish settlers, who constituted 2-3 percent of 
total West Bank residents, 20 percent of total water consumption. Deep well drilling 
by Israeli authorities was detrimental to Palestinian agriculture. In Bardara and Ain 
Al-Baideh, for example, the drilling of an Israeli 24 inch well, discharging 1600 cubic 
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metres per hour, resulted in drying out six out ol'eight local wells iind all the natural 
springs of the area. Al-Auja in the Jordan Valley faced, the same problem when an 
Israeli deep well was drilled its sole source of water. Al-Auja Spring, discharging 5.7 
million cubic metres, dried out in 1979. (hese two areas have been the principal 
vegetable producers in the West Bank.'' 
'fhe introduction of drip irrigation into Arab agriculture remedied part of the 
damage caused h\ the Israeli water polic>. Bui it generated a new dependency on a 
whole conslcllalion of forces the tbrmed of which are Israeli controlled lechnologN 
and the conditions of Israeli market forces. 
.All culti\ation by the village was ruined by the lack of water at an estimated 
loss of S 3 million. Farmers of al-.-\uja have asked the militar> government to slop 
pumping from their well or to suppK them with water from the Israeli wells on their 
land or to allow them to drill a new village well to compel the water supply of the 
spring. The Israelis have caiegoricalK' rejected these requests and have done nothing 
to alleviate the critical water shortage in the villages.''^^ 
hi the Occupied Territories. Palestinians were prohibited to dig any artesian 
wells. A maximum limit of drawn water was set upon the existing wells. An} new 
kind of well was not allowed to be dug for agriculture use. However, in the .Icwish 
settlements as many as 17 new wells were dug up till now compared with 7 by the 
Palestinians. The number of wells in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank is only 
5 percent of the total numbers. Mowever, the quantity of water drawn out ol' ihcm 
corresponds to about 40 percent of all that in drawn out by the Palestinians. Domestic 
water consumption per capita in Israel is about 60 m .^ With the more advanced 
standard of resources could not be solved without continued control over the water in 
the West Bank.'^ ^^ 
138 
In llic CJa/a Strip water consumption overages 100-120 million cubic metres 
per annum. Ninety percent of this total is used to irrigate 45 percent oi'the Strip's 
agriculture, the remaining 10 percent is utilized for domestic consumption, and 
Gaza"s main water reservoir is located in the northern part of the strip, where sc\cral 
Israeli settlements are located. Farmers depend in the large part on water reservoirs 
located in this area of the Strip and in the eastern of Nagev region, areas where the 
soil is porous and where arid weather conditions prevail. Israeli go\ernmeiit through 
its aflllialcd water company, Makorat, has issued restriction against digging of nev\ 
wells and has limited the amount of water utilized by Palestinian larmers. In the 
Naqab Descri. along the (iaza border Israel drilled wells every 2 kilometers to suppl\ 
settlements. I'hcir deep drilling techniques caused a rise in the salinit> of nearby (ia/a 
wells, making Palestinian water source undrinkable.'^" 
.According to the Israeli water commission a year after the resignation of 
Begin in 19S3 Israelis living in the Gaza Strip consumed 2326 cubic metres of water 
per capita, compared with an average consumption of 123 cubic metres for every 
Gazan. 
I'he water policies implemented by the Likud government inside the Strip are 
mainly discriminatory and pose clear threats to the future of Palestinian agriculture, 
especially to citrus production. 
Bcgin's Economic Policy 
Begin came to power primarily as result of Labour's failure to manage the 
econoni) in the impossible years of huge oil-price increases. Moreover the 
combination of full employment, comprehensive welfare and heavy defense spending 
manifested itself in growing budget dellcils. inllation and continuous dependence on 
foreitin aid. 
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Likud's ccuiu)mic plalt'orni was promised on a I'rcc ccononi>. It envisaged a 
rcduclion of govcmmenl invoUcmciil, slimulalioii o(" free enterprise and halting 
inllation by limiting dellcit spending. The eeonomic policies under l.ikud government 
uas quite different from that of preceding Labour administration. " 
On 28 October 1977 Siiiicha Lnrlich the leader of the Liberal who was the 
Finance Minister of Begin's government announced a new economic policy, which 
marked a decisive break witii the past. " 
Ihc rcsull of ;hc new policy was ihav ihc cosl of subsidized good wenl up by 
an overage of 15 percent, electricity and water cost increased by 25 percent, telephone 
and postal charges rose, the price of cigarettes went up 21 percent and that of instant 
coffee 26 percent the VA'f (Value added ta.\) rate uas increased trom 8 tt) 12 percent, 
•fhe compensate, welfare payments and child allowance were increased 12 percent. '"' 
hi case of seeking to reduce the balance of payment deficit, the Likud used a 
policy of increasinu exports, curlailmeni of imports Liberalization ol" business 
regulations and the abolition of lorcign currencx restriciii)n. "" 
Ehrlich ended 38 sears of currency control and fixed exchange rate restriction 
on forcign-currenc)' transactions was lifted and the Israeli pound was allowed to tloat. 
fhe result of this policy was the Israelis could have unlimited deposits of foreign 
currency in their bank accounts abroad. Customs duties were lowered and businesses 
encouraged exporting. Overall, this package amounted to devaluation was over 40 
percent. 
Likud's economic policy during the period of Ehrlich as a finance Minister, 
implemented only two of its policies: Liberalization of currency exchange regulations 
and a limited stimulation of private initiative. The cross pressures of politics and 
securitv caused a steadv deterioration in most of the other economic indicators 
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targeted tor relbrin. Public consumption, the iinliivorable ration of export to import, 
budget detlcits, external debt, and inflation all increased dramatically. The inflation 
rate, which had been 31.4 percent per annum when Likud assumed power, increased 
to 78.2 percent by 1979 Just before the resignation of Hhrlich.''' ' 
•fhe terrible state of the economy finally forced Ehriich's resignation. He was 
replaced b> the State List's Yigal Hurvitz as the Minister of Finance.'' l iur\ i iz was 
equall) a fundamentalist in economic terms. He believed that the rcmcd_\ !a\ in the 
application i.)f even more rigid monetarist policies. 
The Likud under the new Minister of Finance instituted the polic\ of reducing 
all go\ernment subsidies together with the imposition of a wage freeze on public 
sector salaries. 
The austerity policy encountered resistance from other ministers represented 
in the Cabinet, each of which fought to retain or increase its allocation. This policy 
was unpopular with the public. In June of 1980, after a few months oi' llurvilz's 
austerit)' measures, public satisfaction with Likud was down. By the end of 1980. the 
inflation rate was approaching 180 percent, compared to 77 percent two years 
previously. 
Begin understood that the economic situation of ordinary people was a greater 
priorit) for them than questions of ideology. The struggle to make ends meet shaped 
their daily lives. Begin appointed Yoram Aridor as Finance Minister replacing 
Hurvitz in January 1981.'^' Yoram Aridor received a mandate to change the economic 
course. The new policy called the "right economy'" reversed most of the previous 
Likud goals. It aimed to consist primarily of lowering taxes and prices as a means of 
reducing inflation. The new policy virtually abandoned the attempt to control wages 
and phase out subsidies. It was seen as on of the main reasons behind the Likud's 
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victory in the elections for tenth Knesset in the summer of 1981. Ariclor conlinued 
these policies after the elections. The inflationary effects of Aridor's economy were 
increased by the war in Lebanon, the war resulted in a 7 percent annual increase of 
security oulla>s. 'fogether with the "right econom\"" they resulted in a 292.7 percent 
inflation rate by 1983.'^'' 
After the collapsed of the stock exchange in January 1983, public confidence 
in the financial system was badl\' shaken. Purchase of foreign currcnc) reached 
epidemic proportions, forcing the government to devalue the shekel by 23 percent. In 
the last polic\ which Aridor attempt to save the economy from collapse, he proposed 
the polarization plan. The plan drew shop criticism and Aridor was replaced by Yigal 
orgad. 
Likud's Lconomic Policy towards Occupied Territories durin<^ Begin Era 
As a result of the 1967 war, the economics of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
were severcl) disrupted. When the gun fell silent on June 10, 1967. the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip were under Israeli occupation. Since then their economic performance 
has been dominated by the policies and decision of the occupying power. 
'fhe occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip brought their economics 
which was mainly agricultural into close contact with the much larger, more 
industrially advanced Israeli economy. The economies of the two territories have been 
subsequently reshaped by policies and decisions made by the occupation authorities in 
such away as to serve Israeli interest. No Israeli government either under the rule of 
Labour party or Likud parly, was ever formulated a well-deflned economic policy 
relevant to the Occupied Territories. And in every case where there had been a 
conflict of interest among Israel and its {Palestinian neighbors, it was Israeli interests 
always that are first. " 
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IsaicTs economic policies toward llic Occupied Tcrriloiies resulted as a matter 
ot' fact in the subjugation of the latter economy. Business cycles in the Occupied 
Territories came to coincide completely with those of Israel. I he points are as 
t'ol lowing. 
1. Assured export market for Israeli industrial products. 
2. Sources of unskilled or semi-skilled labour for the Israeli economy.'^' 
l.ikLid"s economic policies toward the Occupied Territories are results of 
ideological motivation which could be termed as expansionist Zionism: the policies 
are conspicuous factor which distinguishes it from other economic colonialism. 
Some of typical classical colonial policies in Likud"s economic policies arc as 
follows. 
1. Integration to Israel's economy: Israeli policies aimed at withdrawal of the 
economic barriers between Israel and the Occupied Territories. Under these 
policies, the commodities from Israel industrial products and labourers for Israeli 
econoni) are assured with some exceptions, 'fhe Israeli currenc) is also circulated 
in liie Occupied Territories. The Israeli economy is an advanced economy and the 
Occupied Territory's economy is a less developed economy. Therefore, it was 
possible for the Israeli economy to gain the fruits at the sacrillce of the balanced 
de\elopment of the economy in the Occupied I'errilories. The Occupied 
Territories were turned into an assured market for Israeli industrial and 
agricultural as well as sources for cheap labour for Israel's industry and 
agriculture.'"*' 
2. Laissaz fair in the Occupied ferritories. I'he Israeli authorities adopted a laissez 
fair policy towards the economic activities in the Occupied Territories, in fact 
under this policy, the Occupied Territories were not given effective aid for their 
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development and remained as underdeveloped as ever. The Palcslinian iVliinicipal 
councils had to have recourse to the aid given by Arab countries and development 
expenditures. Even though the rate of saving in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
seems to be comparatively high, those savings could not find suitable chances of 
investment in the territories. Most savings find their outlet in housing and 
educating their children''^^ 
3. Open Borders: Under this policy there is complete freedom tc trade across the 
Green line. Any thing from Israel can be sold in the West Bank. Ilowevcr. the 
reverse is not true. Manufactures and handicrafts can move from the West Ikmk to 
Israel while agricultural goods operate under a restrictive licensing system that 
protects Israeli farmers. 
More over, the Labour E.xchange office which is run by Israeli Ministry of Labour 
puts a ceiling on the number of workers allowed to cross the border and docs not 
allow West Bank Arabs be in Israel at night time unless they agree to be locked in at 
their place of work. 
4. Open Bridge policy: fhe open bridge policy was started by the Labour 
government and later was continued by the Likud party. They allowed 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to have trade relation with Jordan 
and other Arab countries. The discontented on unemployed Arabs can always go 
to the Hast Bank whenever they wish. Economically, the Israelis receive certain 
advantages by keeping the bridge open. The West Bank's exports provide Israel 
with foreign exchange and help cover the West Bank's and Israel's trade 
deficits.'^^ 
5. Jewish Industries in the West Bank: This was a new policy of Likud. In 1983, six 
Jewish industrial parks had been constructed in the West Bank. In these plants, a 
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total of 2500 workers were employed of which 70% were Jewish. Arabs are 
employed in the small, labour-intensive establishments loeated in these parks. 
However, Israeli policy is to build only capital intensive, sophisticated factories in 
the Occupied Territories. The result is a minimum need for .Jewish settlers to 
commute to Israeli cities and also limit Arab employment. Ihese .lewish indListries 
are eligible for grants of up to 30 % free physical inlVastruclLire and lo short term 
credit facilites.'"*** 
Israeli policies have steered the Occupied Territories to a state of dependency on 
Israel, the economies of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip still lack indigenous 
economic and llnancial institutions necessary for starting development programs and 
channeling savings and investment into various economic sectors. As a result, 
investment in industrial development and economic infrastructure has remained 
conspicuously absent in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
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C H A P T E R - IV 
Likud's Position towards the Occupied Territories in the 
post Begin Phase 
On 1 September 1983, at Tel Aviv's Ohel Shem auditorium, Herut's Central 
Committee elected Yitzhak Shamir to lead the party following the sudden resignation 
and dramatic withdrawal of Menachem Begin. Shamir became Prime Minister in 
October 1983. He appointed Moshe Aren a hard line and closes to him to replace 
Sharon as the Defense Minister of his government. Any hopes that the resignation of 
Menacham Begin as Prime Minister heralded a change in Israeli policies were 
banished when the Herut Party chose the even more hardliner, Shamir and Moshe 
Aren to be Begin's successor as leader of the Party. 
Shamir's Background 
Yitzhak Shamir was born in a religious Jewish family in Poland. His Original 
name was Yitzhak Yzenitzky. During his student days, he met Menachem Begin and 
had similarly espoused the Revisionist cause. He looked to Jabotinsky who had 
broken with the Zionist establishment and was then beginning to challenge their 
dominance as an ideal hero. Shamir joined the Betar in 1929 and moved to Palestine 
in 1935. He studies history at the Hebrew University and worked as a building 
labourer in Kerem Avraham. Sharmir logically adhered to the radical position of the 
\oung Betarnike who demanded mih'tary action against the British. 
Shamir joined Irgun Zvai Leumi after his arrival in Palestine. He was 
particularly inspired by Yonatan Ratosh's pamphlet, "Aiming for Government: The 
Front of the Liberation Movement in the future," which advocated that a 
revolutionary minority could catalyze the masses into action. Unlike Jabotinsky, 
Ratosh wanted to declare a Jewish state immediately before a Jewish majority had 
\:>:> 
been attained. 'I'lie Revisionists were totally unimpressed by this thesis. However the 
pamphlet proved to be the bridge which connected Shamir with Avraham Stern, who 
regarded Ratosh as a teacher and monlor.' 
in fact, the lack of progress with the British, the Arab revolt, and the 
darkening Nazi Shadow over Europe's Jews forced some members oi' Betar and the 
Irgun to break with formal Re\isionism. Shamir's disappointment with Jabotinsky, 
who sounded not unlike Ben-Gurion continued through out his days in Lchi until he 
formally joined Herut 30 > ear's later. 
Shamir joined the militant .lewish underground and became the commander of 
the underground militia known as the Stem Gang or Lehi. In its details, Lehi ideology 
was quite elaborate. But crucial points were conveniently summed up as "'Principles 
of Renaissance" (of the Jewish nation), drafted by Avraham Stern for Lehi members 
and recruit's who were commanded to learn them by heart. 
The tlrst can be noticed in principle. A "The Nation" which read ""The Jewish 
nation is unlike any other nation: (it is the) founder of monotheism; the legislator of 
prophetic moralit>: the sole bearer of universal culture; great in tradition and self 
sacrifice: (great) in its will to li\e and its capacity for suffering, in its unique spiritual 
radiance and its assurance of Redemption.". The founders of Zionism, from Merzl to 
Ben-Gurion and Jabotinsky, could only be horrified by a concept of Jewish 
uniqueness so .strikingly similar to Nazi concepts. 'I'he forefathers of Zionism were 
hostile toward, the Arabs of Palestine, some of them even toward all the Arabs, for 
reasons of what they conceived of as Jewish interest. But non of them were hostile 
toward all the non-Jews for reasons of principle, in contrast, the "Principles of 
{Renaissance" do not mention the Arabs, but onlv the "'aliens" who inhabit the land 
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belonging to the Jews. I'he aim of Lchi is defined as the estabhshment of ••tiie 
Kingdom of Israel."'^ 
In the principle D, "'i'he Mission" reads the (Jewish) nation cannot undergo a 
renaissance without restoration of the monarchy. 
Principle 1, "War", proclaims "An eternal war shall be waged against all those 
who satanically stand in the way of the realization (of our) aims". 
Principle J. ••Conquest" postulates •"the conquest of the homeland by force 
from aliens (Arab peoples) for perpeiuit>", principle N, The Fate of the Aliens" reads: 
"The problem of the aliens wil l be solved through population exchanges". Principle P. 
••Rule" postulates after the expulsion of the ••aliens" (Arabs) and the ingathering of all 
Jews to Land of Israel •'an aggrandizement of the Hebrew nation into mililar) 
political, cultural and economic power of the first rank in the entire (Middle) East and 
all the shores of the Mediterranean"^ under the heading the principles of Rebirth the 
borders of land were dctlned b)- a question from Genesis (15:8) to your seed, I have 
given this land from the River of Egypt to the great River Euphrates, the document 
stated that the Land of Israel was conquered by the Jews by the sward. It was here 
they became a nation and only here can they be reborn. 
Shamir and Stern showed their uniqueness in its very earliest political strategy, 
namely in its persistent search for an alliance with Nazi Germany throughout 1940-
1941. 
They refused to believe that Hitler's view on the "Jewish question" could have 
consequences for the fate of Jews. In order to persuade his comrades. Stern used two 
•'ideological" arguments. The first was borrowed from Jabotinsky's distinction 
between ""verbar' and ••behavioral" anti-Semitism. Although, Jabotinsky used it in 
different context it became a fundamental tenet of Lehi's ideoloiiv. Stern ar"ued that 
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Polish anti-Semitism was behavioral and therefore much worse than the Nazi, which 
was supposed to be merely "Verbal". Shamir is apparently affected by this doctrine to 
the very day when he became Prime Minister.** 
The second argument of Stern no less demagogic than the first, was supposed 
distinction between "enemy of the Jews", and Jew-haters". The latter, who like Hitler, 
"merely" hated the Jews, were to be regarded as a lesser evil, since according to Stern 
they were no more than the usual run of anti-Semites "who arise in ever) generation" 
the "enemies" by contrast were those "who occupied the Jewish homeland" which 
meant the Arabs, the British and account of their rule in Syria and Lebanon also the 
French, all three to be regarded as much worse than Hitler.' 
After Stern's death, Lehi fell apart in September 1942. Shamir escaped from 
Mazra prison and together with Israel Eldad and Nathan Yellin-Mor who had been 
close to Begin as a member of Betar in Poland, reorganized Lehi. Lehi began to move 
beyond individual assassinations and attacks, robberies as its main vehicle of struggle. 
Guerilla warfare and attacks on military installations assumed a higher priority. More 
emphasis was placed on propaganda and public relations."^ 
Lehi under Shamir, attempted to strike at the British leadership of that time. 
There were seven assassination attempts on the life of the British High commissioner. 
Sir Harold Mc Michael, and several more were planned, including sent two members 
of Lehi to kill the British Minister Resident in the Middle East Lord Moyne. 
The British Foreign office described Shamir at the time as among the most 
fanatical of terrorist leaders. Whereas the British regarded the killing of Lord 
Moyne as cold blooded murder." 
On May 14, 1948 a day before the day when Britain had announced it would 
abandon the Mandate, the Zionists declared the independence of Israel, suddenly; the 
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govcrnmcm ol" Israel, which was led b\ Bcn-(iiirion. disbandcci the I.ehi and hguii 
and inslriicted the members to join the Israeli army as a unit.'" 
After the establishment of Jewish state. Shamir was engaged in various 
commercial pursuits and during the ibllowing decade held a senior position in the 
Mossatl at'ter which he returned to private business activities and active in the 
struggle for soviet Jewry. Shamir joined the Herut Movement in 1970 and was elected 
to its executive committee, directing the Immigration Department and later the 
Organization Department. In 1975 he was elected Chairman o\' the movement's 
Executive Committee.''' 
Shamir served in the eighth Knesset and continued to serve until the thirteen 
Knesset. Following the 1977 political upheaval, he was elected speakers of the 
Knesset. However in 1978, Shamir abstained from ratifying the Camp David 
Agreement. In March 1980, after Moshe Dayan resigned he was appointed Minister of 
Foreign A flairs. 
Following Mernachem Begin's resignation from the Premiership, Shamir 
became Prime Minister as well. 
Shamir and Likud Party 
When Dayan resigned from Begin's government both the Democratic 
Movement's Yigal Yadin and the National Religious party's Yosef Burg turned down 
the opportunity in the Likud party. In order to head off Liberal claim to the post. 
Begin offered it to Shamir. Many from Labour Hgures opposed this move as Shamir 
had opposed Camp David. But Shamir paid no attention to the critics and cynics and 
conducted Begin's foreign policy in a low key and undistinguished fashion for three 
vears.'^ 
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Unlike Begin, SIniniir did not care alx)Lit his public image or whal people 
thoiighl aboiil him. infact he was chosen because he was seen as having emerged from 
the same ideological milieu on Begin. He was similarly perceived as stubborn and 
t'lrm. However he did not espouse Jabotinsky's liberalism, which he had renounced, 
long ago. He was known instead for his caution and his secrecy, a political shadow 
boxer whose skills were developed in Lehi and in the Mossad. Ironically, he was 
proclaimed party leader beneath the portrait of .labotinslcy, whom he had disowned 
nearly half a century before.'^ 
1984 Election 
Two weeks before the July 23 elections, when Shamir surprised Peres with an 
invitation to form a "National Unity governments". Peres dismissed the suggestion as 
a publicity stunt. Shamir was than trailing badly in the polls. The l.ikud government 
had started a questionable war and had obviously mismanaged the government's 
budget. Likud was running without any help from Begin himself. Shamir had been 
severely criticized by both major newspapers. Ma'ariv and Yediot Acharonot. Labour 
was united, well financed, and lightly organized. The long feud between Peres and 
Yitzhak Rabin was submerged.'^ 
Peres confidently replied to Shamir that a coalition of the major parties would 
undermine the parliamentary system. The very idea offended some Labour supporters 
when Revisionist Zionist politicians from Jabotinsky to Begin have called for national 
unity; they usually meant their ideal of a militant corporate state. 
After the election, however, the left wing published a statement endorsing 
Shamir's offer. The election result was that of the 120 seats in the Knesset; Labour 
won forty-four, a plurality, but only three more than the Likud won. Two dovish 
"civil rights" lists had six seats, which the ultra nationalist 'I'ehiva movement won 
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five. The rcsl ol" the seats, twenty-four, were divided among thirteen t)ther parlies 
religious faetions. eommiinists, annexationists, laissez-faire militants."* 
In fact, the July 1984 elections were generally considered as one of the most 
crucial electoral contexts in Israeli history. The elections tested the durability of the 
new partisan alignment, which brought Likud to power in 1977.lt was commonly 
argued before the election that Oriental support was contingent on Likud's 
manipulation of the economy or due to the personal appeal of Begin.' 
'fhe election campaign, from which Begin was absent, was conducted in a 
highly orderly manner. The Labour Alignment was unilled and its list of candidates 
included many respectable Sephardim politicians, including the former President 
Yitzhak Navon. The election campaign was especially designed to attract oriental 
voters. In spite of all these etTorts. which came on top of the slumping econom\. there 
is no indication that Labour increased its support among the crucial electoral group."' 
The great anti-Labour coalition, which Begin had constructed, was already 
beginning to unravel in 1981. B\' 1984 the magic of the Likud promises oi' 1977 has 
dissipated to a significant degree. In addition, there were now 100,000 new voters 
Likud was in considerable danger of losing votes to Techiya, Morasha and Kahane's 
Kach on the far right. This was perceived by Likud strategist to be a greater threat 
than a swing to Labour.' 
The Likud not only lost support, but also its previous regular increase derived 
from first-time voters and changes in the voting patterns of veteran voter. The entire 
"Right wing" bloc with the exception of the religious parties lost strength in 1984. In 
1981 the Likud Teheya and Kach lists combined won 39.7 percent of the vote, while 
in 1984 they won only 37.2 percent. The difference is slight but it strengthens the idea 
about the decline of the Likud. Moreover it casts doubt on one of the most popular 
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assumptions in Isriicl. i.e. that the right in its entirety enjoys a regular increase in 
support from among \oung people."' 
Obviously not all defections from Likud losses went to Right-wing parties 
('rehe\a and Kach) some voles went to Wcizmann and Horowitz's parties and perhaps 
to religious parties and even the Alignment. Their moderate shift within the right 
continued to gain momentum in post-election opinion polls particularly among the 
youth.'" 
As far as the West IJank and Gaza uere consumed, the .luly election uas .seen 
as a crucial referendum on the Occupied Territories. It was the llrst election campaign 
in Israel's electoral history in which the two major options were clearly spelled out. 
Labour reaffirmed its support for the Allon Plan, whereas Likud stressed its 
commitment to the retention of the territories and the speeding up of the settlement 
process.""* The outcome of the election confirmed the observation that the Jewish 
electorate was almost equally divided on the issue. Both, the parties which opposed 
territorial concessions (Likud Teheya Koch. Morasha, National Religious party, 
Ometz and shas)'^ and the parties which support territorial compromise (Labour, 
Mapam, Shimuri, Ratz and Yahad) could not get the majority of the total votes. The 
polarized outcome of the election led to the creation of the National Unity 
/-^  . 26 
Goveremnt. 
The National Unity Government 
It was the first time in the history of Israel that one party did not get the 
majority seat to form a coalition government. Under these circumstances the two 
major parlies, the Likud and the Labour party faced three options. 
(I). Hold new elections, an unacceptable solution to both parties and to the 
entire Knesset because of the cost of campaigning and the lacks of encouraging polls 
indicating a possible change in the outcome. 
(2). Continue the Likud in power as and interim government. 
(3). form a grand coalition between the Likud and Labour Party. 
The leaders of the Labour Party and the Likud preferred the third option, fhe 
Likud was more resigned to this possibility. It was not surprising that the Likud part) 
called for the formation of a government o\' national unit_\ because even during the 
campaign, it had proposed a government of national unity. LaboLir Party was less 
inclined to join such a government because of its strong opposition to Likud policies 
and its reluctance to accord the Likud new legitimac\ by sharing power with it. 
indeed the decision to form such a government caused a split in the Labour alignment. 
The radical Mapam left the Alignment upon the decision of the Labour Party to join 
the unity government."'' 
However, it took them six weeks of negotiation, which were required before 
Peres, and Yitzhak Shamir could agree on the composition and policy of a coalition 
government. The new government, whose component parties accounted tor 97 of the 
120 Knesset seats, was formed on 13 September. It contained representatives of the 
two major party groupings (Labour and Likud) four religious parlies (the NRP. Shas. 
Aqudat Israel and Morasha) and the Shinui, Yahad and Ometz parties under the terms 
of the coalition agreement Shimon Peres was to hold the premiership for the first two 
years and one month of the government. While Yitzhak Shamir served as Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, after which time ihey were to 
exchange their respective posts for a further period of two years and one month.'** 
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The Slrucliirc of the Unity Government was based on parit) in representation 
and rotation in the ofllee of I'rinie Minister. Moreover, the Likud and Labour formed 
an inner cabinet, composed of five ministers from each party, which gave parities an 
actual veto power over the decisions of the government." 
The only cabinet post not to be allocated was that of Minister of Religious 
affairs, for which the NRP and Shas were vying. They agreed to leave this portfolio 
and that of minister of the interior, which went with it, in the hands of the Prime 
Minister for one month, wliilc solution to the problem was worked out. f-vcntitally, 
NRP and Shas accepted a formula where by the NF^P controlled the Minislr\ of 
Religious Affairs and 60% of the budget for the activities of the Jewish Religious 
Councils while Shas controlled the Ministry of the Interior and the remaining 40% of 
the budget."' 
The Withdrawal from Lebanon 
During Shimon Peres's two years as Prime Minister in the National Unity 
Government, the Government pledged to withdraw, the Israel Defence Force (IDI-) 
from Lebanon; to ensure the security of its northern border, ideally, Israel S>rians 
commitments not to redeploys its forces in areas evacuation by the South Lebanon 
.Army (SLA); and to allow the UN Interim'Force in Lebanon (UNIFiL) to deploy 
north of the SLA area up to Syrian lines in the Beka'a valley."' 
On 14 January 1985 the Israeli Cabinet voted to take unilateral steps towards 
withdrawal, arousing fears of civil war in southern Lebanon when they departed. The 
Cabinet agreed to three-phase withdrawal plans whose final aim was the return of IDF 
to the international border. The first phase took place in February 1985 and involved 
the evacuation of the IDF from the western occupied sector, around Nabatiyah. The 
UN force was asked to police the vacated area with the Lebanese army. In the second 
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phase, llic 11)1' was lo lca\c the oeeupied central and eastern sector (Including the 
southern Beka"a Valley) and redepkns around llasbawah. The third and llnal phase, 
was to be completed some nine months after the first/" 
Shamir Assumes the Premiership 
Under the terms of the coalition agreement, which the coalition Government 
of national unity was formed in September 1984. the term of the Urst government was 
two sears and one month. Shimon Peres, the leader of Labour part) therefore, 
resigned as Prime Minister on 10 October 1986, to allow Yit/hak Shamir, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to assume the Premiership on 14 October, flowcver. the 
transfer of power was dela\ed while the coalition parties negotiated the composition 
of the new Cabinet, which was approved by the Knesset on 20 October.'' 
The Intifadn (Uprising) 
The Palestinian intifada (uprising) was not a iransitor}- phenomenon that 
sprang up from nowhere and may be expected to pass as mysteriously as it arose, but 
it was a watershed in the Palestinian historical quest for independence. It marked a 
decisive break with the ailiculation of post objectives and opted for a significantly 
different mode of achieving independence, 'fhe intifada indeed, relleeted both 
continuity and innovation in the Palestinian struggle for independence. The emption 
of the intifada was a function of a combination of roof causes and immediate cause as 
well as catalysts. 
Root causes 
The root causes of the Intifada are embedded in the continued Israeli 
occupation of Palestinian territories after 1967. twenty years of occupation, which had 
given the Zionists the impression that there are no Palestinian people but Palestinian 
refugees. Thus the Israeli policies aimed at undermining the material and national 
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existence of the Palestinians in tiieir own land/ ' Under the guise of maintaining its 
own security. Israel had pursued a host of policies detrimental to Palestinian socicl\'. 
Israel confiscated Arab land and launched an aggressive settlement policy wl-,ich left 
the West Bank and Gaza fragmented both geographically and demographically. Israeli 
"iron fist", policies (marked by repressive measures and human rights violations) 
resulted in loss of life, imprisonment, detention, house or town arrest, house 
demolition, deportation, fines interrogation, travel restriction, curfews, closures of 
educational institutions, unjust ta.xes. economic hardship, and the like. Hard!) a single 
Palestinians household had been left untouched.^" 
There were four processes of hegemonic subjugation articulate in the creation 
and maintenance of this internal colony: political suppression, economic exploitation, 
institutional "destructuring" and ideological repression. Israeli policy intends these 
processes to prevent, or at least to sustaining, either politically or economically, an 
independent I'alestinian entity or state, while at the same time strengthening and 
expanding the state of Israel."^ 
fhe Israeli occupation failed to win the sympathy or support of any 
meaningful sector of the occupied population. Such attempts to undermine the 
material existence of the Palestinian people were compounded by continuous Israeli 
denial of Palestinian national aspirations self-determination and on independent 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli denial was perceived by the 
Palestinians as a deliberate attitude that blatantly ignored international recognition of 
Palestinians legitimate rights. When harsh Israeli occupation policies entered a 
coalitional cause with the heightened state of national and political awareness among 
the Palestinians (after twenty years of sec thing discontent), ripened Palestinians a 
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state of deep anger and frustration which finally led to an uprising or a well known 
Intilada as well.' 
I'he Immediate causes 
A number of developments in the Palestinian, Arab, and Israeli arenas found 
their way into the consciousness of the Palestinian people under occupation. These 
developments came to provide the immediate cause for tiie Intifada. 
In the Palestinian arena, the PLO and its leadership had been unable to deliver. 
Just prior to the uprising, the PLO had reached its lowest ebb. Armed struggle was 
reduced to an empty slogan. The withdrawal of the PLO's military presence in 
Lebanon highlighted an unprecedented degree of weakness and lack of meaningful 
national unity among the PLO factions only exacerbated this weakness. The 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza gradually began to realize that they could no 
longer count on the "exterior" alone for their salvation."*' 
In the Arab arena, the Palestine problem sank for a number of reasons to a 
position of secondary importance. Among these reasons were the weaknesses of the 
PLO itself, the problem of Lebanon, and the Iran-Iraq war. The Aman Summit 
Conference of November 1987 fully reflected growing Arab negligence of things 
Palestinians. 
In the Israeli arena, malignant Israeli intentions regarding the future of the 
Occupied 'ferritories had become crystal clear, as manifested in the active Jewish 
settlement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Palestinian frustrations, doubts, and fears 
were perpetuated and reinforced by the clear and significant Israeli voices calling for 
the "transfer'" of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to the East Bank of Jordan, 
or far the establishment of an "alternative home" (watan badil) for them in Jordan. 
Furthermore. Israel had adamantly refused to recognize any fundamental change in 
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ihe Arab/Pakstinian posilion. The net effect was growing Paleslinians cerlainly that 
Israel is not interested in a meaningful peaceful settlement to the connici.''^ 
Catalysts 
A part from the causes (both root and immediate) a number of developments 
acted as catalysts in precipitating the outbreak of the uprising. Just prior to the 
uprising, a bloody confrontation between the Israeli security forces and a group of 
Islamic Jihad members in Gaza Strip resulted in the death of four Palestinians and one 
Israeli intelligence ofllcer. The incident created an unprecedented state of highl\ 
charged nationalist sentiments. S\mpathy with, and admiration for. the Islamic Jihad 
climaxed. 
The Tigger ol" Intifada 
The incident that was a trigger which sparked off the intifada, occurred on 8 
December 1987 near the Jabaliya refugee camp in Gaza, when an Israeli army truck 
crashed into vehicles carr_\ing Palestinians to work in Israel at the military check point 
in Gaza Strip. Four Palestinians were killed and eight others seriously injured. Three 
of those who died were from Jabaliya refugee camp."'° 
On 6 December, two da>s before the incident, there was a case of a 45 \ear 
old an Israeli merchant named Shlomo Sakal who was stabbed in his neck in Gaza's 
seedy Palestine Square. Two days after Sakal's death, the Jabaliya case happened and 
suddenly rumors spread like wildtlre that the Israeli driver was avenging the stabbing 
of Sakal. 
Outraged, 10,000 of Jabaliya's inhabitants turned the funerals of those killed 
in the accident into a huge demonstration against Israeli military rule. They thronged 
the narrow streets of the squalid shantytown. charting nationalist slogans and waving 
the green, red white and black Palestinian Hag. Late to the night they powered out 
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their anger in demands for vengeance. 1 he stage was set lor what was to become 
known as the "'Intifada'", or literally, "shaking" or "uprising"."" 
On 9 December, when an Israeli army patrol entered the Jabaliya camp on a 
routine mission, Jabaliya youths who were still agitated from the might before pelted 
the soldiers in their jeep with stones. The soldiers gave chose on foot when they 
returned to their vehicle they found it surrounded by an angry mob. Suddenly, out of 
nowhere, the flaming petrol bombs were thrown. In the panic that ensued the soldiers 
opened Hre on the crowd and a fifteen year-old youth named llelcm Sissi died almost 
instantly of a bullet wound in the heart. He was the first of thousands of victim who 
died in the long run of Intifada. By next day much of the Gaza Strip was in turmoil. 
Trouble broke out in Khan Yunus, another large refugee camp. Black smoke from 
burning t\ros hung in the air. Rioting youths, their faces masked by "Keffiyehs", set 
up rudimentary roadblocks, using rocks and anything else they could lay their hands 
on. Agitation continued in Jabaliya. Thousands demonstrated outside Shifa Hospital 
in Gaza as the casualties began to mount. In response the Israeli soldiers fired live 
ammunition and two Arabs were killed a school boy and a man standing on a flat roof 
of a house. The Israelis later claimed that the latter had been hit when they fired 
warning shots into the air. Several Palestinians were injured. Disturbances, like a 
bushfire in a high wind, spread to West Bank camps near Jerusalem and Nabkis, and 
many other centers besides. A spontaneous rebellion had begun. Palestinian anger and 
resentment were boiling over and no one could be sure where it would lead."*' 
The Intifada Continues 
Rioting in the Gaza Strip soon spread to the other Occupied Territories when 
the days of violence turned to weeks, Israeli reaction ranged from bloodthirsty 
demands for a tougher crackdown as General Sharon told everyone who would listen 
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liiat he uoiikl llnish ihc inliliida in days. Though, among the Israeli doves. General 
Amrani Mitzna, the oflleer in ehargc of Israeli forces in Ihe territories, said he and his 
men found their task as distasteful. 
'fhroughout December and January, amid insistent TV images of Keftlyeh-
elad youths battling helmeted Israeli soldiers in rock-strewn streets, Israeli 
government desperately sought a formula to put down the uprising. Curfews, mass 
arrests deportations and the use of live ammunition accompanied by melodramatic 
threats to apply the "Iron tlst" made little impact. The day's rage continued. Yitzhak 
Rabin the Defense Ministers ordered an odious might, power and beatings policy 
which announced on 19 January of the same >ear, brought cries of sham even from 
some of Israel's most committed L'S supporters. "" 
In January the number of Palestinians shot dead by the heavils reinforced 
Israeli army and security forces rose to 38 persons, four of them were deported to 
Lebanon. A few days after that 1000 of Palestinians had been arrested, fhe 24 hour 
curfews were in force around 12 or more refugee, camps in the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank, preventing the entry of food and supplies.'*'^  On February 5, two episodes 
seemed particularly shocking. In one, Israeli soldiers attempted to burying alive four 
Palestinian youths in the village of Salem near the large Arab West Bank town of 
Nablus. In the other, late in February, the American CBS network filmed four soldier 
brutally beating two Arab youths in Nablus itself in a long sequence that was almost 
unbearable to watch, even for the most hardened observers of violence in the 
territories."*"^ there was widespread international condemnation of the "iron fist" tactic 
that Israeli forces employed to control rioters who hurled bricks, stones and petrol 
bombs. A series of strikes was widely observed in the Occupied Territories and many 
of the estiniated 120.000 Palestinians who commute to work in Israel staved at home. 
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The dcmonstralions against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the (ja/.a Strip 
continued, apparently unabated. The uprising had demonstrated a surprising resilience 
and organized itself into a mess movement, and into popular committees in almost 
every town and hamlet, giving the uprising the strength to weather mass arrests of 
thousands of activists and deportation of some of its leaders. At the end of March, 
Israel redoubled its efforts to extinguish the Palestinian revolt by economic as well as 
militar> means. By the end of March more than 100 Palestinians were killed during 
the uprising and estimated 4000 had been arrested and detained without trial for six 
months, under martial law."*^  
The uprising which had probably begun more as a spontaneous expression of 
accumulated frustration of 20 years of occupation, degrading living conditions, over 
crowding and declining opportunities in education and employment, than as 
politicalh co-ordinates demonstration was soon being exploited and orchestrated by 
an underground leadership the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), 
comprising elements from across the Palestinian political spectrum the PLO. the 
Communist Party and islamic Jihad. The UNLU organized strikes, the closure of shop 
and businesses, and other forms of civil disobedience, including the non-payment of 
taxes. It also distributed regular newssheets, exhorting Palestinians to continue the 
struggle and instructing them in mean of revolt. Thus, Palestinians in the Territories 
and Arabs in Israel joining forces in massive demonstration which the UNLU had 
planned for Land Day on 30 March were lifted on I April, however, under the 
guidance of UNLU and the result of the measures seemed to be steel the Palestinians 
resolve to continue the uprising."*' 
The Intifada developed a parallel authority to that of the Israeli occupation the 
authority of the masses, struggling with the occupation forces over the control of the 
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West Ikmk and (ja/.a. This diialily of aullioiily and the l*alcstinian experience of 
ruling themselves in their own coLintr\ (although partial), along with their desire and 
persistent attempt to extract more authority and freedom, had an important effeet on 
the course of the intifada/'* 
The human and material losses caused by the Intifada indeed, became a 
burden to Israeli authorities for previously the occupation had been a source of profit. 
This became an additional incentive to the Palestinians to continue with the Intifada. 
Certain symbols, such as the Palestinian Hag. headdress, the victory sign, the funeral 
ceremonies, and the repetition of the phrase "Allah Akbar" (God is great), moved 
Palestinian national sentiments and mobilized the masses. The declaration of certain 
areas as "liberated zones" had a similar effect. In some places, Palestinian Hag 
remained hoisted on mosque minarets and electricity and telephone poles for se\eral 
months. This provided the people with a sense ol' pride and challenge to the 
occupation authorities certain district events, such as boycotting the Civil 
•Administration offices, the mass resignation of policemen and customs officials, and 
the refusal to pay ta.xes. changed the peoples emotions, enhancing their spirit of 
determination and challenge to the occupation authorities. ' 
Leadership and Politics of the Intifada 
'Ihe Intilada became institutionalized as an organization, near-unanimous 
challenge to Israel's presence in the Occupied Territories. The secret of the Intitlada's 
success was the series of leaflets, which was as the major organizing tool. The leaflets 
had begun to appear to Palestinian in early .lanuary 1988. The first underground 
leallet of the Intifada made a shy appearance. Then Communique No. 2 olthe Intifada 
appeared. Rumours have it that it was at this stage, through consultations with, and 
the aid and blessing of Khalil Wazir well known as Abu Jihad, a Fatah second in 
coininaiid. ^ ihat the Uniilcd National Leadership ol' Uprising was conceived and 
created. I'lie Communique No. 3 enshrining the birlii of the UNLU appeared. I he 
uprising leaflets suddenly took on a special format, which continue to exist.""*' in tact 
the Communique No. 3 was issued in the name of the "Unined National Leadership 
of the Uprising". The leailets called for strikes and demonstrations to be held on 
certain days, times and places, and gave other instructions and advice. The growing 
network of people's committees both distributed the leaflets and encouraged local 
people to follow their instructions." 
Uiiifled Nutional Leadersliip ofUprisin} ' (UNLU) 
Alter the surprise of the spontaneous explosion of Intifada, Abu-Jihad quickly 
formed the PLO-Unitled National Leadership of the Uprising organization, so called 
because George flabash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PI-'l.P) 
and Nayef Mawatmeh of the Democratic front for the Liberation of Palestine (Dl LP) 
were initially involved, wanting to take full advantage of this opportunitN""^. For 
sometime it was used by the name of Unified National Command of the Intifada. This 
body's name came to be referred to with familiarity inside the territories as al-Qi_\ada 
al Muwahhada, the Unified Command, or Leadership and to be commonly Anglicized 
in the form ""'fhe Unified National Leadership of the Uprising". 
The basic membership of the UNLU consisted of four individuals, one 
representing each of the four major secular nationalist organizations active within the 
Occupied Territories: Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Palestinian 
communist Party (PCP). fhese organization were all. to a greater or lesser extent 
active participants in the work of the Tunis based PLO."^ ^ 
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Ihc aim of UNI,L was in line wiih the aim of Palestinian sell'sulTiciency. its 
first task was to form lucal "people's committees"" in refugee camps, towns and 
villages to deal with feed distribution, health, education, security and local aflairs on a 
mutual self-help basis. Fatah pla\ed the main part in appointing local leaders and 
controlling and coordinating the people"s committees, which were the building block 
of the Inlillada and ensured Pl.O leadership, which henceforth became the overall 
authorit> in guiding the uprising acti\ities and shaping its political goals.'' 
I nder the UN'I.L' leadership, the uprising became increasing!} organized and 
political!) oriented, slri\ing to sever the contacts between the local Palestinian 
population and the Israeli authorities. 
Demonstrations and protest rallies were to be regulated disciplined and 
mounted according to an ordered programme on specil'ic dates and in spccillc places, 
with quiet intervals in between. Demonstrators-would be permitted to throw stones 
and petrol bombs, to block roads and hinder security forces, but not to use fire arms. 
The UNI U proclaimed, a boycott on all Israeli products except the essentials, 
and encouraged the Palestinian population not to approach the Israeli authorities such 
as the legal system operated by the civil administration, and avoid going out to work 
in Israel. Fancy weddings and celebration were prohibited as well as the purchase of 
lu.\ur\ goods. Stores opened for onl\ three hours a da\ and the population was 
encouraged to grow vegetables, on natiu'c rabbits and chickens in their backxards. 
House owner were requested to refrain from collecting rent from the tenants without 
means and those considered wealtin were forced to help the needl>.^'' 
In addition, the secret of the success of UNLU was that the structure of the 
organisation was not publicly known or widely discussed, and secrecs had doubtless 
been one factor behind its success. Although, the UNLU appeared to be located 
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physicall\ in ihe Jerusalem and Ramallah area, if several seizures of freshly printed 
ieailets s^ere any indicated, but was not exactly its center located there, in fact all that 
was known was that each of the four major organizations was represented. This was 
one reason the Israeli military regime had resorted to indiscriminate, mass arrests by 
adopting a tactic called "trolling" which could probably nab a few high-level cadres 
but clearl> tailed to put the UNLU out of business.^ 
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
On the eve of the uprising the PLO was at one of its lowest points of prestige 
in the regional arena. It was not only surprised by the magnitude of mass protest in the 
Occupied Territories, but also by its perceived independent grass-root leadership 
which threatened its exclusive standing as a sole national leadership of the Palestinian 
people. .At tlrst the Intifada was a strictly local atTair with no sign of Arafat's picture 
or PLO s\mbols being carried by those throwing stones at Israeli troops. Palestinian 
teenagers demonstrated without being told by Fatah to do so and most of them were 
not the member group of the PLO.^^When the surprise report coming in from the 
battlefront. Arafat consulted Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad). "Was this planning?" "No, 
it was not."Wazir told hmi." 
In fact, Arafat's strategy had never focused on mass mobilization in the 
Occupied Territories, out of disdain for the resident's abilities and fear that they might 
take over the movement. Arafat's constant claims of resistance in the West Bank over 
the years had hidden the reality that the masses there were passive and that much of 
the elite collaborated with Israel. Now, however inhabitants were seizing control of 
their own fate. They identified with the PLO, in combination of the importance of 
Arafat's Tunis head quarters and the internal residents which was a new found energy 
povver.^  The PLO therefore, rushed to take a good chance and to ensure full control 
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of the Intifada. Aralat stressed in the very beginning of the uprising the unity of 
i^nicslinian people, both inside and outside oecupied Palestine. I le said 
"We have pledged to you and to ourselves that we wil l not rest and that we 
will continue resistance until our home land is liberated. We will do this 
together inside and outside our occupied land"^' 
On December 13, Arafat called on urgent meeting of the Occupied Homeland 
Comniillee called the uprising a movement ol'""unarmed resistance". B\' that date he 
had become absolutely confident that the uprising, which had spread all o\cr, the 
Occupied Territories was to continue. 
When the second week of Intifada passed Abu-Jihad head of the PLO's Migher 
Committee for Occupied Homeland Affair and the man responsible inside faiah for 
the West Bank and Gaza gave remarkable interview in .Amman. Me reported that the 
Palestinians people inside the Occupied 'ferritorics had begun to form popular 
committees (lijan Sha"biya) in the camps, villages and quarters of the cities and that 
committee had been formed to take care of the families of the dead and wounded. 
Abu-Jihad went on to mention specifically the kind of weapons used in the uprising. 
Stones, bottles, sling with iron balls, nail, and iron bars thrown on the streets to 
pre\ent the tVee movement of arm\ vehicles, etc, that is all non military ""weapons"" 
directed against the formidable Israeli military machine.^" 
An idea of the interplay of PLO outside and the mass movement inside is 
gi\en by Arafat in an interview b\ I^rench newspaper Le iVlonde. He said that 70 
percent of the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories were teenagers, who all their 
lives had laid under the Palestinian Revolution umbrella. While inside they ousters 
fought for their freedom, the outside, the PLO under leadership of Fatah utilizing the 
most advanced communications technology available including the fa,\ machine, to 
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lead the Palestinian apprising to political success and the rcaii/ation of the dream of 
nKHi\ decades, (lie establishment ofan independent Palestinian stale/" 
For continuity of their plan thus, in January 1988 an anonymous bod\, scll-
detlned as the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) was established 
inside the Occupied Territories. The UNLU pleaded full submission lo the PLC), 
which henceforth became the overall authorits in guiding the uprising activities and 
shaping the political goals. 
Therefore, the objecti\e of uprising was to achicNC the goals for v\liich the 
Pl.O. the leaders of the Palestinian struggle was establishment of an independent stale 
and return to the homeland. Contrary to previous uprisings, the uprising did not aim lu 
achicNC transitional goals like protesting the Camp David Accords, autonomy or plans 
10 impro\e the condition of life. There was also Palestinian consensus at c\er\ level 
on a political solution on international conference with authoril) and the participation 
of the PLO as an independent and essential parts and as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people. ^  
On 16 .April 1988 Abu-Jihad Khalil al-Wazir. generally credited as being the 
organizer and motivator of the Intifada was killed by Israelis in funis. Of lk ia l l ) the 
Israeli government denied any responsibility, vaguely blaming Abu Nidal Falah-RC. 
which had previously made assassination attempts on Aralat but no one rcall_\ 
believed the version." 
After the PLO leadership in Tunis formed a government in e.\ile. the> 
acknowledged the right of Israel to exist, and entered in to diplomatic relations with 
the United Sates. Other Arab States that were previousl\ will ing to let King I lussein 
negotiate ibr the Palestinians immediately recognized the new Palestinian 
government. Yasir Arafat renounced terrorism and embraced non-violent struggle 
\i: 
while at the same time allowing Palestinians to use violence in all cases of scK-
dctencc. lie also expressed his willingness to pursue a "two stales" solution to the 
problem of Palestine. Interestingly, the PLO also endorsed symbolic nonviolent 
actions, such as the "Ship of Return" a boat commissioned to bring exiled Palestinians 
back to theirs homes in Haifa, but before embarkation, it was blown up by Israeli 
agents in C>prus. 
Politically, the Intifada united the various Palestinian faction and groups 
where once the leaders of various groups publicly fought and engaged in mutual 
assassinations, the Intifada caused them to present a united front lo the world. In 
Palestine itself, all of the factions reiterate the necessity oi" working together as 
Palestinians. 
Islamic Forces 
'fhe two major Islamic movements active in the Occupied Territories were the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad movement. Both found their major source 
of popular support in Gaza. There, the high proportion of socially disadvantaged 
families and refugees and the relative religious homogcncil>' of the Sunni Muslim 
population combined to provide a fertile breeding-ground for Sunni Muslim 
population. Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980, Islamists increased their 
popularity and influence in both Gaza and the West Bank in live with the trend 
evident throughout the Muslim in West Asia in the aftermath of Islamic revolution in 
Iran. In 1983-84 a survey found that the rate of religiosity of Gaza residents, as 
revealed in the degree of Islamic observance, come to 57.8 percent of the population, 
while in West Bank it come to48.7 percent.'' 
In fact, there were a few other islamic groups like the Islamic LJberation parly 
which enjoys little influence and little is known about it today and also there were 
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groups whose focus is more theological than politic. These groups include al-Tabligh 
\val-Da"ua (conveyance and call), al-Takllr wai-ll i jra (Atonement and Holy tlighl) 
al-Sutly>ia (liie Sufis). 
Despite their different methods, the goal of the Islamic groups was to 
transform society into an Islamic one, modeled after the llrst Islamic society, and 
established by the prophet Muhammad and his companions, 'fhcse groups also believe 
in need to establish an Islamic state; they argue that the cause of all political, 
economic and social conflicts engulfmg the world today lies in the absence of their 
state, fhesc groups made no distinction between religion and state and consider the 
Quran and Sunnah as the basis for all aspects of life. They also noted that nationalist, 
socialist, and communist political parties have failed to solve the world's problems 
and that the time has come to apply the Islamic Shari 'a law in society. '^^ ' 
The .Muslim brotherhood (al-lkwaiuil Muslimooii) 
The Muslim Brotherhood began the relationship with Palestine after Hasan al-
Banna founded the Brotherhood movement in 1928. They formed a committee (the 
General Central Committee to Aid Palestine) headed b\' Hasan al-Banna himself, to 
protest against Britain and to defend the Palestinian cause. 
After World War II, the Brotherhood sent representatives to Palestine, not 
only spread the da"wah (call to Islam) and invite opposition to Zionism but also to 
assist in the training of Palestinian scouts. Hie Brotherhood position on Palestine 
increased the society's popularity especially after its active participation in the 
Palestine war of 1948 which the Brotherhood volunteers joined." 
From 1948 to the early 1950s the lirotherhood continued its pre-war activities 
and expanded, becoming popular in particulars among the male youth as a result both 
of the part it had played in the 1948 war and of its vehemently anti-Israeli, anti-
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compromise stance Ihe movement represented somethmg to winch the dispossessed 
population could relate because it not onl> olieied political slogans but also piacliced 
what It pleached Ihe Biotherhood thus betanie a political tunning giound loi inan\ 
Hgures who would in inter years rise to the apex of the Palestinian national lesistance 
movement " 
Duiing the 1950s, the si/e ol Biotheihood paiticipalion in the volunicei clioits 
in Palestine v\as not commensuiaie with the si/e ol the socict\ s iiiembeiship which 
at that time was in the hundreds ot thousands and perhaps suipassed a million One of 
the leasons foi this discrepancN could ha\e been the lg\ptian go\ernment s 
leluctance to assist the mo\emeiU 
Between 1958 and 1967 the Biotheihood m the \\ est Bank and the (ja/a Snip 
was weakened b> a high tide of Arab nationalism It v\as a time when anti-impeiialist 
ideas and slogans predominated and when the Aiab people tiied to consolidate 
national independence and achieve piogiess and social lustice Duimg that peiiod the 
issues ot nationalism, Arab unit\. socialism, and the liberation of Palestine did not 
gieatl> concern the Muslim Brotheihood which focusing on Islam as a foim ol 
lefeienee and as identity 
Ihe situation ot the Biotheihood society in the West Bank and the (ja/a Stiip 
after the occupation of Israel remained weak Ihe beginning of Palestinian aimed 
lesistance immediately alter the occupation and the Biotheihood"s leluctance to 
paiticipate in this resistance impeded the emeigence ot the society as an active 
political power, unlike the Palestinian resistance movement, the Biotherhood in the 
Occupied Territories was not willing or prepared politically, ideologically oi 
militaiilv to undertake direct and organized militaiv action against the Isiacli 
occupation ^' 
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Some of the [brotherhood's members were involved in the Fadayeen and 
i'alah's miHlar\ wing war against Israel. But the_\ did not operate under the guise of 
their own organization but in the name ol'I'alah. 
During the first decade of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Ga/.a 
Strip the Brotherhood used this period to regroup and reassert itself as a religious 
organization dedicated to a programme of social reform, fhe group was inllueiiccd by 
the d\namic of Islamic resurgence regionally but was unable to generate the ncccssar>' 
internal political climate for change. '^  
During the second decade of the Israeli occupation (1977-1986) religious 
revivalism was on the rise in the Ciaza Strip and West Bank, 'fhe wars of 1967 and 
1973 v\ere used by Islamic groups to raise Islamic consciousness in the region, fhe 
Brotherhood and Islamic movement regarded the Arab defeat as a defeat for secular, 
nationalist and socialist thinking in the Arab world. Another factor uas ihe oil 
revolution, which Islamic mo\ement in the oil producing countries like Saudi .Arabia 
and Gulf States, benefited from the new wealth and power of those counties. 
However, the Islamic revolution in Iran had a great impact on Islamic group in other 
countries including Islamic movement in the Occupied Territories as well. 
In addition, the expulsion of the PLO's forces from Lebanon in 1982 in the 
aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon had effected also to the growing up of the 
Islamic groups in the West Bank and Gaza strip. It further weakened the PLO and 
brought into question its conduct, its eftlcac) the quality of its leadership and the 
soundness of the strategy, tactics, and political programme as a whole.^ '^ 
During this period, the Brotherhood began to establish mechanisms to spread 
its ideas and increase its infiuence. 'fhe society founded Islamic charity associations, 
which supervised religious school. It also managed nursery school and kindergartens. 
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which were usually ailached to mosques. The Brotherhood also established 
nciuhborhood libraries and sport clubs. In subsequent years, the Brotherhood and 
anollvjr Islamic elements formed several Islamic society and organizations in Mebron, 
Nablus, Jenin, Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and other Palestinian town. 
The Brotherhood enjoyed strong support in the universities of the West Bank 
and (jaza. The votes of the society's supporters tluctualed between 30 and 50 percent. 
I-Acn in Bir/eil Univcrsit). which has been known for its strong nalionalLsl, leftist, 
and liberal tendencies, the Islamists muster coiisiderable support in the student body. 
Muslim students have always controlled the student council in the Islamic University 
in Gaza. Currently they also control the student council in the University of Hebron.' 
The ten years that preceded the Intifada were full of change Islam was 
reasserted in Palestinian society both through the continued provision of vast range of 
important social and educational series. I'he West Bank had in the past been the 
center for Muslim Brotherhood but this was no longer the case, fhe epicenter of 
Political Islam moved to Qaza Strip where the forces of political Islam could make a 
greater impact on society. Whether or not the majority of Palestinians wanted to 
return to the straight path oi' Islam was after not important to the Islamic vanguard 
that followed the banner raised by Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and her cadres in the Muslim 
Brotherhood and later the Mujama^ ** (Islamic congress) which was considered as was 
one and the same thing. 
fhe outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in December 1987 took everyone by 
surprise. It marked the beginning of new phase in the evolution of Muslim 
Brotherhood society in the West Bank and Gaza. This phase characterized by actual 
resistance to the Israeli occupation, may be seen as a beginning of the actual Jihad by 
the sccietv. 
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'I'he leader of the Brotherhood in the Occupied rerrilorics accepted the notion 
of transition into a new phase with some variation of opinion. Sheil<h Ahmed Yasin, 
the spiritual leader of llamas stated that, "every movement passes through stages. 
Shifting from one phase to another is done in decor dance with the decision of those 
in charge. Obviously, the practical reality indicates that Jihad has moved to an active 
phase in confronting the occupation, fhe si/.e of action and participation in this phase 
depends on the nature of available resource", for the question about the responsibility 
of the Brotherhood engaging in armed resistance to the occupation, Yasin said, "Jihad 
is a duty of every Muslim if the .Muslim's land is violated". The Brotherhood also 
claims that it laid the groundwork for the Intifada and is directly responsible to the 
participations of the Islamic student blocs in the violent demonstration, which look 
place against the occupation in the Palestinian universities prior to the Intifada as 
well.'" 
Hamns 
On December 9, one day after the outbreak of the Intifada, a meeting was held 
in the house of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin to start the contingency plans for the Intifada. 
Present at the meeting were most prominent leader of the Mujama in the Gaza strip. In 
addition to Sheikh Ahmad Yasin six other figures were present, 'fhose were Abdul 
Aziz al-Rantisi (a physician) Ibrahim al-yazuri (a pharmacist) sheikh Salah Shihada (a 
staff member of the Islamic University of Gaza). Issa al-Nashshar (an l:ngincer) 
Muhammad Shanra (a teacher) and Abdul fathah Du Khan (a school master)''". 
The purpose of the 9 December meeting was to discuss ways to manipulate an 
incident that took place on December 8, at Jabaliya refugee camp. Discussion in the 
meeting revolved around the need and the means to seize this catal\tic event to 
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change and arouse religious and nationalist sentiments and to create popular 
dislurbaneos.' 
Six days after the outbreak of Intilada on December 14. I9<S7. a mililar> arm 
was formed, called llamas, an acronym of llarakal al-Muqawama al-islami (Islamic 
Resistance Movement, usually translated as "Zeal")- In the same da\, the Muslim 
Brotherhood leader issued a statement calling on the people to stand up to the Israeli 
occupalit>n llamas retrospectively considered this statement the llrst of llamas's 
serialized leallels. As the disturbances in Gaza and the West Bank continued and 
expanded. Sheikh Yasin. as the founder of Mamas and his colleagues continued to 
meet. 
Sheikh Ahmad Yasin. the leader of Muslim Brotherhood and the founder o\' 
the Mujama al-lslami in Gaza also the leader of Hamas. He was born in 1936 in the 
village of .iura in the northern part of the (jaza Strip in Mandate Palestine. His l'amil>' 
left their home in 1948 and became refugees, settled in a refugee camp in (jaza. 
Yasin's >oung life would have a lasting impact on his adult life. Especially, the 
uprooting of his family, which suffered for long time in the refugee camp no doubt, 
had a great impact on his thinking and his view on the Palestine problem. 
Sheikh Yasin completed his preparator\' school education in Gaza Strip, lie 
served as a teacher in a government school for seven years. After that, he moved to 
Cairo and was admitted to the English department of Ayn Sham University of Cairo 
in 1964, but when he completed the first year of his stud\', he was prevented from 
coming back to Egypt because of his Brotherhood membership, flowevcr he 
continued to teach until 1980 and retired from the teaching.**' 
Sheikh Yasin was imprisoned after his retirement from the teaching. So the 
Israelis charged him of belonging to a hostile group and weapon possession. He was 
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jailed lor Icn moiuhs and was released as pail of prisoner exchange llial look place in 
Vlay 1985 belween the Israeli governmcnl and ihc popular l-'ront for the Liberation of 
I'alesline-Cieneral command (P I ' I .D- ( JC) . Alter he was released, he devoted himself 
to education and social work to raise religious consciousness among people, rather 
than to violent resistance to Israeli occupation. Sheikh Yasin pursLied his activities 
from the main headquarters of the Mujama al-lslami at .lawrat al-Shams. the poor 
neighborhood in (ia/a where he li\cd. Yasin's prioriu al this time was lo reform ihe 
Palestinian community from within and to combat the secularism of the PLO factions. 
The emergence of Hamas added a new dimension to Palestinian politics, 'fhe 
new organization was not willing to subs come itself within the frame\sork of the 
PLC) and threw down the gauntlet in the struggle for political power. The activities of 
Islamic organization operated publicly and openly challenging the authority of 
national movement to win the popular support in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Sheikh Yasin himself established contact with Sheikh .lamil llamani, one of the young 
preachers of Al-Aqsa mosque in .lerusalem. Hamani who coordinated very closely 
w ith Yasin and acted as a liaison between the West Bank and Gaza Brothers formed a 
parallel leadership body for Mamas in the West Bank. Me also acted as a link between. 
Yasin and the leadership of the .Muslim Brotherhood in .lordan.^ 
Mamas quickly attracted large following. Young men joined up in droves 
many of them already Islamic activists, others disaffected supporters of PLO faction. 
The organization generated a special appeal among the Palestinian population. Many 
of young men who Hocked to its ranks had refugee backgrounds and saw an 
opportunity for self-identity and esteem vis-a-vis the rest of society through their 
association with their religious organization, which put a mark of holiness on them. 
However, Mamas was able to draw considerable support also from the Palestinian 
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iiiiddlc classes, white-collar workers and professionals. I lamas's growing menibership 
saw the organization through many vicissitudes as the Intifada took root in the West 
Bank and Cra/.a Strip and became the way of life.**' 
Obviously, the Ursl period of llamas activity in the Intifada was characterized 
by reaction to the immediate situation rather than the initiation of anti-occupation 
policies and attempts at a national leadership role. But indeed, a primary aim o\' 
Hamas was to establish an Islamic state in the territor_\ of Palestine v\hosc libcralion 
was lo be achieved by holy wav. The emphasis on this term was congruent with ll-ic 
Islamic symbols and beliefs that constituted Hamas"s political doctrine. Defined as an 
Islamic endowment (Waqt) of the Muslim world as a whole. Jihad was adduced not 
only as a dut\' that devolved on individual Muslims but also as the sole legitimate way 
to retrieve Palestine in its entirety. Hamas thus, adopted the principle contained in the 
PLCs National Charter of 1968, which defined armed struggle as "a strategy and not 
a tactic", in order to preclude the possibility of a negotiated settlement, which by 
definition would entail a territorial compromise. To establish the legitimac} and 
historic significance of an armed struggle in its Islamic meaning (Jihad), llamas 
presented itself as a link in the chain of holy war against Zionism and Israel in the 
defense of Palestine. The inevitability of Jihad was strictly linked to religious faith. 
Because to forgo parts of Palestine was tantamount to forgoing part of Islam. 
Palestine as a whole could be liberated only armed struggle.**^ llamas was initially 
divided into three chapters. 
1. The Political wing 
2. The intelligence gathering sector, and 
3. A military wing named after the 1930s radical leaders Sheikh l/z ad-din al-
Qassam. 
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The iniliuiry wing and intelligence wing later combined, i'he distribution ol'powcr 
within this organizational triangle was never fixed and since the group's inception has 
passed from one point of the triangle to another, meeting situations as needed. The 
intcliigencc apparatus, known as al-Majd (Glory), was initially assigned a policing 
role in the Gaza Strip. With the break down and erosion of Israeli rule in the area." 
The intelligence apparatus was later sub-summed in the organization military 
wing, the Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigade. The wing is responsible for 
executing Palestinians identiiled as collaborations and for attacks on Israeli target. 
B> the si.xth month of the Intifada Hamas was still shadowing the initiatives of 
UNLL. making similar appeals, calls and demands through its communiques. 
Ho\\e\er. the language in which Hamas cloaked such calls was purel> Islamic and 
designed to strengthen the myth of the islamic nature of Intifada: 
We are with every person who truly works for the liberation of Palestine, the 
whole o( Palestine. We will continue to have faith in Allah and His power. 
E\er) .Muslim around the globe is our asset, this is our strength, this is our 
base, and these are our beliefs, and victory is ours with Allah.''' 
The leadership of Hamas immediately recognized the political significance of 
directing the strike and with its first leaflets state arranging localized Hamas actions, 
mainl> in the Gaza strip. By August 1988 Hamas was ready to call for its own 
territories wide strike, resulting in clashes between Hamas and the nationalists, fhe 
Program of activities publicly espoused by Hamas largely paralleled that of the 
UNLL. though with some significant differences. Like the UNLL). Hamas laid out 
periodic timetables for its own strike dajs. After early resistance in some West Bank 
communities to following Hamas, calls for strikes, they (Christians as well as 
Muslims) all apparently joined the Gazans in observing both sets of strike days.^'' 
On some issues. Hamas program was markedly different from that the UNLU. 
For example after the military administration in the West Bank decreed the 
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lesponding of the school in July 1989, ihc UNLU's consensus at llrsl called on 
students to observe the schedule of general strike days, but I lamas argued that the 
children had lost so mach education that they should be cxanipled from the strike. 
Mamas won the internal argument over this issue.*' 
During the first year of the Intifada in fact, the Israeli government saw Hamas 
as an organization, which was not most dangerous enemies as compared with the PLO 
and its factions. iJntil June 1989, fully eighteen months after the outbreak of the 
Intifada, that the Israeli government declared llamas to be a terrorist group, along 
with Islamic Jihad outlawing both and imposing tight control over them. One month 
before the declaration of Israeli government, Sheikh Yasin was again arrested, he was 
charge with having caused the deaths of two Israeli soldiers and four Gazans accused 
of collaboration with Israeli occupation. 
Islamic Jihad 
Following the 1967 War. intellectual and ideological different action uithin 
the Muslim Brotherhood Society began to emerge in a limited way at least on the 
individual level. The war caused a sever shake up within the Brotherhood and posed 
several questions pertaining to the crises of society that were still unaware. The search 
for solutions and alterative continued for more than a decade. The Islamic revolutions 
in Iran in 1979 came to offer an Islamic model that could be emulated. '^~ But even 
more so by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamist nature of resistance 
developed, inter alias, by Saudi and American support to holy war combatants 
(Mujahideen, including, Usama bin Laden) who were joined over years b_\' man) 
volunteers from the West Asia Muslim states. These three major events the 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 War, Islamic revolution in Iran and 
War in Afghanistan had an important impact on the ri.se vf an Islamic Jihadisl 
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tendencies among Palestinians both in Israel and in the occupied West Bank and Gaza 
93 
Strip. 
The beginning of official founding of the islamic Jihad movement in Palestine 
took place against a backdrop of differences of opinion and the emergence of certain 
trends within the Muslim Brotherhood society in Egypt such as al-Takllr wal Mijrah 
(the Atonement and Holy flight) and the Tandhim al-Jihad (The Jihad organization) 
botii of uhicii emerged from Muslim Brotherhood ranks in the mid seventies. 
One of the first Islamic figures in the Occupied Territories to call policy for 
Jihad against Israeli occupation was Ya'qub Qirrish who was connected with the 
Fatah mo\ement. Other islamic figures followed suit later. Muhammad Abu-Ta>r, 
another Fatah affiliate from Jerusalem. And a third Islamic figure initiating the 
Islamic Jihad trend in the Occupied Territories was Sheikh As'ad Bayond al-
Tammimi, the imam of al-Aqsa Mosque. All of them were a source of inspiration for 
all those who believed in the idea of Jihad against Israel." 
Even in Israel itself, there was trend calling itself Usrat al-jiliad (the family of 
Jihad) emerged from within the Muslim Brotherhood Society. The trend appeared in 
1979. the )ear of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The spiritual leader was Sheikh 
Abdullah Nimr Darvish. But there was no evidence to indicate that there was direct 
relationship between the Islamic Jihad and the usrat al-Jihad although, it might have 
some relationship with the emergence of Islamic Jihad in the Occupied Territories.^^ 
The Islamic Jihad movement was officially founded in 1980 by two men from 
the Gaza Strip, Fathi al-Shaqaqi and Abdul Aziz Auda. A-Shaqaqi was one of the 
movement's most important thinkers, while Auda was the movement's spiritual 
leader, 'fhe Islamic Jihad, which was under the leadership and faction of Al-Shaqaqi 
and Auda, was the largest and the first group to emerge in the early 1980. 
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Al-Shaqaqi"s family was originally iVom the village of Zarniiqa in Kamalla 
district of Palestine. After the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, they lied to 
the Gaza Strip. 'rhe\ lived in a refugee camp in Rafah in the southern part of the (ia/a 
Strip. Shaqaqi attended Birzeit Universil) in the West liank, graduated from the 
Mathematics department, and worked as a teacher for a while. 
Shaqaqi continued his study again in the medical school of Zagaziq University 
in ligypl. .Alter graduation, he returned to work as a doctor at llie Vlatlala Hospital 
(.Augusta Victoria) in Jerusalem for a while and moved to work in the Gaza Strip. 
Shaqaqi was arrested two times in 1979 and was imprisoned two times in 1983 
for eleven months and in 1986 for fours >ears. on charges of incitement against the 
Israeli Occupation transporting weapons to the Gaza Strip and belonging to the 
Islamic Jihad movement. Finally he was deported directly from prison to outside of 
the Occupation Territories on August 1, 1988'^. 
Abdul Aziz Auda family came from the Wadi al-Masa area in the Bershcba 
district of Palestine to the Gaza Strip in 1948. They lived in the Jabalisa refugee camp 
in the northern part of the Strip. Auda graduated in Arab and Islamic studied from Dar 
al-Uloom in Cairo, as well as a diploma in the Islamic shari'a. Auda retuned to the 
Gaza strip in 1981. and started to work as a lecturer in the Islamic University in Gaza. 
In the same time he was the imam at a mosque in Beit Lahiya near the Jabaliya 
refugee camp. In 1984, the Israeli authorities arrested Auda on charges of incitement 
and sentenced him to eleven months in prison and, in 1987; the Israeli authorities 
deported him to Lebanon. Auda earned the respect of many people in the Occupied 
Territories until he was deported.^^ 
The Islamic Jihad movement derives its ideology and political ideas from the 
Islamic tradition in general. Nevertheless, there were three figures who enjoy special 
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status among the leaders and Ibllowcr of Islamic Jihad and considered worthy o\' 
emulation, 'i'hey were Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Izzal-din al-Qassam, in 
addition to the Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader ofislamic revolution in Iran. 
From the Islamic Jihad's point of view. al-Banna's importance lies in three 
aspects that he emphasized in his attempt for vitalize the Islamic call. They were 
revival, organization and upbringing. Regarding sayyid Qutb as a special place for his 
intellectual and ideological qualities and his ability to crystallize the aspects of 
challeiigc thai Muslims face as svell as his ideas regarding the way lo confront that 
challenge. Qubt was also a model for the Islamic fundamentalist leader and is 
considered by the Islamic Jihad movement a true symbol of revolutionary islam. The 
Islamic Jihad considered Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam as the main source of 
inspiration for its movement and he was the movement's first pioneer. Al-Qassam is 
viewed as the first leader of the Palestinian armed resistance in the history of modern 
Palestine and the true father of the armed Palestinian revolution. In addition to 
Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Jihad considered his revolution as a source of 
inspiration in term of ideas and practice. He was as a symbol and leader of the Islamic 
revolution and revival, not just in Iran but everywhere. Islam was forming the Islamic 
Jihad's point of view, absent from the battlefield. This revolution proved to the 
Islamic Jihad that Islam was the solution and that Jihad was the way.'^ ** 
Sheikh Auda and his supporters believed that Palestine as an Islamic land 
sized by infidal rulers. To ignore Palestine was to ignore the call to jihad as a religious 
obligation. In an Islamic Jihad pamphlet, Auda wrote. 
What is now taking place in the Holy Land is not just a battle for the 
Palestinian people alone. It is the battle for Islam, a battle for the future of the 
entire umma. It is a battle against the forces of arrogance against the colonial 
he^emonv over our world. 
Aiida emphasizes the pivotal place of Palestine in the wider Islamic struggle 
for liberation in the twentieth century as he said: 
We consider the control cause of the Islamic movement to be the Palestinian 
cause. There is an inseparable connection between saving Islam and serving 
Palestine.'^ 
Shaqaqi also called for the unification of Sunni and Shi'it Islam and the 
mobilization of all Muslim for the liberation of Palestine through the way of Jihad.'*'*' 
From the point of view of the Islamic Jihad, Muslims who have ousted Israel 
from South Lebanon are the best Muslims. Fighting the "Torah adherents to the bone" 
can only be done through the "Islamic doctrine and the war of popular liberation". 
The Islamic Jihad viewed that the suicidal attacks are acts of martyrdom. These 
anacks comprise one of the principal ways in the tradition of Jihad. 
Before the outbreak of the Intifada, there were many cases of demonstration 
against Israeli authorities under the activities of the Islamic Jihad, the first attacks 
attributed to and claimed by Islamic Jihad in Gaza took place in September and 
October 1986. The victims in each case were Israeli taxi drivers working in the Gaza 
Strip, both were stabbed to death. The attack was meant to warning to Israelis to stay 
away from Gaza, formerly popular for it markets and cheap labour. The incident led 
to arrest more than fifty, alleged member of Islamic Jihad. 
In the West Bank, the Islamic Jihad movement was responsible for the famous 
Gate of Moors operation on October 15, 1986. In this operation, three hand grenades 
were thrown by Islamic Jihad members at Israeli troops (conscripts from the Israeli 
Giv'ati Brigade) during a graduation ceremony near the Wailing Wall. About seventy 
soldiers were wounded and the father of one conscript was killed. 
In February 1987 a border policeman on duty at a police post on the Green 
Line in the Old City, of Jerusalem was wounded by a grenade explosion. 
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Kcsponsibilily was claimed by the Islamic Jihad for the liberation of Palestine. 
Another case happened on 13 April 1987 Islamic Jihad led the anti-Israeli 
demonstration which faced by a more than 1000 strong mob of protesting students 
who had been roused by the Islamic Jihad Israeli police opened fire killing one 
student and wounding others. 
The Islamic Jihad had focused its activities on armed struggle against the 
Israeli occupation. The Jihad differs in this context from the rest of the factions that 
adopt this tactic. When it started its operations against Israeli targets, the Islamic Jihad 
refrained from claiming responsibility for these operations, in order not to give the 
Israeli authorities any justification to prosecute its member. Despite of that the Islamic 
Jihad left its special mark on the operations it undertook. Moreover, the Islamic Jihad 
members are known for their good organization, strict discipline and absolute secrecy, 
especially with regard to armed activities. That why the Islamic Jihad attacks was 
usually noted for their effectiveness and success. After repeated Israeli blows prior to 
and after outbreak of the Intifada, the Islamic Jihad began to claim responsibility for 
operations it undertook in order to prove its continued existence.'""" 
Following the outbreak of Intifada the Islamic Jihad members were among the 
first elements to participate in the Intifada. During its early stages, they were 
extremely active in ensuring its continuation. The active participation however, did 
not continue for long. The Israeli authorities prevented the Islamic Jihad from 
attaining more tangible influence among the population. Eventually, the Islamic Jihad 
changed its tactic, which resorted to violent to make up for the decline in its 
participation in activities of the Intifada. 
In the early stages of Intifada the Islamic Jihad avoided taking any stands 
against the positions of the UNLU. In fact some sort of coordination had taken place 
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betwocn ihc Jiliacl and llie UNLU, especially during confronlalions with ihc Israeli 
troops. The Islamic Jihad's initially participation in the Anliradar reinforced its status, 
especially in contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood Society. The Islamic Jihad was 
taking a middle of the road position. An Islamic Jihad leader said: 
"The Jihad is the onl)' organization capable of bringing the traditional Muslim 
trend into the Intifada. Even now, the Israelis are doing everything in their power to 
create opposition between the Islamists (Muslim brotherhood) and the nationalists, 
especiall) is Gaza. But we represent the intersecting point between the two trends'". 
Undoubtedly, the Islamic Jihad movement, as a concept and as an 
organization, had dug its roots inside the Occupied Territories as a political force. 
This movement embodied a revival of religious practices or moral conduct. By its 
daring actions against the Israeli occupation, the Islamic Jihad argue that it played a 
role in rest to ring conlldence among the people following a period of decline 
indifference, and recess of Palestinian nationalist struggle. 
Mass Organization and compliance 
Mass organization played an essential part in sustaining the Intifada by 
buttressing the ability of the families and communities to follow the directives of the 
UNLU and the Islamic groups. These organizations also contributed to decisions on 
the content of the secular and Islamic leadership activity program. 
In the past in both the West Bank and Gaza, the communist held the longest 
record of support for the building of mass organizations. Communist supported 
Labour unions and various women's organizations had been active in the West Bank 
since the 1920s, though most of these latter operated mainly as social welfare groups. 
After the Israeli Occupation in 1967 Israeli authorities closed down 10 of the 13 East 
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Jerusalem based Labour Unions. However in 1967 the Labour activists were able to 
renew the Nablus branch. 
During the early 1970s communists remained the most active in broadening 
the membership in the union movement. Until the late of 1970s other nationalist 
organization the DFLP and the PFLP, for example were also organizing labour 
unions. Later, Latah too joined the effort."" 
The Union movement that emerged in the labour sector was highly political. 
Indeed, the multiplicity of political efforts invested in building labour unions from the 
late 1970s on resulted not in one much stranger labour federation, would have been 
desirable from the labour union point of view, but in at lea.st four parallel labour 
federations that were often in competition with each other. The same was true of the 
women's and student unions that emerged in the same period. In some sectors, too, 
the secular based federations would be revealed by other organization loyal to the 
Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamists. 
After the crushing of the PLCs military capability in Lebanon in 1982, and 
more particularly after the reassessment of the strategies that following that defeat, 
Wazir Shifted toward a fuller embrace of the concept of mass political work in the 
Occupied Territories. It was this shift and the resulting efforts that Fatah's cadres 
inside the territories put into building up women's groups student unions, and the 
omnipresent Shabiba (youth groups) that, according to many accounts from inside the 
territories, tipped the balance and mobilized the majority of West Bank and Gaza 
communities into conscious participation in the nationalist political effort."^^ 
After the start of the Intifada the occupation authorities deported or detained as 
many known activists of mass organizations as they could in an attempt to decapitate 
the organizations. Despite this effort, the principles of community action had become 
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dccpl) enough inlcrnali/cd ihroughoiit the territories that dilTerent communities were 
able to generate new and appropriate local organizations. Informal di\isions o\' 
Labour emerged in man> areas: a merchants" committee would deal with commercial 
question, >outh committees would be responsible for engaging or diverting the 
military, the women of cver\ neighborhood would act as watch committees or 
organize the distribution of emergencx ration, labour committees would surprise 
strike observance or help organize efforts in the •"alternative cconom\"". 
"reconciliation committees" of trusted community members would replace the work 
of the boNCOited court system in resolving interfamily or inter group disputes, "' 
The mass organizations that operated during the Intifada were distinguished by 
their focus on being effective at the local level, a feature that arose directly from their 
having to adapt to a range of differing local conditions in refugee camps, remote 
villages or larger or smaller urban areas. In some villages for example, prior to the 
Intifada 70 percent of the village's workers had worked in Israel, but during the 
Intifada onl\' one busload of 49 or42 people travel into Israel for work and they don't 
go on strike days. Meanwhile the village council was employing people in various 
capacities, and others workers had found jobs in the nearby town of Ramallah. Most 
of the villagers had returned to their traditional reliance on agriculture. In 1988 
harvest the village had been able to send olive oil to Gaza and West Bank refugee 
camp. Under the advice of activists the villagers had decided to set up a system of 
popular committees as a result of 55 day of imposed curfew. The village 
reconciliation committee now resolved all local disputes, a function that previously 
had been performed by a Muktar whose role had become largely discredited during 
the Intifada."" 
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The mass organizations consisted of interest-based group such as labour union 
women's and student unions, merchant committees, and prolessionai unions and 
geographically based groups such as local popular committees and watch committees. 
Some of these organizations emerged during the Intifada, but many others predated it 
by years, it in undoubtedK true to sa\ that if the Palestinians of the two occupied 
areas had not had a rich experience in mass organizational work prior to December 
1987, the political leadership would have issued its leallets in vain and the eruption of 
early December would have been over w ithin week or days. 
The Likud (lovcriimcnt's Response to the Intifada 
Practically, Likud government had relied on a combination of political, 
economic and military measures to quell the Intifada. Politically, it sought to identify 
the West Bank and Gaza leaders who might be willing to ignore the PI 0 and 
negotiate with Israel. This effort failed for two reasons. First, the PLC) retained strong 
suppon in the territories and had warned of and carried out reprisals against those 
suspected of independence political dealing with Israel. Second, there were 
anticipated of gains commensurate with risks of separate discussion with Israel 
because the Likud under Shamir had ruled out any territorial concessions in advance. 
Basically there was a deep chasm between the Likud's aim of Permanent retention of 
the Occupied Territories and widespread support for an independent state among 
inhabitants of the Occupied Territories. 
The uncontrollable spread of Intifada exposed the Israeli army's excessive use 
of military forces against an armed civilian population. According to UNRWA 
figures, 20 Palestinians were killed and 200 were wound in clashes with the army 
during the first two weeks of the Intifada. Most of the casualties were camp residents, 
including five martyrs from Jabaliya and four from Balata. The army attacked camps 
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with an extraordinary range of measures during tiie first phase of the Intifada. Camp 
residents were subjected to prolonged curfews and sieges, massive arrest campaigns, 
restrictions of movement and beatings sometimes badly, tear gassing and even torture 
were carried out at the many detention centers where Palestinian suspects were 
housed'". 
In addition, the Intifada also led the Israeli official under Likud to the creation 
of new such prisons. From December 21, 1987 when the Dhahrich Prison was opened 
near Hebron, through the spring of 1988, dozen of temporary and permanent prisons 
and camps were opened the most notorious being Ketziot or Ansar III in the Negev 
desert. Ten oi' thousands of people have been in and out of one or another o\' these 
detention centers since December 1987. Between five and fifteen thousand are 
detained in them at any given time there is immumerable documented cases of 
psychological and ph>sical torture as well as several confirmed cases of killing of 
prisoners, including two in Katziot who were short point blank on August 16 1988 by 
the prison director himself. In its 1988 report. Amnesty International concludes that 
there has been a marked increase in report of "torture and ill-treatment of Palestinian 
detainees". Clearly, the Likud government's efforts were armed at preventing the 
intifada from reaching the towns and villages of the Occupied Territories."" 
The repressive measures taken against the Intifada went beyond the massive 
infiiction of bodily harm. They were graduated down ward to include economic 
sabotage of a direct or indirect nature. Examples of such economic measures include 
crop burning and the uprooting of trees, prolonged siege of villages (which prevented 
planting and harvesting), the explicit prohibition of harvesting and marketing: house 
demolition, prolonged curfew; and heavy fines, imposed for example, on motorists for 
such "violations" as not having enough oil in the engine, having an elbow protruding 
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trom Ihe windows, improperly adjusting headlight beams in broad daylight, and 
having dusty license plates, in addition to the full array of moving violations. 
Aftertimcs. a driver received a number of citations for the same offense several time a 
day. Merchants also suffered heavy fines for nonpayment or late payment of ta.xes. 
Many saw their businesses sealed and their property confiscated. Even street vendors 
and vegetable market operators suffered the loss of their products as soldiers often 
dumped market stalls and crushed their produce. 
Likud's Government after the 1988 Election 
Since 1987 Shamir's government confronted with the violent Palestinian 
Intifada, to which there appears no end in sight. On the other hand was the U.S. 
decision to begin low-level talk with the PLO, after 13 >ears of abiding by Kissinger's 
policy of not dealing with the PLO in any way. The shock of the change in US policy 
came after a series of verbal manures by Yasser Arafat. It began at the Palestinian 
National Council meeting in Algiers, where Arafat implied recognition of Israel and 
acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and 338 while declaring an independence 
Palestinian state to be established on the basis of UN Resolution 181 the old 1947 
partition plan (See Map no.8). The Western Europeans greeted it with enthusiasm and 
the interpretation that Arafat had turned moderate. Soon after that Arafat renounce in 
Geneva use of terrors, and accepted, Israeli's right to exist. His verbalization was 
sufficiently correct for the US to open dialogue with the PLO. 'fhe change in the 
position of the United States was dramatic and traumatic for Israel. Israelis were 
stunned that in spite of repeated assurances by both Reagan and Bush, the U.S. did not 
consult with Israel on the change at al l ." ' ' 
•fhere were no unexpected changes to the balance of power, in an Israeli 
election, which was held on 1 November 1988. The two main parties Likud and 
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Labour ran neck to neck. Likud won 40 seats and labour 39 I'olloucd by tin; usual 
dimple as both sought to tempt smaller parties into a coalition to gain enough seats to 
go\em. 
Shamir presented to the Knesset his "Unity" government, in which Likud and 
Labour each had eleven ministers. Moshe Arens a hard-line Likud man became 
Foreign Minister and Rabin remained at Defense Ministry. Certain political 
agreements had been reached: that there would be no rotation of the premiership: 
Likud would have e.\cusive control over foreign affairs: and eight new .lewish 
settlements would be established in the Occupied Territories within a \ear. The latter 
brought Shamir into conilict with the US administration which wanted such 
expansion to stop while the peace process was unfolding. In short, it was a hard line 
anti-Palestinian government. Speaking in Belgrade, Arafat declared that the new 
Israeli coalition government "was not for peace, but for war". 
In February 12, 1990, at the meeting of the Likud central committee, in front 
of the 3000 delegates including Shamir, the chairman of the central committee, Ariel 
Sharon announced that he was resigning because under the Premiership of Shamir, 
Palestinian terrorism was running rampant (including the Intit^ada) while in fact law 
and order could be reestablished in a relatively short time. Lventuall\ the committee 
and the delegates still gave their confidence to Shamir."^ 
However, on 15 March 1990, Shamir lost a vote of confidence in the Knesset 
and Likud-labour government collapsed. President llerzog gave Shimon Peres a remit 
to form a new government. But, Peres failed to take a vote of confidence, fhe remit, 
therefore, was handed over to Shamir again on the 2?"^ Apri l . On 8 June 1990 Yitzhak 
Shamir announced the formation of a new Israeli Likud coalition government. Shamir 
again became i'rime Minister, David Levi became vice i'rime Minister and Foreiun 
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Minislcr. Moshe Arens took the Defence portfolio. Despite his open qiianel with 
Shamir, Ariel Sharon became Minister of Housing and Construction. The media 
labelled it the most right-wing government in Israeli history. 
Madrid Conference 1991 
In earl> of June 1991, President George Bush invited West Asian leaders to a 
peace conference. The conference would be jointly chaired by the United States and 
the USSR and attended by Israel, a joint Jordanian F'alestinian delegation and certain 
Arab States, lie promised Shamir that there would be no Palestinians from East 
Jerusalem or PLO representatives in the delegation but called on Shamir to halt his 
settlement programme."** 
By earl) August intensive diplomatic efforts by Secretary of state James Baker 
had secured the agreement of the Israeli Syrian, Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese 
Governments and of Palestinian representatives to attend a regional peace conference, 
fhere was the first time Palestinian and Israelis sat down at the same negotiating 
table, fhe terms of reference for which would be a comprehensive peace settlement 
based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. An initial "symbolic" 
session of the conference was held in Madrid, Spain, in October. 
'Ihe Palestinian delegation was headed by Faisal Hussaini with Ms. llanan 
Ashrawi, a University professor, as spokesperson. The Israeli delegation was headed 
by Prime Minister Shamir with Binyamin Netanyahu as spokesman (Netanyhu a 
radical Likud member and deputy foreign minister at the time, had come and deputy 
foreign minister at the time, had come to international notice during the Gulf crisis as 
the Israeli spokesman at the UN, where he had vigorously advanced the Israeli case 
influent American English, specializing in what later became known as sound 
bites)."^ 
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hlo\ve\cr. subsequent talks soon bceame deadlocked over procedural issues. 
Israel, wary of making any gesture that might be construed as recognition of 
Palestinian independence, repeatedly questioned the status of the Palestinian 
Jordanian delegation and the right of the Palestinian component to participate 
separately in negotiations; furthermore Israel's refusal to halt construction of new 
settlements in the Occupied Territories continually jeopardized the peace process. 
In addition, the Right-wing minorit)' members of Likud's governing coalition 
opposed to an_\ Israeli participation in peace conference, threatened to withdraw from 
the coalition i f funds were not made available for settlement programme.'^" 
In December 1991 the Government's majorit\ in the Knesset was reduced 
when the Minister of Agriculture (a member of the Right wing Nationalist Tzomel 
part)) resigned in protest at the Prime Minister's opposition to electoral reform, fhe 
majority was last entirely in January 1992 when two other Right wing Nationalist 
groups Moledet and Tehiya left the coalition. Their withdrawal was a deliberate 
attempt to obstruct the third session of the West Asia peace Conference in Moscow, 
Russia where delegate had begun to address the granting of transition autonomy to 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
In Ma\ 1992 at the first multiteral negotiations between the parties to the West 
Asia peace conference commenced; Israel under the Likud; government boycotted the 
meeting on Palestinian refugees and regional economic development after the USA 
approved Palestinian proposals to allow exiles (i.e. non-residents of the Occupied 
Territories) to be included in the Palestinian delegations to these two sessions.'"' 
However, in the next month, Likud party was defeated by Labour Party in June 1992 
general elections and Yitzhak Rabin became a new Prime Minister by the support of 
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an alliance of Labour, Marclz and the iillia-orthoclox Shas and also commanded ihe 
iinoftlcial support of the two Arab parties.'" 
Likud Policies toward the Occupied Territories under Shamir. 
The Likud government's position on the Occupied Territories was that both 
the West liank. which included East Jerusalem and the Ga/a Strip were historic 
integrate part of the Land of Israel. From 1977 to 1984, under the leadership of Begin 
and from 1986-1992 under the leadership of Shamir, a coalition of clericalist and ultra 
nationalist poUvical pav\ies scl av to pevnvancnt integiiUc the West Bank and Gaza Svrip 
into Israel. 
For security, economic, theological and resource-related reasons, the 
government felt these areas should not be relinquished to Arab rule in return for peace 
or for any other objective. In the face of international opposition to its ambitions 
toward these territories, as well as constraints against formal changes in their status 
built into the Camp David .Accords, the Likud government eschewed explicitly 
annexationist legislation or declarations of permanent incorporation. Its strategy 
instead was de facto annexation the creation of demographic, economic and 
infrastructure "facts" that would bind the areas and their 1.4 million Palestinian 
inhabitants (including expanded East Jerusalem) inseparably to Israel '\ Therefore, 
the policies, implemented by Likud government to achieve the expansion of Jewish 
state in the Occupied Territories indeed, did imply a theory of how states are built a 
theory emphasizing settlement elaboration of administrative, economic, and social 
institutions among the settler population, land transfers and control of (rather than 
elimination or assimilation ot) indigenous inhabitant.'^'' 
In short, the occupation the Gaza Strip and the West Bank presented Israel 
with two political imperatives: to absorb land in order to establish more secure 
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defense lines and to absorb land in order lo fiilfill historie and religious rights to 
portions of the Occupied Territories. 
Likud's Settlement Policy under Shamir 
When Shamir came to power in 1983 there were 42.500 Jewish settlers who 
were living on the West Bank among 800,000 Palestinians. The number of Jewish 
settlers increased rapidly during Begin era (1977-1983). in fact when Begin started 
his government the numbers of settlers were only 4,700 in the West Bank. Moreover 
80.000 Israel Jews have lived in East Jerusalem alongside about 110, 000 Palestinians 
and 1400 Jewish settlers have lived in the Gaza Strip among 500,000 Palestinians.'"^ 
The land of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip could be available for exclusive 
use under a variet\ of administration and legal instrument used by Israeli authorities 
at the first year of Shamir government in 1983. These devices include, outright 
expropriation, closure for security or military purposes, classification of land as 
protected natural area, confiscation for public purposes and preparation of land for 
settlements including planning, design construction and installation of infrastructure 
facilities and recruitment and absorption of settlers, are tasks performed by a complex 
array of officials, quasi-officials and private organizations. Responsibilities frequently 
overlap, missions and practices change. At times these activities are closely 
coordinated, at other times there is vigorous competitions for control of various 
dimensions of the settlement. " 
The Continuity of Settlement 
Under the National Unity government led by Labour party during 1984-1986, 
more significantly, beginning in 1984 the party platform carried on article pledging 
opposition to the dismantling of any Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories and 
guaranteeing their safety following a political agreement, in fact, Likud party forced 
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ihc Labour parlv to adult itself to the realities, which was created by iJkud 
government in the past. 
The Labour did however, opposes any additional settlement outside of the 
security zones and regarded most of the settlement set up by Likud during 1977-1984 
as worthless from defense perspective, when it was a partner in the first National 
Unil\ government (1984-1988) Labour prevented the erection of new settlements in 
area outside of the Allon map. Similarly in 1988 Labour insisted on a veto power over 
the building of new selllemenls by the second National Unity government, which 
dominated by the Likud party. 
Since the economic crisis of 1984-85 and formation of the new National Unity 
government, the pace of settlement has lagged because of shortages in funding and the 
lack of enthusiasm for settlement by the Labour members of the government. Further 
uproar greeted a plan virtual l\ to freeze the programme of creating Jewish settlements 
on the Occupied Territories. Although the rate of settlements had slowed down the 
number of settlements established since 1967 lladrisen to 129 settlements which 114 
settlements are in West Bank by March 1985 and Israel had direct control of more 
than 50% of the 490000 of land in the West Bank.'^^ 
in February 1984, Yaval Ne'eman, Israeli's Minister for Science and 
Development under the National Unity government announced that at the end of the 
budgetary year there would be 50,000 - 60,000 Israeli settlers in the Occupied 
Territories. The growth would be a result of the completion of apartments whose 
construction had started in previous years. The target set by the Israeli government 
and the Section for settlement in the World Zionist Organization is to create ti l l 1986 
conditions to complete the settling of a Jewish population of 100,000 in the West 
Bank. The investment would amount to $ 1.55 million. The activities in the said 
205 
period (1983-1986) would promote the dynamical development during the next thirty 
years that would bring the population to be settled all over the West Bank and 
Jerusalem up to about 1.2 million.'^ "^  According to this blueprint, funds would be 
invested to develop sources of employment for about 17,300 persons to build 20,860 
housing units, to construct 400 kms. of roads, to develop infrastructures for electricity, 
water and communications the plan anticipates that si.xty-five to seventy-Uve percent 
of these settlers will settle within comminuting distance of Jerusalem and the 
metropolitan area of Tel-Aviv; an extensive road network would cross the West Bank 
north to south east to West to link the settlements to each other and to centers within 
the "green line"; extensive industrial development would be promoted to provide 
employment for settlers; most settlements would be urban and semi-urban. They 
would be geared to attracting urban populations from Jerusalem and the Tel-Aviv 
area, by oftering suburban housing in accordance with anticipated demand 
patterns.'^^(See Map no.26 ) 
In the Gaza Strip most of the settlements are located in the south along the 
coast near the strip water aquifers. By 1985 for example, Israeli settlements together 
contained 600 dunums hot houses while Arab farmers had hothouses only 450 
dunums. The Israeli vegetable marketing board, Agrexco, stopped marketing Arab-
produced vegetables from the Occupied Territories, concentrating on those produced 
by Israeli settlements only. 
Other areas of the Gaza Strip settlements are in northern, central and eastern of 
the Strip. In northern settlement Bloc there are four, settlement in 1984. Each in 
central and eastern settlement Bloc has one settlement, in 1985 settlers of the central 
settlement Bloc were 170 from 55 housing unit.'''' 
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In 1985 under Shamir government there were already about 140 Jewish 
settlements in the Occupied Territories housing about 140, 000 people and more were 
planned Palestinians on small farms and in villages weic being surrounded by 
aggressive Jewish settlers which made them feel harassed and intimidated. It seemed 
that there was an Israeli master plan to deprive them of their land and homes. At the 
lime all Palestinian movement between the Gaza Strip and West Bank prohibited. It 
was hopes that with the signing of the 10 allow in 1993. settlement activity would 
come to the West. But this has not happened. The Israeli government announced the 
creation of a permanent new settlement in the heart of Hebron and expansion of two 
settlements in Jerusalem and Nablus. It was also the Israeli plan to expanded the 
municipal boundaries of Jerusalem and establish as umbrella authority to include a 
member of illegal annexation more Occupied Palestinians land maintaining a specific 
demographic composition with the aim of furthering the process of the Judaization of 
1 • 13"' 
the city. 
It was not until 22 December 1988 that the new National unity government 
under the leadership of Yitzhak Shamir as Prime Minister was formed, the National 
Unity government which Likud and Labour each had eleven ministers and Moshe 
Arens a hard-line from Likud member became Foreign Minister had announced that 
eight new Jewish settlements would be established in the Occupied Territories within 
a year. This announcement in fact, conflicted with the US administration which 
wanted to stop such expansion during the 1989 Baker peace process plan was 
unfolding and the Intifada no sight to be an end. In January 14, 1990 the US state 
Department openly criticized Shamir for saying that the Occupied Territories would 
be used to settlers Jewish immiuranls from USSR. 
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Shamir used diplomacy lo avoid US condemnation, and pressed on v\ith 
Soviet Jewish immigration. His domestic policy was to establish more Jewish 
settlements in the Occupied Territories, continue to crack down hard on intifadc' 
intensify tax avoidance confiscations, improve intelligence gathering and sanction "on 
the spot killing".'" 
In the mid of 1990s, the wave of immigration from Soviet Union turned out to 
be blessing for Israel's econom> which reached in those years six to seven percent a 
)ear. In addition, in May 1991, 15,000 Ethiopia Jews immigrated to Israel and on I I 
April 1991 the Knesset disappointment at the short fall in the expected number of 
Soviet Jewish immigrants, estimating that up to one million Soviet Jews had cancelled 
as postponed their plans to immigrate to Israel due to its uncertain security situation. 
In order to help with absorption, however, Israel requested that the US government 
grant it 10 million dollars worth of loan guarantees. The US government conditioned 
the guarantees on Israelis stopping all Jewish settlement activities in the Occupied 
Territories. However, Shamir government refused to do; the requested guarantees 
were eventually granted to the Rabin government toward the end of President Bush 
administration.'^'' 
During the Gulf War (1991), the Scud raids from Iraqi Army attacked Israel, 
its dire economic prospects and the large number of immigrants, receiving 
unemployment benefit. In fact, it was that Soviet Jews were reluctant to settle in the 
Occupied Territories as most preferred to cling to urban centers. A US state 
Department report to congress on 20 March 1991 had stated that over 200,000 Israelis 
living in some 200 settlements in the Occupied Territories (most other international 
assessments quoted about 140 settlements with about 140,000 settlers) and that of the 
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cstimalcd 185.000 Soviet Jews who had arrived in Israel in 1990. approximately 4 
percent had settled in the Occupied Territories. 
Housing Minister. Ariel Sharon continued to establish new settlements in the 
Occupied Territories, it being reported that he planned to build over 13,000 new 
homes within the next two \ears, as this was essential to provide strategic depth. New-
settlers began to move into Revava on 10 April 1991 the llrst settlement to be 
established in the Occupied Territories for two years, and on 23^'', Sharon opened 
another one at Talinon, near RamaUah. A ihird was opened at Kanai' on (he Golan 
Heights, and Sharon declared at the ceremony that he intended to double the Israeli 
population of the Golan Heights (then said to stand at about 12400). and would ensure 
that the territory' was never return to Syria. 
Construction continued, and on 2 July 1991 Sharon opened a new settlement 
at Mevo Dotan on the West Bank. On the 29''^  work began on yet another at Avneh 
Hafetz near Ramallah designed to become the largest on the West Bank. The Defense 
Ministry conllrmed that plots of land were given free to settlers, and that so far in 
1991 Shamir's government had expropriated over 8000 hectares of land in the 
Occupied Territories. Banker continued to talk about halting the Israeli settlement 
process, but there was no mention of dismantling settlements already established in 
the Occupied Territories. 
In early October 1991, the US Congress again condemned Israel for pursuing 
its settlement programme, and again withheld the load guarantees. Furthermore, the 
US Export-Import Bank criticized the structure of the Israeli economy and cast doubts 
on its abilit\ to repa>' debts i f it continued on its current course. Israel's response was 
to announce that an army post in the Golan Heights was to be turned into a settlement, 
and on the 16^ '^  confirmed that more housing was to be built in the settlement of Givat 
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Hamatos in southern Jerusalem. Shamir finally, announced before going to election in 
1992 to please hard line nationalist parties, he increased Jewish settlement funding, 
and said that of the 19500 housing units planned for 1992 some 5000 would be in the 
Occupied Territoies.'^^(See Map no.27, 28,and 29 ) 
Ariel Sharon's "Seven Stars Plan" 
In the terms of the joint Jewish Agency World Zionist Organization (WZO) 
development project for the region, Ariel Sharon had planned to emerge the "Seven 
Stars Plan" which was currently developing seven Jewish settlements so as to 
transform the whole Triangle area, northeast of Tel Aviv. Opponents argue that this 
large-scale plan has already wrought immeasurable damage to the Arab residents of 
the area, the Local ecology, the state budget and Israel's legal and planning systems. 
The Seven Star Plan, based on a more comprehensive 20 years project of the Jewish 
Agency and the WZO, was approved by the inter ministerial committee of Absorption 
in December 1990 and the National Committee for planning and construction in June 
1991 .'"^ The Seven Stars plan provides the clearest example by which state sponsored 
development is used to expedite a political goal. As an immediate consequence, this 
project effectively erases the "green line" and eliminates the Arab community in the 
region as a homogeneous unit. In the long run, it also serves to Judaize the Triangle 
and the northwest of West Bank, and to prevent an eventual peace agreement. 
International public opinion and possible conditions attached to U.S. aid to 
Israel have constrained this latest Sharon plan officially to specify only sites for 
development on or inside the "green line". However, this illusion is made transparent 
by reading of the joint Jewish Agency-WZO plans (cited above) to provide a 
continual bridge of Jewish settlement that is to line metropolitan Tel Aviv with Ariel 
and other Jewish settlements already established in the occupied West Bank. This 
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previous blueprint, the Hron-Reihan plan, ' " does not distinguish between the Arab 
citizens in Israel and the Palestinian Arab residents of the occupied West Bank, but 
uniform implies that the whole of these four century old communities are a threat to 
security.'^ ** 
The backbone of the Seven Stars is the proposed road No.6 which will run 
parallel to the seashore highway and link the seven new and expanded settlements. On 
its part the road will sever the lands belonging to the Arab villages of Taibah, Tira and 
Jaljuria. requiring the confiscation of hundred of dunums. In addition, an e.xit ramp 
had been graluitousl> planned so that it will eliminate most of .laljulia's agricultural 
lands. 
The Seven Stars Plan established priority for the building of four urban centers 
(stars): Modin, planned to house 160,000 settlers, Rosh Haayin planned for 50,000, 
Kochov Yair, Planned for 20,000 and Kharish, planned for 35,000. Rosh Haayin will 
acquire the lands of the Arab villages of Kafr Qasem, Kafr Bara and Jaljulia. Kharish 
has been configured to break up the continuity of the Taibah-Tira Qalansua Arab 
village network and Kharish will absorb the Arab villages in the Wadi Ara (Nahal 
Eron) region. Meanwhile, Arab land is also being confiscated in contiguous areas 
outside of the immediate Seven Stars settlement sites, exemplified by the state's 
February 1991 capture of 3,200 dunums from Umm El-Fahem municipality. 
Consistent with both Jewish Agency and Markowitz plans, the Seven Stars will 
reduce the Arab villages of Aryan, Hanun Sharaya and Mansua to a memory.'"^ 
Likud's Security Policy 
With its Revisionist heritage and its reputation on the standard bearer of 
mainstream nationalism, the Likud embraced the security issue with zealous 
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conviction. I'he Likud was able to articulate the deep scat historical fears of the 
populace and elect orally it was seen to be party which was strong on securitv. 
Undoubtedly, the Occupied Territories are important to Israeli security. 
Particularly the Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip indeed, there are 
two attitudes current in Israel on the question of the significance of settlement to the 
country's security. One maintains that these settlements are primarily of political 
value in that they determine the border of the state. In this pcrspccti\c. settlement has 
only secondary significance with regard to security, as Ben-Gurion the first Israeli 
Prime Minister observed, "our security is built firstly and principally on the reserve 
arm}, not on border settlement." 
The second position regarding settlement is that border settlements are an 
important and vital element in the defense of the nation. The settlers fight in the 
defense of their homes and families. One of the Lessons learned from the Yom 
Kippur War is that Israeli can not depend on early warning only, so it is \ ital to build 
a settlement based line of defense capable of halting the enemy. 
In summary, both view regard border settlements as having a security value 
they differ in their estimation of the extents to which these settlements contribute to 
the national's security.' 
The Security Policy under Shamir 
Although few in Israel during Shamir premiership held to old Revisionist 
dream of a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan, the securit) issue nevertheless 
helped to cloak the ideological issue and gained the Likud support within the country. 
In addition during Shamir's early period, the PLO seemed to have largely lost the 
ability to wage an armed struggle against Israel through its borders due to the loss of 
the base in Lebanon and expulsion of the PLO's head quarters from Beirut. By 1985 
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ihe center of Palestinian activism had clearly moved in to the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. The increasing number of individual violent attacks of Palestinians against 
Israeli Jews, the growing politicization and mobilization of the Palestinians public 
through grass-root movement and PLO based institution, and the rise of new young 
local leadership which had matured in the Israeli jails, all gradually changed the 
nature of the Palestinians, in the Occupied Territories from acquiescent to 
rebellions.'"*" 
In this situation, security concerns have acted as major restraint on the public's 
amenability to concessions. Not only do Israelis see themselves as motivated by 
security concerns, but they perceives their government as being so motivated as well. 
The majority believed that settlement policy under the Likud party was mainly aimed 
at making Israel's hold on the West Bank permanent. The government's main 
motivation was seen as security concerns (55%) rather than "historical and religious 
considerations''. 
Security concern will play a major role in determining the type of final 
arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Israeli public expressed the view 
that "Israel's military control over West Bank is vital for Israelis security.'''^ 
Under the leadership of Yitzhak Shamir, the Likud party employed many 
policies and practices in the Occupied Territories for security reasons. There were as 
follows. 
1. Strong-arm Policy 
Under the first Shamir government in 1983. the strong-arm policy was planned by 
Moshe Arens, a Defense Minister. Under his "'enlightened occupation" the village 
Leagues were demoted and military government was forced to observe more stringent 
law and order. Because of his alleged leniency Arens came under repealed auacks 
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iVom Jcuish settlers who demanded slifTpunishment for such infringements as stone -
throwing and traffic hindrance. A recent ordinance provides for long prison term for 
stone throwing. Arens and his military government moved away from traditional 
punishments such as blowing up the family homes of suspects. This punishment has 
proved ineffective as a deterrent and, because of its high visibility, has drawn 
international criticism. Arens also refrained from implementing the recommendations 
of a 1983 IDF panel, which suggested exiling the offenders in civilian disturbances. " 
2. Shin Bet Agency 
The Shin Bet is the Israeli domestic intelligence service, and is directly 
answerable only to prime minister. It plays an over whelming important part in the 
lives of residents of the Occupied Territories. It is reliance on intelligence information 
from Shin Bet operatives that the Military commander wil l order drastic measures as 
deportation, administrative detention, or town arrest. The shin bet also carried out 
most of the interrogation and investigation of all but the most minor offenses in the 
Occupied Territories and Israel. Finally, "security clearance" from the Shin Bet has to 
be recei\ed before a wide range of permits and licenses can be issued.'"*^ 
The activities of Shin Bet, the Israeli internal military intelligence agency, 
came under security in 1986, when it was suggested that the deaths, under 
interrogation of two Palestinians in April 1984 had been deliberately concealed. The 
official shin Bet version of events was that all four Palestinians involved in the 
hijacking of an Israeli bus had been killed at time of the incident. But photographs 
revealed that the two terrorists were captured alive. Two subsequent official inquires 
between April 1984 and August 1985, confirmed that the two terrorists had died at 
later stage and identified Brig Gen Yitzhak Mondechai as the prime suspect in their 
deaths. Modechai was acquitted by a military court in August 1985 and the Attorney 
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General Yitzhak Shamir, initiated investigations into affair He was told by leading 
Shin Bet officials that Avraham Shalom, the director of the agenc> had ordered three 
prisoners execution and had falsified evidence and suborned witnesses at two official 
inquiries. Zamir insisted on a police investigation in to affair. Likud in particular, 
feared that such an investigation would reveal too much about the operation of Shin 
Bet, thus preventing the organization from functioning effectively and so endangering 
national security.'"'^ 
At the end of June Avrahm Sharom resigned as director of Shim I3et, he and 
three of his deputies having been assured of a pardon and immunit> from prosecution 
by the president of Israel, Chaim Herzog. In letter to President Herzog, Shalom stated 
that his actions had been taken "on authority and with permission'" presumably from 
Itzhak Shamir, to whom as Prime Minister at the time of the killings and over-up, he 
was responsible. In August a further seven Shin Bet agent were granted a presidential 
pardon for their alleged involvement in the killings or the subsequent cover-up, with 
the backing of Prime Minister Shamir ostensibly to prevent irreparable damage to the 
service. Later, after the Cabinet voted by a narrow margin for police inquiry which 
was supported by Likud and small-religious parties, rather than a full judicial iniquity 
which supported by Labour Party, a secret report compiled by Ministry of Justice and 
based on a three month long police investigation into the affair absolved Itzhak 
Shamir from any blame for the deaths of the two Palestinians or for he subsequent 
attempts by Shin Bet to conceal the truth of the incidents inquestion'"" 
In June 1987 the government established a commission of inquiry under 
Moshe Landau the former Supreme Court President to investigate the agency. 
However in the same year it was discovered that the confession on the basis of which 
Izzat Nafsu a Circassion Muslim officer from Kfar Kama, one of two Circassion 
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settlements in northern Israel, had been convicted of treason. Izzat Nafsu had joined 
Shin Bel and risen to the rank of heutenant when he was accused of working for PLO 
at the time of serving in southern Lebanon in 1978. His defense was that had been set 
up by Shin Bet, claiming that he had met an informer who turned out to be senior 
Fatah officer. This man had tried to black mail him into cooperating with Fatah, 
which Nafsu had refused to do. Nafsu claimed that all the evidence against him was 
false. The subsequent inquiry by the Landu commission revealed that the Shin Bet 
had systematically lied in their evidence to courts throughout the past sixteen years. 
ihcse disclosures and the finding of Landau commission have the most drastic 
implications for a large part of the occupied population who have been convicted of 
"security" offenses, or suffered from any of the variety of administrative restrictions 
or punishments used by the military commander in reliance on the Shin Bet's 
information. It was claimed in the Landau commission's report that the findings of the 
inquiry, and in particular the perjury of Shin Bet, came as a surprise to the judges to 
whom the Shin Bet had lied. To the Palestinian population they came as no surprise. 
Innumerable people have challenged the evidence of the Shin Bet, most often as to the 
circumstances under which their confessions were taken, but also as to the facts 
alleged against them. But they have found that the evidence of the prosecution 
witnesses almost invariably believed over their own.'""* 
In addition, when the intifada began the government had expected that Shin 
Bet would quickly get to the root of the trouble and arrest the ringleaders, but as it 
relied on informers and collaborators, a system that under "fear or favour" pressure 
normally produced some results, its people had been blunted when faced with mass 
disobedience. Shin Bet struggled under a dark cloud of unpopularity and suspicion. 
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from both Israelis and Palestinians, and its relations with other Israeli security 
services were not of the best. 
3 Iron fist Policy 
The Israeli Cabinet endorsed an iron fist policy on 17 January 1988, although 
there were reported differences between the Shamir faction and the Shimon Peres. 
Yitzhak Rabin, the defense minister sided with Shamir. The iron fist policy however 
was divided over the long-term solution to the Palestinian question. At the end of 
January an order of Itzhak Rabin, Israeli security forces adopted a policy of 
indiscriminate pre-emptive beatings of Palestinians, allegedly to avoid shootings, 
which were internationally condemned. The new policy, combined with the periodic 
imposition of curfews on refugee camps, towns and villages, far from quelling unrest, 
appeared to provoke it and encouraged greater sufferance and organization among the 
Palestinians, who set up committees to oversees the collection and distribution of food 
and other supplies, and to coordinate resistance, by this time there were numerous 
media reports of soldiers using batons and rifie butts against demonstrators, of limbs 
being deliberately broken, of soldiers entering homes at night, and of impromptu 
collective punishments.' 
The "Iron Fist" policy of Shamir and Rabin to suppress the Intifada was 
applauded by a majority of the Israeli public. The Solution had a disquieting effect on 
those who looked for deeper reasons for this outburst of Palestinian militancy. Despite 
the Palestinian use of the media to gain maximum, political capital from the daily 
events, the very idea of the Israel Defense Force acting as a police squad appalled a 
growing minority of Jews in Israel and in the Diaspora.'^° 
Retaliatory measures against the Palestinian demonstration continued, 
including forcibly closing shop and markets, preventing fuel and food from reaching 
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offending refugee camps, and withholding petrol from filling stations. Media footage 
was taken of Israeli soldiers preventing food or fuel label vehicles Irom entering 
refugee compass but journalists in Israel especially foreign ones, were finding it 
increasingly difficult to obtain official permits to cover incidents or gum information 
about them. 
In March Rabin announced he was replacing Israeli reservists on duty in the 
Occupied Territories with border police whose number were increased from about 
5000 to around 6500. The border police were e.\tremel> valuable to the Israeli 
authorities, being something of a foreign legion. Most were Druse Arabic-speaking 
and Arab-thinking, with a Bedouin's contempt for settled .Arabs.'^' 
Israeli's Iron fist tactics continued to be well reported in the media and caused 
anxiety among those concerned with human rights issues, as illustrated on 5 February 
when a protest notice, signed by 600 Israeli academics was placed in most of the main 
Israeli newspaper to denounce rule b> force. Eventually Rabin announced a new code 
of conduct, which was much the same as his original "iron fist"' one, with a few 
provision added.'^" 
4. The Policy of Preventive Detention 
In 1985 authorities reinstated the use of preventi\e detective, which had been 
in disuse since 1980. According to this law, the military has the power to imprison 
local residents for indefinite periods of time without charge and without trial. By the 
end of 1985, more than 100 persons in the Gaza Strip were detained under this law. 
Gazans are detained in local jails for a broad range of security offenses from 
rock throwing to violent demonstrations to murder. Prisoners are held both inside the 
Occupied Territories and in cases of life sentence are held in ma.vimum security 
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prisons inside Israel. The authority of the Israeli prison system extends inside the 
Gaza Strip and West Bank.'" 
5. The Policy of Deportations 
Military orders reinstating deportations also occurred in August 1985 after an 
absence of five years. Designed to permanently remove individual Palestine from the 
Occupied Territories, deportation were initially invoked as a punitive measure by the 
British under clause 112 of the British Emergency Regulations which the Israeli 
continue to uphold. ^  
6. Curfews 
The Curfew is backed up as of late by the Rabin line mounds of earth at the 
entrances to the camps that is intended to make entry to and exit from the camps 
difficult, forcing the residents to go by way of a limited number of entrances, which 
are under supervision. A continuous curfew and the hardship it creates, has had one 
effect that is already clear beyond all doubt. The degree of solidarity among the 
residents is immeasurably greater today than it was on the eve of the curfew.'^ ^ 
Invoked as a retaliatory measure for terrorist incidents; curfews have been imposed 
upon cities, towns, villages and refugee camps. Curfews can last from one day to 
several weeks. During a curfew, residents are prohibited from leaving the area and are 
often confine to their homes for certain hours of the day. Leaving one's home under a 
curfew can result in imprisonment and, in some instances, death. Persons wishing to 
enter or return to the curfew area are prevented from doing so which can create 
serious problems for those families whose sole income earner works outside the area. 
Curfew are applied to the Palestinian population only, Israeli settlers are allowed 
freedom of movement.'^ ^ 
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7. The Policy of Demolition of Houses 
The demolition of houses is a punitive measure activity applied inside the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank. According to this measure, the homes of security 
offenders are either destroyed or sealed, leaving the families of those individuals with 
nowhere to live and with no right of compensation. Considered a deterrent as well as a 
pimishment. demolition alwa\s occurs before any legal proceedings have taken 
place.'"' 
8. The Policy of Beatings 
fhe result of the defense minister's policy can be seen on the hands, legs, 
backs and heads of hundreds of youths and old people in the Gaza Strip. According to 
the report of the Ramallah-based human rights organization Al-Haq, has point to more 
than 200 people in period of Shamir's National Unity. Government needing plaster 
casts in recent daNS, after having been brutalU' beaten by soldiers. A significant 
number of the injured were not demonstrators who were beaten during disturbances. 
There are a number of rooms in Shifa Hospital in Gaza populated entirely by people 
with broken hands and legs. 
The marks on the beaten bodies indicate that those who were beaten in 
response to illegal activities received many more blows than were necessary to deter 
them. The damage to the army inherent in the policy of beatings (beyond the 
I S ^ 
diplomatic and political damage) is likely to be horrifying. " 
9. The Policy of Maltreatment 
According to Al-Haq report pointed that in the Nuseirat refugee camp, on the 
night of the 19"' of J anuary 1988, all the men between the ages of 16 and 40 
concentrated in on corner of the camp. Hundreds of youths remained outside until 5 
A.M. on a cold and partly rainy night. The youths were made to kneel in the mud for 
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hours. This collective punishment was accompanied by the beating of those who 
dared to raise their heads. 
In the Sejich refugee camp, on the same night, hundreds of youths were called 
out of their homes at 11 P.M. and were forced to remain outside for a long time to 
clean the street. ^ 
10. The Policy of Smashing Windows 
In the streets of the Nuseirat refugee camp, one saw, wilhout any difficulty, 
several dozen (may be more) windows that have been smashed in compliance with an 
order the army received from the political echelon. Fragments of broken windows and 
shutters are scattered throughout the camp, and have been spread around, in those 
days, by the soldiers' stick. Smashing the windows of the wretched, often unheated, 
houses had. of course, a special significance, particularly in the winter. Armored 
personnel carriers passing through the camp have damaged houses on a number of 
occasions, and in one incident an armored vehicle "shaved'' an inner courtyard in the 
name of deterrence, gratuitous maltreatment, or perhaps or order.'^ *^  
Likud's Counter Terrorism Policy 
Terrorism seems to be dominant among Israeli security concerns, outweighing 
fear of a pan-Arab assault. According to Russell A. Stone among specific security 
worries, terrorism was cited more Israelis from 1973 to 1979 than any other. Many 
Israelis see territorial concessions, as opening the way to increase is terrorism.'^' 
Most studies that analyze Israel's defense strategies have thus addressed 
terrorism as a marginal issue and for good reason. Looked at in purely physical terms, 
terrorism is certainly no more than a tactical problem, as can be shown from a cursory 
calculation of the actual physical damage and number of casualties caused in all the 
years of anti-Israel terrorism. However, the effect of terrorism on public moral in 
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Israel is far out of proportion to its purely material impact. Terrorism has had a 
definite strategic effect, primarily because public moral eventually translates into 
shifts in political stance, which in turn effect changes in the nation's policies. ''' 
Over years, Israeli concern about terrorism has been focused on the PLO, 
toward whom Israelis harbor a deep-seated mistrust. In April 1984 two thirds of the 
public aid that the PLO"s long-term intention was "to annihilate Israef. A few moiilhs 
earlier, on the heels of several attacks on Israelis seven in ten felt that terrorism was 
threatening Israel's security. 
Added to the list of Israeli concerns about terrorism is the new one of Israeli 
fundamentalism. In April 1984. 72 percent of public perceived "a sharp rise in Islamic 
fundamentalism in the West Asia" as a major threat to Israel's security.'^ ^ 
.At the heart of Israel's counter-terrorism policy in the "democratic dilemma*' 
the contlict between Israel's counter-terrorist measures during the periods in question. 
and the country's liberal democratic values. With a view to addressing this conflict, a 
qualitative model with which to measure the harm done to democratic values by 
counter-terrorist policies and action, was proposed. This model is based on an analysis 
of the main measures that Israel has used against terrorism and how these measures 
reflected on the "democratic dilemma". The list of measures includes intelligence, 
offensive attacks, defensive measures, counter-terrorist legislation, prosecution of 
suspected terrorists, punitive measures political concessions, and public relations and 
education.' 
The Counter-terrorism Policies of the Unity Government and the Shamir 
government 1983-1992. 
Yitzhak Shamir summarized a project for counter terrorism as policies adopted 
by his government and the extent to which these policies accomplished their goals. He 
said. 
?2? 
We came very close to annihilating terrorism. In my opinion and Pm 
not the only one who thinks so, it is practically a fact that in 1992 the PLO was 
on the brink of destruction. Arab terrorism was on the brink of destruction as a 
whole, because they lost faith in it. Demoralization decimated all the 
terrorists" ranks... The General Security Service and Israel Defense Forces 
showed incredible capabilities and durability, learned the lessons from every 
clash, the morale of our fighters was high and we were truly close to 
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Victory. 
Undoubtedly, the challenges faced by Shamir's government and the unity 
governments in connection with Palestinian violence and terrorism were immense at 
times unprecedented in Israel's history. These governments scored quite a few points 
in facing these challenges, but Shamir's analysis of the facts is nevertheless a 
subjective one made in retrospect, and does not necessarily reflect things as Ihey 
really were. 
Shamir's governments and the unity governments were established after the 
PLO's military forces in Lebanon had been defeated and dispersed to various 
countries. At the same time, these governments had to deal with rising Shiite 
terrorism in Lebanon and fundamentalist Islamic militarism in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. Contrary to Shamir's perception of the facts, the IDF was unable to 
properly handle the "Intifada" and scored only limited success in Lebanon. Other 
cabinet members, such as Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin, maintained that 
concurrently with military action against the Palestinian organizations, Israel must 
push forward political initiatives that would bring an end to the conflict, and these 
members gained more clout over t ime.'^ 
Throughout this period. Israel carried out various offensive activities 
(including several audacious, large-scale operations) and continued to invest money 
and human resources in defensive activities as well. These activities were carried out 
both routine and as preventive and retaliatory measures. In hostage situations these 
governments continued ihe policies of their predecessors. Meaning was that when 
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military solution was not viable, they were ready to make the needed concessors to 
the terrorists as was shown by the "Jibril Deal" of Mas 20, 1985, concluded when 
Shimon Peres was Prime Minister. On that occasion, three Israeli soldiers held by the 
PFLP-GC since Lebanon war was exchanged for 1150 prisoners held in Israel. The 
number of terrorists, who were released from prison, the severity of the crimes they 
had committed, and the government's willingness to allow them to return to territories 
controlled by Israel, were all unparalleled. However, in terms of political negotiations 
with Palestinian terrorist organizations, Shamir's governments and unity governments 
upheld and even radicalized their predecessor's hard line, no negotiating with terrorist 
organizations. This philosoph\ was even put down in a low that forbade any 
communications with PLO representatives. 
During this period several high profile scandals surfaced involving attempts by 
the General Security Service to cover up misdeeds. Most prominent was the "Bus 300 
Affair", in which the Palestinian terrorists who had hijacked a bus were captured alive 
and killed by the GSS, which them tried to cover up the matter. This scandal, along 
with the discovery of a Jewish underground, and the need for mass punishments 
during the Intifada, illustrate the ethical dilemmas faced by these governments in 
combating terrorism in the most etTective way on the one hand, while minimizing the 
injury to liberal-democratic values on the other. During their period, such dilemmas 
were often resolved by courts, which intervened and defined the boundaries, which 
could not be crossed.'^^ 
Land Policy under Shamir 
Land seizure in the Occupied Territories under Shamir government was based 
on its Iron Fist policy, which escalated the processes of land confiscation and 
colonization and planted settlements right in the midst of Palestinian urban 
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concentrations. The provocative character of these developments triggered sharp 
conflict between Israeli authorities and local Palestinians.'^* 
The Likud government's method of land confiscation in the Occupied 
Territories constituted a burning political question especially since under the Begin's 
government's autonomy proposals all such land would not be included in the area in 
which Palestinians will be granted a modicum of self rule. Some lands have been 
seized for security purposes. At the beginning of 1985 there were about 23-closurc 
order in force, encompassing an area of about I million dunums. This land was served 
for security purposes, but it was soon utilized for the election of settlements after the 
High Court of Justice established that the Israeli settlements in the Occupied 
Territories are part of the regional defense system and therefore considered a security 
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necessary. 
Since the settlements are largely civilian although many began as military 
outposts, and most belong to particular religious political movement. The majority of 
settlements produce agricultural commodities, which often compete with local 
production. However, the majority of settlers works in Israel and commute daily from 
the Strip. Tourism is a growing industry for Gaza's settlement community since many 
of them are located along the Mediterranean's coats. In 1985 the government claimed 
possession of 100,000 dunums of land in the Gaza Strip. Of this number, 20,000 
dunums were leased to Jewish Agency and an additional 7,000 were leased to Hof 
Gaza, a regional settlement council. Most but not all Israeli settlements are built on 
lands declared to be state domain. There are presently 18 settlements occupy a known 
figure of 22,250 dunums (5,562 acres) of land, yielding an average of 10.4 dunums 
(2.6 acres) of land for each Israeli settlers'. 
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Land ratios for the Arab population, however are ditTcrent. According to the 
1985-86 Report of the Militar\ Government, Gaza's eight refugee camps presently 
occupy 5,500 dunums (1375 acres) for the construction of refugee housing projects. 
Given a population densil\ of 1400 per square kilometer, it is clear the land 
allocations between the Israeli and Arab populations in the Gaza Strip are highly 
discriminatory.' 
The most essential role who managed the land confiscation policy since the 
beginning of Lii^ud government was the former of Israeli Ministry of Justice, Plia 
Albeck who was in charge of such operation under the Likud government. 
As Amiran Cohen, the reporter of the Hebrew press "Al-llamishmar", 
mentioned in her article "The mother of all the settlement" about Al-beck and the 
Land confiscation policy: 
Politically speaking. Plia Albeck is the Likud government's most precious 
legal resource. Without her, the state of Israel would not conceivably succeed 
in seizing over 2 million dunums of land, or roughly a half of entire are of the 
West Bank, without paying a penny in compensation. In particularly every 
dunum of land on which Housing Minister under Shamir government, Ariel 
Sharon's bulldozers operate, was seized through her effort." 
Through the legal talents of Ms Al-beck which have blossom in particular in 
cases involving land in East Jerusalem (and the Golan Heights). Al l land and property 
of Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem was not legally owned by them, but by 
the state of Israel. A 1950 Israeli law was meant to apply without distinction to any 
conceivable territory, which might fall under Israeli sovereignty. Shamir government 
used the custodian's office, which operated within the Ministry of Housing, which 
headed by Sharon, to seize lands of Palestinians. The seizure of Palestinian land did 
not only seize from the genuine refugees who absented from Israel, but also Israeli 
Arabs who had become Israeli citizens, even they had been elected as Knesset 
members. Legally; they are still considered Absentees, which means that legally all 
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llicir propcil) belongs to Ihc state of Israel, hence their description as '•Present 
Absentees". A l l Arab residents formally became absentees. Iheoretically, the 
custodian of the absentee property could confiscate all houses and other property of 
all East Jerusalem Arabs on the ground that they were no longer its legal owners."" 
Enter Ms. Albeck. Acting in coordination with Sharon and with the custodian 
already operating under Sharon's authority, she carefully scrutinized East Jerusalem 
property archi\es in order to discover "the Absentees'" so as to confiscate maximum 
property. In this job, Al-beck was remarkably successful. Nothing was too 
insignificant to escape her attention. On an inspection tour in the Muslim Quarter of 
the Old City of Jerusalem, she noticed a tiny shop, which looked temporarily shut 
down. She immediately called her office computer to find that the shop owner was 
resident of the territories, banned by order of the authorities from entering Jerusalem 
and the rest of Israel, just as thousands of other Palestinians are. Upon thus fmding 
him an "absentee" she at once gave instructions to confiscate the tiny shop. Of the two 
methods of "Judaizing East Jerusalem'' in current use, Al-beck is clearly superior to 
Sharon's contrived settlement drive.''^ 
In addition, during Shamir's government, the arrival of huge number of 
emigrates in Israel from the USSR provided the boost for a fresh round of the 
expropriations and renewed settlement. Shamir government announced a set of 
guideline, which was released on June 8, 1990 regarding "Green Line" the 
demarcation point separating Israel from the Arab territories occupied after 1967 War. 
The main provision stated plainly that settlement in all part of the land of Israel is a 
right had an inseparable part of national security; the government wil l act to 
strengthen broaden and deepen settlement. Further data on settlement activity and its 
relation to immigration is contained in a report by Al- l laq, the Palestinian legal 
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organization, that between January 1988 and June 1991 over 504. 120 dunums of land 
(one dunum equals 100 square meters) were confiscated by Shamir government 
authorities in the Occupied Territories including East Jerusalem.'^ '*(See Map no. 30 ) 
In summary land acquisition continued to be the backbone of Zionist political 
and economic objectives. The policy served two purposes: it increased the 
vulnerability of the inhabitants by virtually destroying their established agricultural 
economy and consequently, their values and mode of life without presenting them 
with a better alternative; second, land expropriation facilitated the control of the 
mobility of inhabitants, hence their emigration or ghettoization. Therefore Likud 
government, both under Begin and Shamir confiscated any land they wanted in the 
Occupied Territories and also helped the Jewish Agency (responsible for Jewish 
immigration) and individual Israelis to purchase Palestinian land, so that it would be 
available for more settlements when authorized. Displaced Palestinian farmers and 
other occupants were forced to leave and take menial jobs became unemployed or 
emigrate as well.'^ ^ 
Shamir's Water Resources Policy 
Israel currently user more than 95 percent of the estimated 1,850 million cubic 
meters (mem) of water that annually rises between the Jordan River and 
Mediterranean Sea. Israel's high ratio of water utilization is unsurpassed by any other 
nation in the world. 1995 Israel had developed all its renewable water resources and 
reached a critical point in the exploitation of non-renewable supplied (those which can 
not be replenished naturally). With current annual water usage at 1.75 billion cubic 
meters (BCM) Israel is leaving itself a shallow cushion of less than 100 MCM.'^ ^ 
Israel consumers five times more water per capita than its Arab neighbors. 
Though high consumption is definitely a result of Israel's intensive agriculture and 
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indiislrializalion, culture also plays a part. Israelis tend to be having more like 
Europeans than like natives of the West Asia. Their habits of water use do not suit the 
dry Levantine climate. 
Water consumption of the average Palestinian family in the West Bank is 
estimated to be less than a quarter of that consumed by the averages Israeli family. 
Many Arab villages rely totally on rainwater for their agriculture while Israeli farmers 
make extensive use of sophisticated irrigation s\stem. Prince Hassan Ben Talal, the 
crown Prince of Jordan, stated that water consumption in the West Bank did not 
improve under occupation, as Israel controls the use of these vital resources. The use 
of water for agricultural purposes has remained at the 1967 level. Drilling of irrigation 
wells has been severely restricted in the West Bank since 1967, while the Israeli 
compan\ was given permission to drill 30 new wells there. Since 1967, only two new 
wells for agricultural use have been permitted to the people of the West Bank. The 
Israeli Water commission usually tries to show deficits in water availability in Israel, 
which is used as an argument in support of their claims on the water resources of the 
West Bank and neighboring areas.'" 
While Israel has sunk dozens of mostly deep well for settlements and for 
military camps, all Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories were supplied with 
running water, the Arab resistant have been denied permission to drill for water. On 
the other hand 51 percent of the Arab villages and Hamlets are deprived of such 
service and are obliged to rely on rain and spring water. 
Israel is over drafting its water resources at fifty percent beyond their natural 
replenishment rate, causing water table levels to drop swallow well to go dry. 
Nowhere have the effect of the over pumping been felt more than in the Gaza Strip. 
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Before 1967. iinregulaied pumping allowed scawater to contaminate the costal 
aquifer. The salinity caused citrus groves to shrivel and die. 
To enable Gaza water resources to replenish, annual water usage would have 
to be halved from the present consumption of 120 MCM to 60 MCM according to 
estimates of the West Bank data Base Project (WBDBP). But nobody seems will ing to 
accept drastic cuts. Accusing fingers are pointed in all directions. Israelis charge that 
anti quoted and inefficient Arab irrigation methods lose almost half of the water that 
enters the system a legitimate claim, but modem, efficient irrigation technology is out 
of the Arab financial grasp. To the Gazans, injustice lies in the water consumption of 
the 2,000 Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip, who consume 30 time more water per 
capita than do the 650,000 Arabs living there.'^'' 
In fact, in Israel, the main agricultural problem is scarcity of water. Water 
from the Jordan and Yarqan river sand from the Sea of Galilee is diverted by pipeline 
to arid areas in the south. Because of utilization of practically all of the country's 
potential water resources, further development of agriculture involves intensifying the 
yield from land already irrigated or obtaining more water by cloud seeding, reducing 
the amount of evaporation, desalinizing sea water and diverting water from the 
Occupied Territories. Indeed, ground water resources provide most of the water 
requirements on the densely inhabited Israeli coastal plain.(Sec Map no.31 ) 
Substantial parts i f not most, of these resources originate in rains, which fall during 
the winter months over the western slopes of the highlands of the West Bank. The 
rock formations of these high lands were flows deep underground westward towards 
the coastal plain. Some of these underground flows appear in Israeli territory in the 
form of large springs, which used to feed the few perennial revisers of the coastal 
plain. The springs and many hundreds of wells, all strictly controlled by an Israeli 
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national water authority, tap to the utmost the available ground water resources to 
meet the requirements of the Israeli population and its economic activities. ' 
As a matter of fact, the structure of the Palestinian agricultural sector has been 
shaken and many people deserted their land because of the restrictions imposed on its 
irrigation and utilization. Shortages of water for agriculture have led to a shapdrop in 
the amount of irrigated Arab West Bank land from 27 percent before 1967 to 37 
percent, now, under Shamir government Israeli settlers, on the other hand are 
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irvigaling 70 percent of ihcir farmland. ' 
Government subsidy allows water to reach Israeli farmers at a fiftN percent 
discount. On the West Bank Jewish settlements pay about one-fourth of what 
Palestinians pay for water Israel derives most of its water from the Jordan Ri\er and 
three underground aquifers the largest of which is located under the mountains of the 
West Bank the other two aquifers, situated within Israel's pre 1967 borders, ha\e been 
fully tapped.'^-
In the Gaza Strip, water consumption averages 100-120 mem per annum. 
Ninety percent of this total was used to irrigate 45 per cent of the Strip's agriculture; 
the remaining 10 percent was utilized for domestic consumption. Consistent over 
pumping in conjunction with advance ecological conditions, has lowered the water 
table and caused sea water to seep in. Consequently, water used for irrigation was 
becoming more saline and damaging the quality of Gaza's agriculture particularly 
citrus. In light of the critical water problems inside Gaza, the Israeli government, 
through its affiliated water company. Mekorot, has issued restrictions against the 
digging of new wells and has limited the amount of water utilized by Palestinian 
farmers. In Gaza farmers are limited 800 cubic meters per year for hard soil and 1000 
cubic meters per years for sand\ soil. Indeed, water quotas for Palestinians farmers 
have been tl.xed for over a decade, and over use can draw severe fmes. 
These same restrictions on water consumption however, do not apply to the 
Israeli settlement inside the Strip, which have installed thirty-five to forty new well 
during Shamir government's period. Gaza"s main water reservoir is located in the 
northern part of the Strip, where several Israeli settlements are located. Indeed, water 
consumption by Israeli settlers for exceeds that of Gaza. According to the Israeli 
Water Commission, in 1985 alone Israelis living in the Gaza Strip consumed 2,326 
cubic meters of water per capita, compared with an average consumption of 123 cubic 
meters for every Gazan. The water policies implemented by the Israeli government 
inside the Strip are plainly discriminatory and pose clear threats to the future of 
I S » 
Palestinian agriculture, especially to citrus production. 
There is a wise consumes that control of the territorial water resources is vital 
to Israel's well being. About 475 million cubic meters, i.e. One quarter of Israel's 
annual water potential originate in the West Bank. According to Meir Ben Meir, the 
water commissioner, one quarter of the water reaching Israeli kitchens and farms 
originates in the West Bank. The annual potential of the West Bank aquifers is 600 
million cubic meters of which Palestinian inhabitants are only allowed to use only 20 
million cubic meters, Israeli takes 95.5 percent and leaves the West Bank with 4.5 
percent. The inequality of the allocation of water of Jew and Arabs can be seen in the 
1990 plan in which 60 million cubic meters of water where available to 30 Israel-
agricultural settlements while 90 million will be available for 400 Palestinian 
villages.'^" 
Indeed, the confiscatory policy had supported the Israeli settlement and 
preserved the deteriorating water indigenous to the Occupied Territories. As with land 
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contlscatioii. this process escalated under the Likud government, with which in 1982 
transferred management ofthe water system from the military government to Israeli's 
national water company, Mekorot. Consequently, the quality and quantity of water 
available for domestic and agricultural consumption by the Occupied Territories have 
been made increasingly dependent on the consumption "requirement" of both Jewish 
settlers and Jewish Israelis requirements defined by Israel. Constraints on water usage 
imposed by Israel on Palestinian unchanged since. 
The authorities imposed a monopoly on water distribution and tightly 
monitored existing Arab wells. There were man> effects directly to the Palestinian 
people. One ofthe main results of Israel control over and removed ofthe water ofthe 
occupied Territories was a reduction in irrigated agricultural areas. It also becomes 
difficult for Palestinian farmers to intensify production. Many villages were left with 
no drinking water system and cities faced water shortages. ^{See Map no. 32 ) Lack 
of investment by Shamir and the National Unity government in the Occupied 
Territor) "s agriculture continued restrictions on export markets, unequal access to 
financial resources, increasing cost of agricultural production (particularly recurrent 
expenditures) and limitations on water usage have eliminated incentives for economic 
investment and have forced growing numbers of produces out of agriculture in to 
employment inside Israel. Consequently, these measures have undermined the 
potential for structural growth inside Gaza Strip and the West Bank economy and the 
possibility of promoting independent economic activity. The policies of Shamir 
contributing to the stead) destructing of Gaza Strip and the West Bank agricultural 
sector have had similar impact upon the territories industrial sector."*'' 
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Fable-4.1 
Comparative water consumption estimates 1989 (in million cubic meters unless 
specified otherwise) 
West Bank Gaza Total Israel Jordan 
lotdl consumption 
Agi ic i i l tu ic 
Domestic 
industry 
Avg population (1000) Per 
capita (m )^ 
Overall 
Domestic irrigated area 
Total (1000 dunums) 
% of cultivated area 
Source: 
1 Statistical Absti act ot Isiael 1990 pp 3 8 
2 VI Bilbaisi and \I Bam llani watci Rcsouiccs m lordan niocccdings ol i.i>nlci(.nc(. on waici 
RcbOLiKcs in the \iab\\oild Joidan Univcisit\ 1987 p ""^  
3 Y Abu \lailc llK Watci PioblcminGd/a 1990 p4 
4 Dtpaitmcnts ot AgiicultLiic in the West Bank and da/a 
Isiael's restrictive and exploitative domination ot water lesouiees in the Occupied 
Territories has gra\el\ affected the social and economic undei pinning ot the 
Palestinian societN I he most \isible consequence is the consideiabK iowci per capita 
consumption in the teriitoiies vis-a-vis Israel and Jordan 
The data m table 1 indicate that per capita domestic consumption in the 
occtipicd tciiitoiies amotints to 33% that ol Isiael and that the lalio ol aica undci 
iiiigation IS about one-filth that ot Isiael Consumption levels aic also Lonsidciabl) 
lower than in Jordan 1 he impact of these shortages on Palestinians quality ot lite and 
the productive potential of their agiiculture ate certamK grave 
In the Occupied Iciiitories, the Palestinians have occasionall> pioicstcd 
against Israeli exploitation ot undeiground water resources to supplement supplies 
inside Israel proper and irrigate Jewish settlements The Palesti mans have little powei 
to do any thing but watch hundreds of their pre 1967 spiings and wells giaduallv 
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turned aiilhoriiies have highly sophisticated water pumping and transport systems to 
irrigate the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Str ip . ' " 
However, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) passed a 
Resolution on 19'*" December 1983 (Resolution No. 144) during Shamir llrst 
government, condemning Israel for her exploitation of the natural resources of the 
Occupied Territories and calling upon all states international organizations and other 
institutions not to recognize or cooperate with or assist in any manner the measure 
under taken b\ Israel to exploit these resources or to effect any changes in the 
structure of those territories.'^^ 
Israeli Economy under Shamir 
During the second half of 1983 after Shamir assumed the premiership, the 
monetary crisis emerged as the main cause of the Government's declining popularity. 
There were a number of reasons for this. Partly responsible was the policy of the 
Minister of Finance Yoram Aridor. in maintaining an artificially high valuation of the 
shekel, with result that exports become less profitable and failed to increase in 1982 
and 1983, while imports rose as the exchange rate made them cheaper. Excessive 
spending by the Government was also a significant factor Israel gross national product 
(GNP), measured in constraint prices, registered no growth in 1982 and increased by 
less than 1% in 1983. The countr\"s foreign debt at the end of 1983 was. at $ 22,566 
m. the highest per head of population ($ 5550) in the world. 
A number of more immediate factors exacerbated the deleterious effect on the 
economy of long-term government policy during 1983. Defense expenditure, already 
absorbing one quarter of the budget, increased as a result of commitments in Lebanon, 
costing aboutSl m. per day; the West Bank settlement programme and a four-month 
strike of the nation's doctors added to the economic burden."*"^ The crisis led to the 
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rcsigiiiilion ol' llic Minister of l"inance Yorani Ariclor in October 1983. I ho now 
Finance Minister who came to replace Aridor was Yigai Cohen Orgard. 1 le concerned 
over the effects of cuts in social services and increased in the price of food and caused 
growing labour unrest. Turther uproar greeted a plan virtually to freeze the 
programme of creating Jewish settlement on the Occupied Territories in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to save money at the beginning of 1984. 
Beside cabinet opposition Cohen Orgard's policies were greeted with 
increasing labour unrest as intlalion accelerated to 190% at the end of 1983. A new 
round of price increased in January 1984. coupled with the reduction of food 
subsidies, meant that food prices had trebled in three months. The Government 
approved a 46.5% cost of living increment for wage earners in January amounting to 
85% of the increase in inilalion during the preceding quarter. 
In March 1984, the real value of wages fell by 25% Cohen Orgard allowed the 
shekel to depreciate in line with inflation. The control of inflation however, was no 
longer Shamir's go\ernment principle aim and as a result, the annual rale had risen 
from under 150% when Cohen Orgard assumed in October 1983 to about 400"'o in 
July 1984.'" 
Under tlie Niitional Unify Government 
'I he new government which included a new Minister of Finance llxhak Modai, 
immediately requested more aid from the USA including $ 1,000 m., unrelated to 
Israel's annual grant to be paid at once.''^" the US government, however, promised to 
grant additional aid if Israel reduced government spending and introduced a 
comprehensive programme of economic austerilN to curb inilalion and reduce the 
balance of payments deficit. 
UG 
'Ihc new government made two attempts to patch over the clinicuh economic 
problems b)' negotiating a "pacicage deal" among labour unions, employers and 
government. Only in June 1985, faced with a growing magnitude of foreign currency 
outflow and loss of control over the inflationary process, the Prime Minister and 
Minister of Finance joint!) nominated a professional team of economists, headed by 
the Director General of the Ministry of Finance, to design a new economic 
programme. The team was given three weeks for its deliberations, and its programme 
was approved by the goxernment in July 1985. '" 
On the eve of the introduction of the new "package", the cabinet agreed a 
budget for the year 1985/1986 involving planned expenditure of $ 23,300 m., some 
what more than that for 1984-85 with the cuts in spending ($ 1,300m.) considerably 
less than the amount for which Itzhak Modai had been arguing. 
The second ''package" of economic measures was introduced on 4 Fcbruar> 
1985. However, consumer prices rose by 13.5% in February 12.1 percent in March 19 
percent in Apri l , 6.8 percent in May and 14.9 percent in June an annual rale of more 
than 300 percent. The country's reserves of foreign exchange, which felt to $ 2601 m. 
at the end of 1984 continued to dwindle. 
'fhe programme relied on a wide national consensus to initiate a fall in public 
and private consumption in order to halt the accelerating spiral of price rises, 
devaluations and wage adjustments, bringing inflation from a 25 percent a month 
level to a target of virtually nil. To achieve such an ambitious goal, the plan had to be 
drastic and comprehensive and achieve a major impact on public expectations. The 
programme announced several simultaneous steps; the budget dellcit was cut b} $ 1.5 
billion (7.5 percent of GDP). The Israeli shekel was devalued by 20 percent and 
export subsidies as well as import duties were reduced. The Cost of Living 
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AdJListmcnl (COLA) agreement was temporarily suspended and all shekel 
denominated aggregates were frozen. These included price control, wage freeze, and 
rate of exchange pegging and credit restrictions. Finally, the indexed or dollar-linked 
instruments remained, but their liquidity was drastically reduced. The US government 
granted a special aid for the achievement of the programme.''''' 
The effect of the economic stabilization programme, launched in July 1985 
continued to be fell in controlling the rate of inflation which in October was 4.7 
percent in 'November 0.5 percent and in December 1.4 percent giving an overall rate 
for 1985 and the end of the year the real value of wages fall by about 25%, and in 
February 1986 the Histadrut (The General Federation of workers in the land of Israel) 
called a strike of public sector employees to protest against the continuation of 
stringent monetary policy in the 1986-87 budget. Inflation, however, remained under 
control, with consumer prices falling by 13 percent in January (the first monthly 
decline for more than a decade) and rising by 1.6 percent in February.'^' 
fwo areas o\' obvious success of the 1985 programme were in arresting 
inflation and reduced from 118 percent in the following half year 19.6 percent the 
calendar year 1986, 16.1 percent in 1987, and 16.4 percent in 1988 and 20.2 percent 
in 1989. The public sector budgetary deficit (and therefore infusion) measured by the 
excess of local spending over revenues dropped from over 7 percent of GDI^  in the 
first half of 1985, to zero in the second half. In 1986 and 1987, the budget showed 
surplus, and therefore negative infusion. The rapid and decisive sectors contributed to 
the success. US government's aid eased the pressures on the balance of payments 
front and allowed a foreign exchanges freeze. Also helpful were the exchange rale 
erosion of the dollar compared to other currencies and the wage erosion as well as the 
reduction in oil prices. The major impact of the plan was achieved by the ability to 
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maintain llscal restraint. Instead of being an injector of fmuls into the economy, the 
public sector cireu funds out of the economy at a rapid rate.''"' 
However, the situation of Israeli economy made Shimon Press, the Prime 
Minister of the National Unity government from Labour party, unexpectedly 
advocated economic growth. The Minister of Finance Itzhak Modai criticized Peres, 
accusing him of endangering the success of the economic stabilization programme. 
Finally, in April 1986, Modai was exchanged portfolios with Moshe Nissim the 
Minister of Justice. 
Under Shamir as a Prime Minister of the National Unity government a 
combination of wage rises, a 10 percent fall in exports during the last quarter of 1986, 
and an increase in the level of imported consumer goods, threatened to offset the 
benetlls of the government's authorit\ measures. 'I he rate of intlation rose to 2.4 
percent in October, and to 2.9 percent in November, it fell to 1.5 percent in December, 
but rose to 2.9 in January 1987. However the success of the government's austerity 
programmes and the injections of US aid into the econom> was evidenced by an 
overall intlalion rate of 19.7 percent in 1986 (compared with 185.2 percent in 1985 
and 444.9 percent in 1984) a surplus of $ 1.371 m. in the current account of the 
balance of payments in fiscal 1986, and an increase in reserves of foreign exchange, 
to $ 4,200 m. After initial opposition, a new progrmme of measures was introduced in 
January 1987 with the approval of the manufactures association and the llistadrul.'' 
Moshe Nissim's Economic Programme 
The new (ten points) economic programme was devised b\ Moshe Nissim, the 
Minister of Finance.''^'* Total recommended reductions of planned expenditure b\ 500 
m. new shekels in the 1987-88 budget were restricted to 400 m. new shekels after a 
proposed reduction of 180 m. new shekels in the defense budget had been 
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successfully resisted in the Cabinet, but they included a cut of more than 100 m. new 
shekels in government subsidies on basic commodities. In addition there were to be 
large reduction in spending on health, education and social welfare; a major reform of 
the tax system to encourage capital investment; a wages "freeze"; a partial de-
indexation of cost living payments, reducing the level of compensation of cost-of-
living payments reducing the level of compensation from 70 percent to 43 percent of 
rises in prices; and reductions in the public sector work force. The programme was 
introduced in two stages, in January and on 1 Apri l, and the arrangements for 
controlling prices were to remain in force until April 1988. On 12 January the cabinet 
approved a budget of 39,300 m. new shekels for the fiscal year 1987-88 incorporating 
spending cuts of 400 m. new shekels. Two day later, the shekel was devalued by 10.2 
% in relation to a "basket" of five international currencies (the shekel, which had 
formerly been aligned with US dollar, was linked with a "basket" of currencies in July 
1986, in an attempt to prevent wide fluctuations in the exchange rate and to stabilize 
returns from foreign trade). In April 1987 the Knesset approved the state budget for 
1987-88 in the form in which it had been presented by the Shamir's government. ' 
During 1987, Shamir's National Unity government continued the economic 
programme which to restrain inflation. At the end of 1987 the overall rate of inflation 
for the preceding 12 months was 16.1 percent the lowest annual rate for 15 }ears. 
Israel's reserves of foreign exchange rose to $5,700 m, in November 1987 on receipt 
of the US economic aid grant for the fiscal year 1987-88, totaling $ 1,200 m. At the 
end of 1987 Moshe Nissim, claimed that Israel's real GDP was grovving at a rate of 
more than 4 percent per year, compared with only 2.2 percent in 1986. 
Unemployment which as a result of the shedding of thousands of public sector job by 
government in a cost saving exercise, during the whole of 1987 rose by 3 percent in 
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the industrial sector and industrial output rose by 5 percent, the visible trade dciicit 
increased b\ 36.5 percent to S 3228.6 m. incorporation an l<S.6 percent rose in the 
revel of exports and balance of payments rose by 55 percent to $ 6,200 m. largely 
owing to a 200 percent increase in the cost of security imports, to $ 2700 m. Israeli's 
foreign debt rose to 3300 m. at the end of 1987.-"" 
In I'cbruary 1988. the Cabinet approved a supplemcnlar) budget, allowing for 
additional expenditure of 1,160 m. new shekels in the period December 1987 to 
March 1988, which was made necessary by increased spending on security in the 
Occupied 'I'errilorics wage rises, an increase in slate subsidies and the failure to 
implement decisions to reduce spending on health and education. Although 
expenditure had risen beyond the limits of the original budget, income had meanwhile 
risen by 1,500 m. new shekels largely owing to an increase in tax collection and 
growth in economic acti\ it>. 
Owing to excessive reliance on the •"frozen"' exchange rate polic_\. the 
economy lapsed into an unplanned recession in 1988. Mowever this policy failed to 
achieve its main largest of reducing the rate of inflation, which at 16.4 percent was 
close to that of 1987. In November and December expectation of a devaluation of the 
shekel intensified. The reaction of the private sector was to make purchases of foreign 
currency, financed mainl\ by drawing on shekel deposits. This gave rise to an 
increase in short-term credit, causing the Bank ol" Israel to abandon its policy of 
reducing interest rates. In an attempt to prevent the devaluation of profits financed by 
short term borrowing the rate of interest on Bank of Israel monetary tenders was 
raised to a second level of 48 percent.""' 
Ml 
Shamir's last term Economic Policy 
The new National Unity government of 1988 elections, which led b\ Yitzhak 
Shamir as a Prime Minister and Shimon Peres as a new Minister of i-'inance, presented 
a new economic programme in January 1989. Under the new programme, the shekel 
was devalued by 13.4 percent and exchange rate policy was made more flexible by 
permitting an adjustment of up to 3 percent above and below the basic exchange rate. 
In addition, the commitment to non-intervention in the exchange rate, which had 
prevailed since 1985, was abandoned. Import duties were reduced in accordance with 
trade agreements, and exchange rate insurance for exporters was lowered from 12 
percent to 10 percent. The new programme envisaged a reduction of about 100 m. 
new shekels in the budget deficit in an attempt to reduce the domestic deficit from 
some 3.5 percent of GDP in 1988 to i .5 percent -2 percent in 1989. This was to be 
achieved through reductions in planned expenditure and increased in revenue. 
The new programme was also in an attempt to neutralize the inflationary 
effects on real wage rises. The cost of living agreement (COLA) was intended to 
maintain the exchange rate at a level appropriate to the renewal of export growth. 
Within the framework of the new economic programme the Bank of Israel adopted 
various expansionary measures intended to reduce the cost of credit. Despite all these 
measures 1989 was characterized by relatively stack economic activity for the second 
consecutive year. Real GDP rose by a mere 0.4 percent, following an increase of 1.6 
percent in 1988.^"' 
The economic developments during 1989 showed that in the first half of the 
GDP rose by 0.6 percent compared with the second half of 1989 recorded a 1.5 
percent increase over the first half-year. Improved business sector prolltability 
brought a transformation in the development of industrial production, which has been 
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on an upward trend since the second quarter of 1989. Export of goods also recorded in 
signitlcanl increases (9.2 percent). Towards the end of 1989, a rise in fi.xed 
investment, became apparent, following a two-year decline. Private consumption 
remained stable. The consumer prices rose by 20.7 percent in the 12 months to 
December 1989. 
However, one major challenge facing the Israeli economy was mass 
immigration from the former USSR. Consequently a large number of Jews moved out 
of the country to Israel in 1990. The number of Jewish immigrants to Israel was 
181759. which was largest annual figure since 1951. In following year i.e. 1991. 
about 135551 came and it was expected that by 1995 about one million of them would 
be reaching to Israel. A million immigrants did not mean only revolution in Israeli 
cconom\. it mean that Israel in need to build a new Israeli economy which more 
advanced high tech, more competitive than before.'*^ 
During 1990 the Israeli economy began to emerge from recession. GDP 
expanded, in real terms, by 5.7 percent, following the low growth rates of 1988 and 
1989, and totaled 1,303,269 m. new shekels, 'fhis improvement was given impetus by 
the mounting wave of immigration from the USSR. 
The second important development to affect the Israeli economy was the crisis 
in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf region during the second half of 1990. The Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and its aftermath affected prospects for economic 
growth in Israel in a number of areas; there was a drastic decline in the number of 
tourist arrival: a substantial rise in fuel prices: a significant increase in expenditure on 
defense, and a postponement of investment projects. The capital market's reaction to 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was made evident a fall in share prices similar to that 
recorded in the capital market of most Western countries. More over, Iraqi attacks 
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with Scud missiles on Israel during January and February 1991, paralyzed part of the 
economy and for a few days brought it to an almost complete stand still, even after a 
return to normal activity was declared 
The third factor in influence economic development was the political crisis, 
which erupted in March 1990 and was to last for two months. The crisis ended in 
April, when President Herzog invited Yitzhak Shamir to form a new coalition 
government without the participation of the Labour party. The new government was 
eventually formed in early June resulting in a considerable delay in the formulation of 
policies for the construction industry and immigration. 
During 1991 the Israeli economy continued to grow and it became apparent 
that damage caused by the 1990/91 crisis in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf region had 
been only temporary (it is estimated that the conflict in the Gulf cost the Israeli 
economy some $ 2,000 m. but this was made good during the course of 1991) GDP 
expanded in real terms, by 5.9 percent, totaling 134,756 m. new shekels. Investment 
in fixed assets increased substantially by 41.8 percent reaching 31,958 m. new shekels 
while stocks rose by 134 percent. Private consumption, which accounted for 61 
percent of (GDP) increased by 7.6 percent. As a result of the e-xpansion of economic 
activity in 1991 there was a shop size of 15.8 percent in imports of goods and 
services. The value of exports however, expressed in real terms, had declined by 2.3 
percent. Meanwhile the rapid absorption of immigrants into the Labour force caused 
unemployment to rise and the erosion of salaries in real term. 
In 1992, the last year of Shamir's government, the Israeli economy grew at a 
rate not recorded since the early 1970s. Fuelled by high levels demand for Israeli 
exports and high rates of pubic and private consumption was that GDP expanded by 
6.6 percent and business sector GDP by 7.9 percent. Gross investment increased by 
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7.6 percent reaching 39,814 m. new shekels al'lcr spectacular 45 percent increase in 
1991. High economic growth rate and other positive economic developments 
generated a bullish trend in the stock market 1992 being a record year for securities 
trading. The Tel Aviv stock exchange share index (excluding banks) rose b\ 91 
percent. The daily volume of shares traded on Stock Exchange reached $ 45 m. an 
increase of 55 percent over 1991.'"' 
Shamir's Economic Policy towards the Occui)icd Territories 
As same as Begin's government, Shamir's government strivcd to harness the 
economic resources and labour power of the indigenous Palestinians in the service 
Israeli economy. Although officially considered independent economic unit, the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank have been forced through the former government policies, 
into integration into Israel's economic system. As a matter of fact, the occupation had 
helped transform Israel into state with an imperial economy, relying for its well being 
on the captive human and material resources of the Occupied Territories. Moreover, 
Israeli government had taken control of the service infrastructure of the West Bank 
and Gaza, confiscated Palestinian land and water resources exploited and degraded 
Palestinian labour help the Occupied Territories as a captive market, and restricted 
their external trade. 
During Shamir's government, there was slower improvement in comparison 
with the continuing rise in the Israeli standard of living, there was virtually no 
improvement in the West Bank and there was a decline in Gaza Strip. At the same 
time, number of those working in Israel increased in order to provide for the growing 
population and to maintain the gains in living conditions. In the Occupied Territories 
the rapid growth in population and education was high, but the real growth in the 
economy was slow, little change in local employment opportunities and only slight 
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improvement in ihe standard of living, with that due ahnost entirely to employment in 
Israel. The combined gross domestic product of the two territories in only 5.4 percent 
of the Israeli gross domestic product. 
During the early 1980s until the outbreak of Intifada in 1987, this period was 
characterized by stagnation and declining employment opportunities. The collapse of 
the regional oil boom promoted a decline in worker, remittances f;om the Gulf. While 
continued growth in Israel was virtually flat in the mid 1980s. Beginning with 
Intifada, employment for Palestinians in manufacturing and services declined. This 
decline was offset by a rise in construction employment in response to an Israeli 
housing boom resulting from a surge in immigration. However recession and near 
hyperinflation in Israel had a serious impact on the 35 percent of the Palestinian 
labour force employed in Israel, and on the majority of Palestinian trade with Israel. 
Once work opportunities abroad declined there was increased pressure to employ 
workers at home. 
For the late of 1980s until the last term of Shamir's government in 1992, out 
put declined as the Intifada continued due to strikes and repression of economic 
activity. Political and economic uncertainly prevailed. A recovery in 1992, apparently 
fueled by draw dons of savings and expectations of peace, was followed by a renewed 
decline in 1993.^ °^  
The Israeli economic policy under Shamir from the beginning of his 
premiership up to the outbreak of the Intifada was based on directly or indirectly 
economic activities in five areas. 
1. Reducing the sources of growth in the Palestinian economy 
2. Controlling the course of Palestinian investment. 
3. Control lint: external trade 
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4. Neglecting the Palestinian economic infrastrLicture and. 
5. Levying excessive taxes 
I. Reducing Sources of Growth in Palestinian Economy 
The Israeli government reduced growth in the Palestinian economy and 
prevented Palestinians from freely utilizing their material and human 
resources. Their policy was done by restricting the use of land and water, 
impeding capital accumulation, and reinforcing distortions in professional 
training. 
( I . I ) The restriction on land use and control over water, this policy, as already 
mentioned in Shamir's land policy and water resource policy. The Israeli 
government seized more than 65 percent of the West Bank and 50 percent of 
Gaza Strip from Palestinian people, and designed and carried out land use plans 
in accordance with geotropic and economic interests without any consideration 
for Palestinian interest. On the other hand, the Israeli government imposed a 
monopol) on water distribution and tightly monitored existing Arab wells, 'fhis 
enabled them to move more than 450 million cubic meters of the West Bank 
supply or 78 percent of renewable waters in 1987. Some 30-60 million cubic 
meters of Gaza Strip water annually, or close to one third of its renewable water 
supply.""' In 1990, the amount of water supply from the West Bank rose to 600 
million cubic meters and Palestinian allowed using 20 million cubic meters or 
about 95.5% taken by I srael and 4.5 % for Palestinian people. However in 
1989, the amount of water left for various uses by the Palestinians did not 
exceed 120 million cubic meters in the West Bank and 100 million cubic meters 
in the Gaza Strip. The result of their policy was reduction in irrigated 
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agrieuluiial areas ol' Palestinian former, which was dinieiill for them to 
inicnsitv production." 
(1.2) Deny the means for capital accumulation. 
The Israeli government closed down Arab banks operated in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip to prevent the creation of an\ Palestinian fmancia! institution with 
banking functions. Indeed, individual saving remained scattered in the society rather 
than being pumped back into the economy in the form of investment. With no 
national banking system, it became too difdcult for individual saving to make their 
way into productive local investment. This step had severed economic con.sequences 
as it denied the Occupied Territories the instruments and means of capital 
accumulation, indispensable to the development of contemporary economies. A side 
from this, the value policy, the unavailability of means for amassing savings and 
preserving their value against inflation usually pushes their owners to spend them 
quickl\- b\ smuggling them abroad or by purchasing consumer products and precious 
jewelr\. 1 hese uses of savings have negative effects on the national economy. 
On the other hand the Israeli government allowed Israeli bank to open its 
branches in the occupied Territories. This step was meant to make it easier for Israeli 
businessmen to control their market and for the Israeli authorities to collect taxes and 
pay the Solaris of the Palestinian employees of the government."'" 
(1.3). Reinforcing Distortions in Professional Training 
The Israeli policy of occupation in the area of training Palestinian human 
resources may be summarized as the willful reinforcement of distortions inherited 
from the Jordanian administration of the West Bank and the Egyptian administration 
of the Gaza Strip. The existing educational system suited Israeli policy perfectly. The 
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authorities niainly intervened in curricula when the latter contradicted Israeli and 
Zionist political and historical myths. 
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), Jordanian and 
Egyptian educational policies in the Palestinian land, were directed toward the 
production of large numbers of Palestinian students who could be exported as clerks, 
employees, and teachers in Arab administrations or university graduates who would 
also be likely to emigrate. In fact what the West Bank and Gaza Strip lacked were 
vocational training programmers in agriculture and industry. The condition led to the 
creations of successive waves of graduate qualified for leaving their homeland. It was 
a reason that why the occupation authorities tolerated the expansion of university 
education. The authorities refused to change the situation; they refused to give an 
admission to develop a school of agriculture, for example in case of An-Najah 
National University in Nablus. However, whenever overwhelming Israeli economic 
interest required the authorities consented to open vocational centers attached to 
labour exchange bureaus so as to provide crash training for the Palestinian labour 
force in Israeli factories.^" 
2. Controlling the course of Investment 
The occupation authorities imposed direct control over the course of investment in 
the Occupied Territories by maintaining the right to accept or reject every investment 
project in every economic field. Thus, the establishment of an) company in industry, 
agriculture, tourism or commerce requires prior approval by permit. Usually, permit 
application are granted or refused based on the economic and political interests of the 
occupation. Any projects, which would strengthen the Palestinian productive base and 
deemed "threatening" to Israeli economic interest, were routinely rejected. Most 
agricultural projects and all projects for electricity production and water storage have 
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been reject, as well as the cooperative housing projects and thousand ol'construction 
permits also, were refused annually. 
3. Controlling External Trade 
For more than twenty years almost all export of the Palestinian good from the 
Occupied Territories to any place in the world e.xcept Jordan, were banned by Israeli 
government. The authorities imposed tight control over the external trade of the 
Occupied Territories. After the outbreak of the Intifada the ban was lifted, especially 
the unavailability of Western European markets was concern, although bureaucratic 
obstacles and probably even sabotage have limit the impact of their new avenue of 
trade.''^ 
4. Neglecting the Palestinian Economic Infrastructure 
The Israeli authorities subjected the development of the Palestinian economic 
infrastructure to their will through the monopoly on land, energy, water and 
transportation planning. The result of this policy was purposeful neglect in violation 
of their duties as the de facto authority. 
Man\ irrigation projects have been blocked, municipal planning strictly limited, 
and the creation of industrial zones stymied. On the other hand, the Israeli settlements 
in the Occupied Territories were equipped with complete infrastructure of roads, 
electricity, water and telephones. In the process, no consideration was given to the 
interests of the Palestinian population. '^^  
5. Lex'jing Excessive Taxes 
While military government spending on basic services and infrastructure was 
strictly limited, its budget was swollen by repeated amendments to the income tax 
law, the position of the value added tax, and continuous increases in prices of various 
permits and procedures, including travel. In 1984 the military government's revenue 
250 
from only two sources, income tax and net direct taxes on local production, equaled 
12 percent of the Occupied Territories GDP. Those two sources alone covered all of 
its budget expenses. As result, budget revenues from other sources were transferred to 
the Israeli government treasury a net gain of 150 million. Economically, such tax 
policies further limited Palestinian incomes demand and investment."'^ 
Shamir's Economic Policy in Areas of complementary 
The economic policy of Shamir and the National Unity government occurred 
to cooperation in areas of common interest to both sides. The scope and magnitude of 
complementary that exists or may exist between cooperating partners have been the 
key determinates to the level cooperation. 
There were four sectors that are of special prominence to the Occupied 
Territories and Shamir government namely trade, agriculture, industry and tourism. 
Trade 
Obviously, inequitable bilateral terms of trade between Israel and the 
Occupied Territories have given rise to a typically colonial subjugation of 
Palestinian's economy to that of Israel. The Israeli lopsided policies in regard to the 
territories industrial and agricultural sectors have precipitated large gains. Israeli 
exports to the West Bank and Gaza Strip grew steadily up to $ 961 million in 1987, 
which added up to91% of the territories total imports. By contrast, the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip exports to Israel amounted in the same year $ 304 million. This leaves 
Israel with a substantial surplus in its commodity trade with the territories, amounting 
in 1987 to $ 657 million (see table 4.2) in addition to being a major market, especially 
for certain goods, the territories provide Israeli exports with the distinctive advantages 
of operating in a captive market that is rigidly sealed against competing trade, and 
with which they incur negligible transportation costs. 
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ilrics 
90.0 
15.8 
80.6 
93.3 
44.8 
58.9 
3.3 
'I'otal 
1051.2 
130.2 
764.0 
397.0 
75.2 
303.1 
(-) 654.2 
Tabic 4.2 
Summary of external commodity trade * - 1987 (U.S. S million) 
Israel Other count e
Imports-total 961.2 
Agriculture 114.4 
Industrial 683.4 
Exports - total 303.7 
Agricultural 30.4 
Industrial 244.2 
Balance (-) 657.5 
*Does not include trade with liast .lerusalem (population around 138.000 i.e. 14% of the West Bank 
an J Ga/a) 
Source: Statistical .Abstract of Israel, 1990. p. 717 .ludea. Samaria and Gaza Area Statistics. 1987 (3). 
Commodity breakdown of trade for 1986 show that 86% of all Israeli exports 
10 the Occupied Territories were classified or industrial, and only 14% are agricultural 
(see table 4.2). 
Trade in Labour services constitutes one of the fundamental facets of relations 
between Israel and the Occupied Territories. Since the early year of occupation, Israel 
has become avenue for around 35% - 40% of the Labour force in the Occupied 
Territories. Base on Israeli statistical data, wage earnings received by Palestinians in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip amounted in 1987 to approximately U.S. $ 466 million, 
i.e. 18.7% of the territories GDP for that years."'^ 
The Bilateral trade between the Occupied Territories and Israel however, was 
severely restricted in the wake of the Intifada. The Palestinians imposed a strict 
boycott on all Israeli goods that can be substituted by local produce. Consequently, 
imports from Israel dropped markedly during the Intifada possibly by around one-
third of their 1987 level. 
Agriculture 
Agriculture plays a unique role in the economic, social and political life of 
both Jews and Palestinians. Agriculture is the primary user of land and water 
resources both of which lie at the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Excessive 
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polarization of agriculture may have its own justifying rationale for both people, tlic> 
should be aware of the economic implications to their agricultural policies. 
The cooperation between the both sides, notwithstanding in the complex non-
economic ramifications, the economic setting of agriculture differs markedly on both 
sides of the green line. This was vividly illustrated, for instance, by shape differences 
in agriculture's contribution in gross domestic product for 1987: 5% in Israel and 26% 
in the Occupied 'fcrritories. share of labour force 5.2% and 22% in the Occupied 
Territories and share in total exports 7.5% and 28% in the Occupied Territories."'^ 
Palestinian agriculture has been subject to far reaching transformations during 
the occupation period. Among the most significant of these were changes in the 
labour market, technological transfer and capitalization shortages, but the 
transformations in external agricultural trade played a particularly significant role in 
shaping Palestinian agriculture. 
fhe aforementioned transformations have reflected in a substantial way on the 
volume of Palestinian agricultural produce shipped to Jordan and neighboring Arab 
countries, which dropped from over 200,000 tons per year during 1975-84 only 
42,000 tons in 1989. 
Competition between Palestinians and Israeli producers in markets on either 
side of the green line has never been equitable. In addition to direct regulatory 
discrimination aimed at establishing nearly on-way traffic in agricultural trade. Israeli 
producers enjoy the additional advantages of lavish subsidies and access to a highly 
developed system of supportive services. Inequitable competition has thus, accorded 
Israel a lucrative surplus on its agricultural trade with the territories amounting in 
1986 to $84 mill ion.' '^ 
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Industry 
Industrs did not play a significant role in the economy of the Occupied 
Territories its contribution to territories GDP amounted in 1988 to 7.5% and its share 
of the employed lobour force was 15.9% in addition to being noticeably low fraction 
of GDP, these rations point to a relatively low productivity. The bulk of existing 
industrial firms consist of household service or artisan workshops, operated and 
financed mainl> by their owners. A recent survey of West Bank industries has 
revealed that 88% of all firm that emplo\ fewer than eight workers and 67% of firms 
that employ eight workers or more, are owned by individuals. Around 93% of all 
industrial firms in the Occupied Territories employ then workers or fewer. The 
average total seized of investment for firms that employ fewer than eight workers U.S 
$ 16.200 and for those that employ eight or more workers it was U.S. Si92000 per 
firm. Counting on the size of investment per worker, there add up to U.S $ 4,418 and 
US S 10,168 respectively.-''^ 
The Palestinian industrial section has undergone profound transformations 
following the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987. Indirect response to the 
boNCOtt declared on substitutable Israeli products occupation authorities escalated 
their regulator) restrictions relative to the entry of Palestinian products. The damage 
was further aggravated by numerous "security" measures that were targeted to quell 
the Intifada. Many such measures had direct economic bearing, such as curfew and 
roadblocks, but the most vicious on them was resorting to exorbitant tax polices that 
were of clearly punitive nature. 
One year after turbulent period, which many firms went out of business, the 
majority of industrial firms in the Occupied Territories have succeeded in serving 
Israeli sanctions. Following the shock of the first year after the Intifada most 
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industrial tirnis have managed to tai<e advantage of the massive protection generated 
as a consequence of the boycott policies enforced by the uprising command.^''' 
Tourism 
After June 1967 occupation, tourism in the West Bank witnessed rapid 
growth. This was facilitated by the complementary nature of tourism between both 
parts of Jordan, West and East Bank. Tourists found it particularly attentive to be able 
to visit within one country such a combination of sites as the Petra Jerash in the East 
Bank, and the unique collection of religious sites in the West Bank. 
Tourism in the Occupied Territories and Israel has been subject to far reaching 
consequence in the work of Israeli occupation. Most important, traffic between the 
East and West Bank of Jordan was drastically obstructed after it had been completely 
free. By contrast, Israelis and foreign tourists in Israel have been permitted 
unconditional entry into the Territories across the green line after nearly two decades 
of closed borders. This has accorded Israel the unprecedented opportunity of 
launching vigorous marketing campaigns, this time promoting itself as the "Holy 
Land"; Israel's tourism potential grew further following the signing of the Camp 
David accords. The number of tourists visiting Israel rose from 114,000 in I960 to 
record 1.379,000 in 1987. Hotel rooms rose for 6,501 in 1960 to 32,028 in 1987. In 
1990, foreign currency earnings from tourism amounted to U.S. $1,080 million which 
was equivalent to 11% of Israel's total exports. The overall contribution of tourism in 
Israel's GNP during the same year was estimated at 3.8%. 
In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, tourism stagnated markedly during the 
occupation period. It was true that the number of tourists vesting both territories had 
probably continued to rise. They were handicapped by numerous problems and 
constraints. Most important, Palestinian tourism firms and institutions were denied 
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access lo financial resources marl<eting campaigns, training and manpower 
development facilities and proper planning by a Palestinian sovereign authority.""' 
The impact of all these problem and constraints on Palestinian tourism was 
disastrous. This was evidenced, for instance by a noticeable decline in the number of 
hotels and the bed capacity in West Bank hotels. The number of West Bank hotel 
dropped during 1970-1987 from twenty-nine to eighteen, the number of beds from 
868 to 807. and number of person-nights from 84,590 to 39,272. 
The Tourism industry was hit very hard following the outbreak of the 
Palestinian uprising. This was expected in light of the excessive sensitivity of this 
sector to political unrest and security hazards. Compared with 1987, the number of 
tourists visiting declined by 15% in 1988 and by 14.7 in 1989. The consequences on 
Palestinian tourism, however were much worse Tourists have become considerably 
more concerned for their safely in East Jerusalem and Bethlehem, as well as in other 
parts of the Occupied Territories. For obvious discriminatory purposes, such fears 
were over exaggerated by Israeli authority. 
Tourism was the economic sector that reflected the highest degree of 
complementarily between the Occupied Territories and Israeli. The two entities 
constitute a wealth of tourism attractions that qualify them for a Leading position in 
international tourism. 
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CHAPTER - V 
The world of Revisionist Zealotry has its day and it 
should fade into history. The Irgun and Lehi belong to 
the mythology of the past. For Likud it is the right time 
to reconsider the reality of today and the party's policies 
toward the Occupied Territories and its neighboring 
countries. The ideological struggle to retain Eretz Israel 
in its entirety has lost all its relevance in the changed 
political scenario and should be completely abandoned in 
the larger interest of peace and security in the region. 
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Chapter-V 
Conclusion 
Likud's victory in the 1977 elections which made Begin the first non-Labour 
prime minister of Israel, marked a turning point in Israeli history. The heirs of 
Revisionist Zionism and its proponents were given their first opportunity to turn their 
ideology into operative policy. This came about after more than fifty years in the 
opposition (since 1925) where their direct influence on Zionist policy was marginal or 
nil. This dramatic change in the political status of the Zionist "right" made a new era 
for a ftandamental and major historical case within the context of the history of 
Zionism and the state of Israel. One could see this as the Likud's historical purpose 
which was no longer based so much on the Jabotinskyite creed as it was on the 
venting frustration and rage against its opposite party. 
The Likud had a clear, firm nationalist ideology. It was therefore quite 
reasonable to assume that this ideology would provide the direction for its policies or 
that Likud would at least make a concerted effort to provide historical justification for 
its basic outlook. Many of the acts of the Likud governments from the election of 
1977 up to 1992 the last year of Shamir's government, have been rightly judged in the 
light of their relevance to Likud's ideology and principles. 
The first Likud government seemed called upon to actuate the world view of 
the Revisionist movement and to carry out its ideology according to a declared 
political policy. That is, it appeared obligated to immediately apply Israeli sovereignty 
to the Occupied Territories. Indeed under different circumstances, it later did this in 
Golan Height and East Jerusalem. In fact in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria as 
they always called) a much more central position in Revisionist ideology than the 
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Golan Heights, the logical natural move from the point of view of Herut and its 
associates was not made. 
It was said that "the right of the Jewish people to Eretz Israel is an eternal in 
inalienable right" but there was no positive statement about applying Israeli 
sovereignty. The phrasing was of a distinctly negative nature. 
1. Judea and Samaria (The West Bank) will not be handed over to any foreign 
rule. 
2. Between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River there will be only Israeli 
sovereignty. 
Thus, from an ideological point of view, there was a definite "softening" for 
tactical purposes, and the tactics turned into policy. 
The first Begin government (1977-79), implemented what was universally but (in 
hindsight) mistakenly perceived as Begin's peace policy. 
Dayan who was once a stalwart and bastion of the Labour Alignment but had been 
relegated to political wilderness following the October war, agreed to join the Likud 
led coalition as Foreign Minister on condition that no sovereignty would be imposed 
over the Occupied Territories while peace negotiation were in progress. 
To be sure, Begin was not in a comfortable position when he accepted Dayan's 
condition. His world view and ideology were clear; his style was often close to that of 
the messianic trend. But he also brought with him a Jabotinskyan political heritage 
and unequivocally refused to define his movement as a messianic one. 
After the arrival of Sadat to Jerusalem, Begin came to Egypt with two projects the 
first was on withdrawal from Sinai and the second was on autonomy for the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. 
In fact, from Begin's point of view any agreement over "administrative 
autonomy" (not only cultural autonomy) for Arabs of the West Bank was merely a 
document of tactical nature. Even it included elements from the liberal formulations 
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of Jabotinsky (which had also been of tactical nature at the time) Begin's basic 
intention in his formula of autonomy was to extricate himself temporarily from the 
bonds of ideology so that he could implement his political approach. 
Although Sadat disagreed with Begin on several crucial issues related to the 
Occupied Territories, his readiness to risk everything for peace and Begin's 
willingness to trade the Sinai for the West Bank, along with growing US pressure on 
Israel for peace led to the signing of the Camp David Accord. There was two parts to 
the Camp David Accord. The first called for the implementation of an autonomy plan 
for the West Bank and Gaza Strip to be followed after five years by a permanent 
settlement status. The second was a framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty 
between Israel and Egypt, which was to be the base for the complete withdrawal of 
Israel from Sinai. 
The Accord however, did not mention the PLO all through its text. The 
Framework did not address itself to two other important segments of the Palestinians 
problem, the status of Jerusalem and the Refugee question, since the Palestinians did 
not include only the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In fact there was no 
structural linkage between the two agreements concluded at Camp David. Egypt and 
Israel could conclude their peace agreement whether or not there was any progress in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moreover, following Camp David Begin maintained 
that he had achieved his main goal: the continuation of Israel's control over the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip and the prevention of a Palestinian state in these territories. 
Begin pointed out that Israel's status in the area was for the first time, internationally 
recognized. He presented Palestinian autonomy (under Israeli's rule) as an alternative 
to Palestinian independence, and although he admitted that Israel gave up the right to 
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unilateral annexation, he pointed out that in practical terms its position on the West 
Bank had not eroded. 
Begin's second phase started in 1980 and ended in 1983 when Begin resigned 
from the premiership. With the departure of Dayan and Weizmann there was no 
longer any serious opposition to Begin. With a new political elite emerging around 
him Sharon, Rafael, Arens and Shamir, constituted the most hawkish government in 
Israel's history. In addition the support of National Religious Party (NRP) radicals 
and sustained by the Eretz Yisrael true believers in the Renaissance Party the position 
of the government was to the far right. The Israeli policy towards Arabs and 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories became increasing dogmatic, aggressive and 
single mined. 
The second Likud government carried out the most hawkish policy towards its 
neighbor. Israel bombed the Tamuz II Iraqi reactor and in July 1981. A year later 
Israel invaded Lebanon. 
Begin himself controlled the entire decision making process. He was not only the 
ideologue of the invasion but also its executioner. 
During Begin era the process of building settlements in the West Bank including 
East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip reached unprecedented level. The government did 
everything possible to erase "the green line" and place Jewish settlements where they 
would obstruct any future attempts to divide the West Bank into separate Jewish and 
Arab enclaves. 
Likud's Sharon plan pursued the objective of building a third belt of settlement on 
the Western highland extending from Jenin to the north and Bethlehem to the south 
effectively bisecting the high land of the West Bank. In fact Sharon plan intended to 
divide the populated West Bank into two small areas. The containment of the 
Palestinians would be facilitated by enclosing them from all sides by belts of colonies 
which would eliminate physically any chances of a return to the 1967 borders. It also 
moved Israeli border to the doorstep of the Palestinian populated areas with the 
intention of preventing their physical development to the west. 
The World Zionist Organization and Likud government produced the Droble plan 
which added another bloc of settlement surround the northern town of Jenin and 
around the town of Jericho to prevent even a small corridor connecting Palestinians 
with East Jordan. 
During the last few year of Begin's rule, the Likud pursued economic rather than 
purely ideological policies in an effort to prevent a territorial compromise in the West 
Bank. Likud attempted to use the centrifugal pulls in both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem 
metropolitan area as a vehicle for channeling Israeli population into the West Bank. 
The Likud settlement strategist believed that by using the natural demand for land in 
central Israel, they would be quickly able to form a critical mass of population, a 
sufficiently large number of people to prevent any effective internal or international 
pressure for withdrawal. Previously, only the ideologically motivated volunteered for 
the settlements but gradually ordinary families moved to the West Bank because 
housing was cheaper and the settlements were near enough to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv 
to serve as commuter suburbs. 
Likud under Begin also used tactics for land grabbing like declaring it to be 
abandoned. They believed that the Palestinian did not have strong ties to their land. 
Many of them had abandoned or were willing to abandon their property if offered 
property elsewhere in the Arab world. Likud also changed the style of land 
purchasing. For many years the purchasing of land was carried out by the government 
under Labour party for national goals supported by a solid public consensus. Likud 
party lifted the ban on private land purchasing by Jews on the West Bank. By the free 
private purchasing a rush of land speculation began and land values went up, so some 
Arab could not resist the temptation to sell. Due to the new land policy during Begin 
era Israel came to control about 42 percent of the land on the West Bank and 31 
percent in the Gaza Strip. 
Following the sudden and dramatic resignation of Menachem Begin, Yitzhak 
Shamir became Prime Minister in October 1983. The new government was more 
hard-line than the former government. Shamir used to be a member of Betar, and 
joined Irgun Zvai Leumi in Palestine. But later on he broke with the Irgun and formed 
a new group which became know as the Stem Gang or Lehi. After the establishment 
of Israeli State Shamir joined the Mossad and held a senor position in the Agency. In 
1970, he joined the Herut party and was elected to its executive committee. He served 
in the eight Knesset and continued to serve until the thirteen Knesset. Shamir was 
chosen to replace Begin as a Prime Minister, because he was seen as having emerged 
from the same ideological milieu as Begin. However he did not espouse Jabotinsky's 
liberalism. He was known instead for his caution and his secrecy, a political shadow 
boxer whose skills were developed in Lehi and in the Mossad. Ironically, he was 
proclaimed party leader beneath the portrait of Jabotinsky whom he had disowned 
nearly half a century before. 
Under Shamir the Israeli government pursued policies aimed at undermining the 
material and national existence of the Palestinians in their own land. Under the guise 
of maintaining its own security Israeli government confiscated Arab land and 
launched an aggressive settlement policy which left the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
fragmented both geographically and demographically. Shamir's "iron fist" policies 
resulted in loss of life, imprisonment, detention, house or town arrest, house 
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demolition, deportation, fines interrogation, travel restriction, curfews, closured of 
educational institutions, unjust taxes, economic hardship and the like. 
The harsh Israeli occupation policies entered a collision course with the 
heightened state of national and political awareness among the Palestinians. Deep 
anger and frustration among the Palestinians finally led to an uprising popularly 
known as Intifada. 
The Intifada started in Gaza Strip and soon spread to the West Bank. The Intifada 
had probably begun more as a spontaneous expression of accumulated frustration of 
uventy years of occupation, degrading living conditions, overcrowding and declining 
opportunities in education and employment than as politically co-coordinated 
demonstration against Israeli occupation. However it was soon being exploited and 
orchestrated by an underground leadership, the United National Leadership of the 
Uprising (UNLU) comprising elements from the PLO, the Communist Party and 
Islamic Jihad. Finally Hamas was formed by Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and his company 
to support the Intifada. 
The emergence of Hamas added a new dimension to Palestinian politics. The new 
organization was not willing to subsume itself within the framework of the PLO. 
Obviously during the first period of Intifada, Hamas activity was characterized by 
reaction to the immediate situation rather than the initiation of anti-occupation 
policies and attempts at a national leadership role. Indeed, Hamas's primary aim was 
to establish an Islamic state in the Occupied Territories whose liberation was to be 
achieved by holy war. 
Likud government had relied on a combination of political, economic and military 
measures to quell the Intifada. It sought to identify the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
leaders who might be willing to ignore the PLO and negotiate with Israel. 7'he spread 
of Intifada exposed the Israeli armed civilian population. The Likud policies also 
graduated downward to include economic sabotage of a direct or indirect nature such 
as crop burning and uprooting of trees, prolonged siege of villages, the explicit 
prohibition of harvesting and marketing. Many of Palestinians saw their business 
sealed and their property confiscated. Even street vendors and vegetable market 
operators suffered the loss of their products as soldiers often dumped market stalls 
and cmshed their produce. 
Under the National Unity government the Likud party forced the Labour party to 
adapt itself to the realities which was created by Likud government in the past. 
However, Labour opposed any additional settlement outside of the security zones and 
regarded most of the settlement set up by Likud during 1977-84 as worthless from 
defense perspective. By March 1988 Israel had direct control of more than 50% of 
land in the West Bank. There were already about 140 Jewish settlements in the 
Occupied Territories, housing about 140,000 people and more were planned. 
Palestinian everywhere in the Occupied Territories was being surrounded by 
aggressive Jewish settlements which harassed and intimidated them. It seemed that 
there was an Israeli master plan to deprive them of their land and home. 
In the mid 1990s, the wave of immigration from Soviet Union turned out to be 
blessing for Israel's economy. The Shamir government requested the US to grant it 10 
million dollars worth of loan guarantees. The US government conditioned the 
guarantees on Israel's stopping all Jewish settlement activities in the Occupied 
Territories. The Shamir Govenmient however, refused to do as the US government 
conditioned. On 20 March 1991 a US State Department report to congress, had stated 
that out of an estimated 185,000 Soviet Jews who had arrived in Israel in 1990, 
approximately 4 percent had settled in the Occupied Territories. Further more in early 
October 1991 the US export import Bank criticized the structure of Israeli economy 
and cast doubt on its ability to repay debts if it continued on its current cause. 
During Shamir's early period, the PLO seemed to have largely lost the ability to 
wage an armed struggle against Israel through its borders due to the loss of the base in 
Lebanon and expulsion of the PLO's head quarters from Beirut. By 1985 the center of 
Palestinians activism had clearly moved into the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There 
were increasing numbers of individual violent attack of Palestinians against Israeli 
Jews. The growing politicization and mobilization of the Palestinian public through 
grass-root movement and PLO based institution and the rise of new young local 
leadership which had matured in the Israeli jails, all gradually changed the nature of 
the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories from acquiescent to rebellions. 
In this situation, security concern played a major role in determining the type of 
final arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Shamir government 
employed many policies and practices in the Occupied Territories for security reasons 
such has the strong-arm policy, Shin Bet Agency, Iron fist policy, the policy of 
preventive detention the policy of demolition of house and policy of beating and 
policy of maltreatment. Shamir's government had to deal with rising Shiite terrorism 
in Lebanon and fundamentalist Islamic militarism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
The PLO also began to shift more of its attentions toward the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip as the backbone of its legitimacy. Since the outback of the Intifiada in December 
1987 and especially since the 1991 Gulf War the PLO leadership has increasingly 
turned its attention to the Occupied Territories at the expense of Diaspora Palestinians 
including those residing in neighboring refugee camps. Contrary to Shamir's 
perception of the facts the IDF was unable to properly handle the Intifada and scored 
only limited success in Lebanon. 
Under the premiership of Shamir official Israeli policy regarding a West Asian 
peace remained divided, Shamir opposed the concept of international peace 
conference involving the five permanent members of the Security Council and instead 
proposed direct negotiation between Israel, Egypt the USA, and a joint Jordanian-
Palestinians delegation excluding PLO. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the subsequent entry of US 
forces into Saudi Arabia had a massive impact on the regions politics, causing 
alliances to shift and crumble. During August two distinct blocs had emerged. One 
included Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt at the core of a group fully committed to 
securing Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. A pro-Iraqi bloc included the 
PLO, Jordan, Yemen and Algeria. Saddam Hussain sought to legitimize his predatory 
move by portraying it as a noble attempt to promote the liberation of Palestine from 
Zionist occupation. While the falsehood or dishonesty of this linkage was eminently 
transparent, the widespread emotional outburst it aroused underscored the 
explosiveness of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The PLO frankly announced support 
for Saddam's stand and his theory of linkage. Either in response to strong pro-Saddam 
sentiments among Palestinians in Jordan and the Occupied Territories or due to 
frustration with Israel's indifference the PLO hedged its bet on siding with Iraq. This 
was manifested by assiduous attempts to deftise the crisis on Saddam's terms-such as 
the dethronement of the Kuwaiti royal family and the complete satellization of 
Kuwait-something that was anathema to all Gulf regimes. When these efforts failed to 
produce results and the spectre of war loomed large, Arafat threw in his lot with 
Saddam. Should war break out, he told a frenzy audience in Baghdad, a week before 
the actual outbreak of hostilities, the Palestinians would be in the same trench with the 
O0f \ 
Iraqi people to confront the US-Zionist-Atlantic build up of invading forces. Thus 
mistake of riding with Iraq cost the PLO dearly. 
Soon after the Gulf War and the defeat of Iraq, President Bush stressed in a 
major speech to a joint session of the congress that he regarded the drive for a 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as one of his administrations top priorities in 
the post war era. The regional realignment during the Gulf War, he contended had 
meant Arab states and Israel standing together against a common aggressor Iraq. This 
he said had brought the prospect of peace in the area closer than ever before. In early 
June 1991 President Bush work utters to a number of West Asian leader in an attempt 
to advance moves towards the convening of a peace conference. Those receiving 
letter included the Israeli Prime Ministers, Egyptian and Syrian Presidents and the 
Jordanian and monarchs. As for the Palestinians, US Secretary of State, James Baker, 
from the begiiming told West Bank leader that the PLO must be excluded from any 
talks, but that Palestinians linked to the PLO and from East Jerusalem might be port 
of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The PLO weakened by its stance during 
the Gulf War, had no option but to support the American peace efforts Arafat agreed 
the remain aloof from talks so long as Palestinians from within and without the 
territories were permitted to represent Palestinian interests. 
The first phase of the West Asian peace conference was held in Madrid from 31 
October 1991 with the following in attendance: Israel, a joint Palestinian-Jordanian 
delegation Syria and Lebanon. The process embarked on would consist of a series of 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the aim of achieving peace treaties 
between Arab parties and Israel. From October 1991 to August 1993 Israel and the 
Palestinians (under Jordanian umbrella) engaged in eleven sessions of negotiations. 
Between Israel and other Arab states nine rounds of talks took place before being pre-
empted by rounds of talks took place before being pre-empted by the Oslo Accord of 
September 1993. 
Shamir decide to go to Madrid at the end of 1991 because of his belief that 
conditions were mach more favorable to Israel following the Gulf War. He felt that he 
could stonewall and prevaricate as he had done before and like Begin, render those 
areas of the peace process that did not accord with the Likud's position totally 
meaningless. The Israeli far right responded to Madrid conference by announcing that 
more settlements would be built and a large budget drawn up for the purpose. They 
proved the point by immediately establishing the new settlement in Golan Height. 
It was therefore, no surprise that the talks produced little discernible progress. The 
Palestinian and Israelis remained for apart. The Palestinians with PLO approved led 
agreed to interim stages for deciding the gate of the Occupied Territories, as stated in 
Camp David, but insisted that self-determination, meaning a Palestinian state, should 
be the final outcome. The Shamir government adhered to its position of autonomous 
for the Palestinian people but continued Israeli control of the land and all major 
functions including security and foreign affairs. Shamir's intent as he admitted after 
leaving office on June 1992 was to drag out talks or Palestinian self rule for the years 
while attempting to settle hundreds of thousands of Jews in the Occupied Territories, 
thereby creating the appearance of accommodation while working to ensure Israeli 
retention of the territories. The rigidity of these stances caused increasing despair 
among the Palestinian in the territories and intensified violence after promoted by 
Hamas. Shamir's bellicosity ultimately led to the defeat of the Likud in the 
parliamentary elections of June 1992. In those elections labor won the mandate with 
Yitzhak Robin as Prime Minister and Shimon Peres as foreign minister. The coalition 
included representatives of parties on the Left that supported peace and territorial 
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compromise more openly than Labour, analogous to the rightist factions that 
collaborated with Shamir and Likud but were even more militant. With Labour 
victory came out the Oslo accord of 1993 when laid the foundations of 
accommodation and compromise between the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
During 14 years of Likud party's rule, starting with Begin's accumulation of anti-
Labour fragment which had allowed him to build the Likud and attain power in the 
election of 1977, a reverse process of unraveling and fragmentation started under his 
less charismatic and less imaginative successor Yitzhak Shamir who had the 
additional disadvantage of having to cope with a motivated powerful far right. The 
Likud era ended with the heavy defeat of Likud party in the 1992 elections. 
The Likud party under both Begin and Shamir was the radical testimony of their 
generation. They had an emotional standard of confrontational political lives. A 
strange symbiosis of radicalism and pragmatism allowed them to govern and this also 
ultimately proved to be their undoing. 
The defeat of Likud in 1992 elections meant the majority of Israelis determined 
that this world of Revisionist zealotry had its day and that it should fade into history. 
The Irgun and Lehi belonged to the mythology of the past. For Likud it's was the 
right time to reconsider the reality of today and the party's policies toward the 
Occupied Territories and the neighboring countries. The signing of the Oslo Accord 
with the PLO by Yitzhak Rabin in 1993 was a reflection of the changing tapestry of 
Israeli and Palestinian politics. The ideological struggle to retain Erotic Israel and its 
entirety lost all its meaning when Israel took the first hesitant step to recognize the 
PLO in 1993. For the Palestinian this change an Israeli attitude was the first faltering 
step towards the achievement of their long cherished dream of an independent state in 
the region. 
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MAP - 23 
Land ownership of Arabs and Jews in 1948 
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MAP 24 
Landownership in Palestine and 
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Palestinian Villages Depopulated in 1948 
and 1967. and Razed by Israel 
[ 1 .•«*vva>w<otowo i H ^ 
1 1 • •.• * »•«•.« Hf i i — i»w 
g ^ - "Hi»^ 1967 yio r u M »v 
j '^. .Vvdfl;>-» .ndGjJl 5lr<i 
4*--'j?j' 
>;.:•!?; 
-1 Haite^ , • \ 
Id *' •• Ar** • *. •» .'! /fj-^. ••• *:• •- ••.^ •H' PASsiAfUbhlMM^ i f *.*• • • * . » ' 
^.: i 
Niblu* 1 
:•: • 1 
T«I AVIV ,% • I 
Jaffa ' l . . ^ ' . : / 
• ••• ; 
• •'••••'?k. / •. ' y . ! t / • •* V 
• • • • • • • • 1 1 
Gaza V. • . • / 
/ / ' ! 
/ \ ./' * • • • fieersheba / / ^ 
Patostinian Academic Society for tho Stuily of International Affairs 
(PASSIA) 
307 
MAP - 25 
Mediterranean Sea 
) JORDAN 
EGYPT 
50 Kn 
Figure 1.2 The Jordan Basin (reproduced, witli permission, from J.A. All;in 
|cd.l, IViiin: Pence and the Middle Emn |1996], covincsy l.B.Tauris Puhlis'r.crs) 
^08 
MAP - 26 
Israeli SettlemenU in the West Bank, October 1986 
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MAP - 27 
ISRAELI DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST JERUSALEM 
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MAP - 28 
Israeli Settlements in the Gaza Strip, Februftify;4<9A2i 
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MAP-29 
Israeli Settlements in the West Bank, December 1993 
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APPENDIX-1 
Letter by Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild (The Balfour Declaration) 
Foreign Office 
November 2"^ 1917 
Dear Lord Rothschild, 
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's 
Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations 
which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. 
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of 
a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate 
the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done 
which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities 
in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country". 
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the 
Zionist Federation. 
Yours Sincerely, 
Arthur James Balfour 
Source: (http://www.mideastweb.org/strategy.htmn 
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Appendix-2 
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 181 
(Partition Plan of Palestine) 
Summary: 
To solve the problem of the future of Palestine which was under British 
mandate, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided in its Resolution 181 
of 29 November 1947 to divide the territory of Palestine as follows: 
• A Jewish State covering 56.47% of Mandatory Palestine (excluding 
Jerusalem) with a population of 498,000 Jews and 325,000 Arabs; 
• An Arab State covering 43.53% of Palestine, with 807,000 Arab inhabitants 
and 10,000 Jewish inhabitants; 
• The International trusteeship regime in Jerusalem, where the population was 
100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs. 
The partition plan also laid down: 
• The guarantee of the rights of minorities and religious rights, including free 
access to and the preservation of Holy Places; 
• The constitution of an Economic Union between the two states: custom union, 
joint monetary system, joint administration of main services, equal access to 
water and energy resources... 
The General Assembly also planned: 
• A two month interim period beginning August 1, 1948, date of expiry of the 
mandate when the British troops were to be evacuated, with a zone including a 
port to be evacuated in the territory of the Jewish State by 1^ ' February. 
• A five-coimtry Commission (Bolivia, Denmark, Panama, Philippines, 
Czechoslovakia) in charge of the administration of the regions evacuated by 
Great Britain, of establishing the frontiers of the two states and of setting up in 
each of them a Provisional Council of Government; the gradual take-over of 
the administration by the Provisional Council of Government in both States, 
and the organization a democratic elections for a Constituent Assembly within 
two months. 
Full text of Resolution 181: 
'•Recommending a Partition Plan for Palestine: 
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The General Assembly, 
Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory power to 
constitute and instruct a Special Committee to prepare for the consideration of the 
question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session; 
Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all 
questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for 
the solution of the problem, and 
Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document 
A/364) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition 
with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Conmiittee, 
Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair 
the general welfare and friendly relations among nations; 
Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory power that it plan to complete 
its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948; 
Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory power for Palestine, 
and to all other members of the United Nations the adaptation and implementing, with 
regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of partition with economic 
union set out below; 
Requests that: 
a. The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan 
for its implementation; 
b. The Security Coimcil consider, if circumstances during the transitional period 
require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a 
threat to peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain 
the international peace and security, the Security Coimcil should supplement 
the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures under articles 
39 and 41 of the charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as 
119 
provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are 
assigned to it by this resolution; 
c. The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or 
act of aggression, in accordance with article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to 
alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution; 
d. The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in 
this plan; 
Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary 
on their part to put this plan into effect; 
Appeals to all governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action 
which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and 
Authorizes the Secretary General to reimburse travel and subsistence 
appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the 
necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the 
Commission by the General Assembly. 
B. 
The General Assembly, 
Authorizes the Secretary General to draw from the working capital fund a sum not to 
exceed $2,000,000 for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on 
the fliture government of Palestine; 
Adopted by 33 votes in favor, 13 against and 10 abstentions. 
Source: Agency Europe (agency international d' information depuis 1953) 
File: A/UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (Partition Plan of Palestine), htm. 
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Appendix 3 
Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14,1948 
ERETZ-ISRAEL' was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, 
religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, 
created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world 
the eternal Book of Books. 
After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it 
throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to it 
and for the restoration in it of their political freedom. 
Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every 
successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland. In recent 
decades they returned in their masses. Pioneers, ma'pilim ' and defenders, they made 
deserts bloom, revived the Hebrew language, built villages and towns, and created a 
thriving community, controlling its own economy and culture, loving peace to but 
knowing how to defend itself, bringing the blessings of progress to all the country's 
inhabitants, and aspiring towards independent nationhood. 
In the year 5657 (1897) at the summons of the spiritual father of the Jewish 
State, Theodore Herzl, the First Zionist Congress convened and proclaimed the right 
of the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own country. 
This right was recognized in the Balfour Declaration of the 2"'' November, 
1917, and re-affirmed in the Mandate of the League of Nations which, in particular, 
gave international sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish people and 
Eretz-Israel and to the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its National Home. 
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The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people - the massacre of 
million of Jews in Europe- was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving 
the problem of its harmlessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, 
which would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the 
Jewish people the status of a fully-privileged member of the comity of nations. 
Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of 
the world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, restrictions 
and dangers, and never ceased to assert their right to a life of dignity, freedom and 
honest toil in their national homeland. 
In the Second World War, the Jewish community of this country contributed 
its full share to struggle of the freedom and peace-loving nations against the forces of 
Nazi wickedness and, by the blood of its soldiers and its war effort, gained the right to 
be reckoned among the peoples who founded the Untied Nations. 
On the 29 November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a 
resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Egrets-Israel; the General 
Assembly required the inhabitants of Egrets-Israel; the General Assembly required the 
inhabitants of Egrets-Israel to take such steps as were necessary on their part of the 
implementation of that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right 
of the Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable. 
This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own 
fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State. 
ACCORDINGLY WE, MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL, 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF ERETZ-ISRAEL AND 
OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT, ARE HERE ASSEMBLED ON THE DAY OF 
THE TERMINATION OF THE BRITISH MANDATE OVER ERE TZ-ISRAEL 
AND, BY VIRTUE OF OUR NATURAL AND HISTORIC RIGHT AND ON THE 
STRENGTH OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY, HEREBY DECLARE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH 
STATE IN ERETZ-ISRAEL, TO BE KNOWN AS THE STATE OF ISRAEL. 
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WE DECLARE that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the 
Mandate, being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6*^  lyar, 5708 (IS'^ May, 1948), until 
the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in accordance with the 
Constitution which shall be adopted by Elected Constituent Assembly not later than 
the 1*' October 1948, the People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, 
and its executive organ, the People's Administration, shall be Provisional Government 
of the Jewish State, to be called "Israel". 
THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish immigration and for the 
Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the coimtry for the benefit 
of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by 
the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights, to 
all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex: it will guaranteed freedom of 
religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy 
Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
THE STATE OF ISRAEL is prepared to cooperate with the agencies and 
representatives of the United Nations in implementing the resolution of the General 
Assembly of the 29'*' November, 1947, and will take steps to bring about the 
economic union of the whole of Eretz-Israel. 
WE APPEAL to the United Nations to assist the Jewish people in the building 
up of its State and to receive the State of Israel into the comity of nations. 
WE APPEAL - in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for 
months-to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate 
in the up building of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due 
representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions. 
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WE EXTEND our hand to all neighboring states and their peoples in an offer 
of peace and good neighbour lines, and appeal to them to establish bonds of 
cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land. 
The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement 
of the entire Middle East. 
WE APPEAL to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to rally round the 
Jews of Eretz-Israel in the tasks of immigration and up building and to stand by them 
in the great struggle for the realization of the age-old dream-the redemption of Israel. 
PLACING OUR TRUST IN THE ALMIGHTY, WE AFFIX OUR SIGNATURES TO THIS 
PROCLAMATION AT THIS SESSION OF THE PROVISIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE, 
ON THE SOIL OF THE HOMELAND, IN THE CITY OF TEL AVIV, ON THIS SABBATH 
EVE, THE 5™ DAY OF lYAR, 5708 (14™ MAY, 1948). 
David-Ben-Gurion 
Daniel Auster 
Mordekhai Bentov 
Yitzchak Ben Zvi 
Eliyahu Berligne 
Fritz Bernstein 
Rabbi Wolf Gold 
Meir Grabovsky 
Yitzchak Gruenbaum 
Dr. Abraham 
Granovsky 
Eliyahu Dobkin 
Meir Wilner-Kovner 
Zerach Wahrhaftig 
Herzl Vardi 
Rachel Cohen 
Rabbi Kalman 
Kahana 
Saadia Kobashi 
Rabbi Yitzchak 
Meir Levin 
Meir David 
Loewenstein 
Zvi Luria 
Golda Myerson 
Nachum Nir 
Zvi Segal 
Rabbi Yehuda Leib 
Hacohen Fishman 
David Zvi Pinkas 
Aharon Zisling 
Moshe kolodny 
Eliezer Kaplan 
Abraham Katznelson 
Felix Rosenblueth 
David Remez 
Berl Repetur 
Mordekhai Shattner 
Ben Zion Sternberg 
Bekhor Shitreet 
Moshe Shapira 
Moshe Shertok 
(1 )Eretz-Israel (Hebrew)the land of Israel, Palestine.(2)Ma'piiim; immigrant to Israel. 
(Source: John Norton Moore (ed). The Arab Israeli Conflict, Vol. Ill Documents, pp. 349-
51.) 
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Appendix - 4 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 November, 22,1967 
The Securit\' Council 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East. 
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the 
need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in 
security. 
Emphasizing further that all member states in their acceptance of the Charter 
of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with article 
2 of the charter, 
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of 
a just and lasting peace in the Middle east which should include the 
application of both the following principles: 
i. Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 
recent conflict; 
ii. Terminations of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for 
and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every state in the area and their right to 
live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from 
threats of acts of force; 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
a. For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international 
waterways in the area; 
b. For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
c. For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political 
independence of every state in the area, through measures, 
including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 
3. Requests the secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to 
proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the state 
concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a 
peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provision and 
principles in this resolution; 
4. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the 
progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. 
Source: Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East, T* ed., Washington D.C., p. 301. 
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Appendix - 5 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 
October 22, 1973 
In the later stages of the Yom Kippur War - after Israel repulsed the Syrian 
attack on the Golan Heights and established a bridgehead on the Egyptian side of 
the Suez Canal - international efforts to stop the fighting were intensified. US 
Secretary of State Kissinger flew to Moscow on October 20, and, together with 
the Soviet Government, the US proposed a ceasefire resolution in the UN Security 
Council. The Council met on 21 October at the urgent request of both the US and 
the USSR, and by 14 votes to none, adopted the following resolution: 
The Security Council, 
Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all 
military activit}' immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the 
adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy; 
Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 
Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations 
start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at 
establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. 
Source: Congressional Quarterly (1990:301), The Middle East 7* ed., Washington D.C. 
and http://www.mideastweb.org/338.htm. 
Appendix - 6 
The Camp David Accords 
The Framework for Peace in the Middle East 
Preamble 
The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following: 
The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its 
neighbours is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts... 
To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations 
Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbour prepared to negotiate 
peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the 
provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338. 
Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace v/ithin secure 
and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal 
can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East 
marked by co-operation in the promoting economic development, in maintaining 
stability and in assuring security. 
Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between 
nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, 
the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such 
as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence 
of international forces, liaisoii, agreed measures for monitoring and other 
arrangements that they agree are useful. 
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Framework 
Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, 
comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the 
conclusion of peace treaties based on 
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to 
achieve peace and good neighbourly relations. They recognize that for peace to 
endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. 
They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to 
constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel 
and each of its other neighbours which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on 
this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows: 
A. West Bank and Gaza 
I. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should 
participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its 
aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and 
Gaza should proceed in three stages: 
a. Egypt and Israel agreement in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer 
of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, 
there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a 
period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the 
inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its 
civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing 
authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace 
the existing military government, Jordan will be invited to join the 
negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should 
give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the 
inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the 
parties involved. 
b. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected 
self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of 
Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or 
other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate and 
agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-
governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A 
withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a 
redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. 
The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring international and 
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external security and public order. A strong local police force will be 
established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and 
Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the managing of 
control posts to assure the security of the borders. 
c. When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank 
and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years 
will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the 
beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine 
the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its 
neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the 
end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the 
West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, 
one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will 
negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its 
relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of 
representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the 
elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to 
negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the 
agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The 
negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN 
Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other 
matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security 
arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the 
legitimate right of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this 
way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future 
through. 
1. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the 
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West 
Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period. 
2. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the 
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. 
3. Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and 
Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of 
their agreement. 
4. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace 
treaty between Israel and Jordan. 
All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of 
Israel and its neighbours during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in 
providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-
governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. 
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The police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated 
Israeli, Jordan, and Egyptian officers. 
During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the 
self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by 
agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank 
and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and 
disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee. 
Eg\"pt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to 
establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the 
resolution of the refugee problem. 
Egypt-Israel 
1. Egypt-Israel undertaking not to resort to thereat or the use of force to settle 
disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter. 
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good 
faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of the 
Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties to the 
conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties 
with a \iew to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for 
the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace 
negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the 
timetable for the implementation of their obligations imder the treaty. 
C. Associated Principles 
1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below 
should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbours-Egypt, 
Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. 
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationship normal to states at 
peace with one another. To this end, they should imdertake to abide by all the 
provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include: 
a. full recognition; 
b. abolishing economy boycotts; 
c. guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other 
parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law. 
330 
Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the 
context to final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of 
peace, co-operation and friendship, which is their common goal. 
Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all 
financial claims. 
The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related 
to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the 
timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties. 
The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace 
treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members 
of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure 
respect or the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies and 
actions with the undertaking contained in the Framework. 
For the Government of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt: of Israel: 
Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat Menanchem Begin 
Witnessed by: 
Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America 
Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel 
Signed at White House on September, 17 1978 
In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in 
good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the using of this 
framework a peace treaty between them: 
It is agreed that: 
The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or 
locations to be mutually agreed. 
All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the 
dispute between Israel and Egypt. 
Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be 
implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed. 
The following matters are agreed between the parties: 
a. The full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized 
border between Egypt and mandated Palestine ; 
b. The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai; 
c. The use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and 
Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use 
only by all nations; 
d. The right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the 
Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to 
all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways 
to be open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of 
navigation and over flight; 
e. The construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with 
guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; 
f The stationing of military forces listed below. 
After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, 
normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full 
recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of 
economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and 
mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law. 
Interim Withdrawal 
Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, 
all Israeli forces will v^thdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to 
Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement. 
For the Government of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt: of Israel: 
Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat Menachem Begin 
Witnessed by: 
Jimmy Carter, 
President of the United States of America 
Source: The Middle East, /* ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1990), 
pp. 302-303 
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Appendix - 7 
The Madrid Peace Conference 
Following the 1991 Gulf War, US Secretary of State James Baker made eight 
trips to the Middle East in eight months. As a result of the shuttle diplomacy by James 
Baker, the United States invited Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians to 
enter into peace negotiations that were to be held in Madrid, Spain. The following 
contains the invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference that was held on October 30, 
1991. The invitation was jointly issued by the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Only the part of the invitation that highlights the commitment of the peace talks to 
United Nations Resolution 242 and 338 will be presented. 
Letter Of Invitation 
To Madrid Peace Conference 
(October 30, 1991) 
After extensive consuhations with Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians, the 
United States and the Soviet Union believe that an historic opportunity exists to 
advance the prospects for genuine peace throughout the region. The United States and 
the Soviet Union are prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and 
comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, 
between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this 
process is real peace. Toward that end, the president of the US and the president of the 
USSR invite you to a peace conference, which their countries will cosponsor, 
followed immediately by direct negotiations. The conference will be convened in 
Madrid on October 30,1991. 
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President Bush and President Gorbacl-iev request your acceptance of this 
invitation no later than 6 PM Washington time, October 23, 1991, in order to ensure 
proper organization and preparation of the conference... The European Community 
will be a participant in the conference, alongside the United States and the Soviet 
Union and will be represented by its presidency...the Soviet Union and will be 
represented by its presidency...the negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, 
will take place on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338... 
Yasser Arafat Accepts 
United Nations Resolutiosn 242 And 338 
Beginning with the Madrid peace conference, talk continued between Israel 
and the PLO. Eventually, these talks resulted in an agreement between Israel and the 
PLO termed the "Declaration of Principles" which was signed at the White House in 
Washington D.C. on September 13, 1993. In preparation for the signing of this 
agreement, Yasser Arafat sent a letter to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
acknowledging Israel's right to exist while reaffirming that peace negotiations would 
be based upon United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338. The letter from Yasser Arafat 
to Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin is given below. Following Arafat's letter to Rabin 
is Prime Minister Rabin's reply to PLO leader Yasser Arafat. 
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Letter From Yasser Arafat To Prime Minister Rabin 
September 9, 1993 
Yitzhak Rabin 
Prime Minister of Israel 
Mr. Prime Minster, 
The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of 
the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following 
PLO Commitments: 
The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and 
security. 
The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 
The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding 
issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.. 
In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338, the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny 
Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with 
the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, 
the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal appro\al 
the necessary changes in the Palestinian Covenant. 
Sincerely, 
Yasser Arafat 
Chairman 
The Palestine Liberation Organization 
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Letter From Prime Minister Rabin To Yasser Arafat 
September 9, 1993 
Yasser Arafat 
Chairman 
The Palestinian Liberation Organization 
Mr. Chairman, 
In response to your letter of September 9, 1993,1 wish to confirm to you that, 
in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has 
decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and 
commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process. 
Yitzhak Rabin 
Prime Minister of Israel 
Source: http.7/\\^ vAv.liebroots.com/2housesch9.html 
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